635 resultados para Cairo
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Mode of access: Internet.
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Mode of access: Internet.
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Mode of access: Internet.
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Incluye como anexo el Consenso de Montevideo sobre Población y Desarrollo
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Includes as annex the Montevideo Consensus on Population and Development
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Mapa de ubicación de amenazas naturales, con el objetivo de apoyar el proceso de prevención contra desastres naturales en el nivel local.
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Developing an effective impact evaluation framework, managing and conducting rigorous impact evaluations, and developing a strong research and evaluation culture within development communication organisations presents many challenges. This is especially so when both the community and organisational context is continually changing and the outcomes of programs are complex and difficult to clearly identify.----- This paper presents a case study from a research project being conducted from 2007-2010 that aims to address these challenges and issues, entitled Assessing Communication for Social Change: A New Agenda in Impact Assessment. Building on previous development communication projects which used ethnographic action research, this project is developing, trailing and rigorously evaluating a participatory impact assessment methodology for assessing the social change impacts of community radio programs in Nepal. This project is a collaboration between Equal Access – Nepal (EAN), Equal Access – International, local stakeholders and listeners, a network of trained community researchers, and a research team from two Australian universities. A key element of the project is the establishment of an organisational culture within EAN that values and supports the impact assessment process being developed, which is based on continuous action learning and improvement. The paper describes the situation related to monitoring and evaluation (M&E) and impact assessment before the project began, in which EAN was often reliant on time-bound studies and ‘success stories’ derived from listener letters and feedback. We then outline the various strategies used in an effort to develop stronger and more effective impact assessment and M&E systems, and the gradual changes that have occurred to date. These changes include a greater understanding of the value of adopting a participatory, holistic, evidence-based approach to impact assessment. We also critically review the many challenges experienced in this process, including:----- • Tension between the pressure from donors to ‘prove’ impacts and the adoption of a bottom-up, participatory approach based on ‘improving’ programs in ways that meet community needs and aspirations.----- • Resistance from the content teams to changing their existing M&E practices and to the perceived complexity of the approach.----- • Lack of meaningful connection between the M&E and content teams.----- • Human resource problems and lack of capacity in analysing qualitative data and reporting results.----- • The contextual challenges, including extreme poverty, wide cultural and linguistic diversity, poor transport and communications infrastructure, and political instability.----- • A general lack of acceptance of the importance of evaluation within Nepal due to accepting everything as fate or ‘natural’ rather than requiring investigation into a problem.
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The application of object-based approaches to the problem of extracting vegetation information from images requires accurate delineation of individual tree crowns. This paper presents an automated method for individual tree crown detection and delineation by applying a simplified PCNN model in spectral feature space followed by post-processing using morphological reconstruction. The algorithm was tested on high resolution multi-spectral aerial images and the results are compared with two existing image segmentation algorithms. The results demonstrate that our algorithm outperforms the other two solutions with the average accuracy of 81.8%.
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The adoption of IT Governance (ITG) continues to be an important topic for research. Many researchers have focused their attention on how these practices are currently being implemented in the many diverse areas and industries. Literature shows that a majority of these studies have only been based on industries and organizations in developed countries. There exist very few researches that look specifically within the context of a developing country. Furthermore, there seems to be a lack of research on identifying the barriers or inhibitors to IT Governance adoption within the context of an emerging yet still developing Asian country. This research sets out to justify, substantiate and improve on a priori model developed to study the barriers to the adoption of ITG practice using qualitative data obtained through a series of semi-structured interviews conducted on organizations in Malaysia.
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Increasing use of computerized systems in our daily lives creates new adversarial opportunities for which complex mechanisms are exploited to mend the rapid development of new attacks. Behavioral Biometrics appear as one of the promising response to these attacks. But it is a relatively new research area, specific frameworks for evaluation and development of behavioral biometrics solutions could not be found yet. In this paper we present a conception of a generic framework and runtime environment which will enable researchers to develop, evaluate and compare their behavioral biometrics solutions with repeatable experiments under the same conditions with the same data.
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Basing signature schemes on strong lattice problems has been a long standing open issue. Today, two families of lattice-based signature schemes are known: the ones based on the hash-and-sign construction of Gentry et al.; and Lyubashevsky’s schemes, which are based on the Fiat-Shamir framework. In this paper we show for the first time how to adapt the schemes of Lyubashevsky to the ring signature setting. In particular we transform the scheme of ASIACRYPT 2009 into a ring signature scheme that provides strong properties of security under the random oracle model. Anonymity is ensured in the sense that signatures of different users are within negligible statistical distance even under full key exposure. In fact, the scheme satisfies a notion which is stronger than the classical full key exposure setting as even if the keypair of the signing user is adversarially chosen, the statistical distance between signatures of different users remains negligible. Considering unforgeability, the best lattice-based ring signature schemes provide either unforgeability against arbitrary chosen subring attacks or insider corruption in log-sized rings. In this paper we present two variants of our scheme. In the basic one, unforgeability is ensured in those two settings. Increasing signature and key sizes by a factor k (typically 80 − 100), we provide a variant in which unforgeability is ensured against insider corruption attacks for arbitrary rings. The technique used is pretty general and can be adapted to other existing schemes.
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This study analyses British military planning and actions during the Suez Crisis in 1956. It seeks to find military reasons for the change of concepts during the planning and compares these reasons with the tactical doctrines of the time. The thesis takes extensive advantage of military documents preserved in the National Archives, London. In order to expand the understanding of the exchange of views during the planning process, the private papers of high ranking military officials have also been consulted. French military documents preserved in the Service Historique de la Defence, Paris, have provided an important point of comparison. The Suez Crisis caught the British armed forces in the middle of a transition phase. The main objective of the armed forces was to establish a credible deterrence against the Soviet Union. However, due to overseas commitments the Middle East playing a paramount role because of its economic importance the armed forces were compelled to also prepare for Limited War and the Cold War. The armed forces were not fully prepared to meet this demand. The Middle Eastern garrison was being re-organised after the withdrawal from the Canal Base and the concept for a strategic reserve was unimplemented. The tactical doctrines of the time were based on experiences from the Second World War. As a result, the British view of amphibious operations and the subsequent campaigns emphasised careful planning, mastery of the sea and the air, sufficient superiority in numbers and firepower, centralised command and extensive administrative preparations. The British military had realized that Nasser could nationalise the Suez Canal and prepared an outline plan to meet this contingency. Although the plan was nothing more than a concept, it was accepted as a basis for further planning when the Canal was nationalised at the end of July. This plan was short-lived. The nominated Task Force Commanders shifted the landing site from Port Said to Alexandria because it enabled faster expansion of the bridgehead. In addition, further operations towards Cairo the hub of Nasser s power would be easier to conduct. The operational concept can be described as being traditional and was in accordance with the amphibious warfare doctrine. This plan was completely changed at the beginning of September. Apparently, General Charles Keightley, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee developed the idea of prolonged aerial operations. The essence of the concept was to break the Egyptian will to resist by attacking the oil facilities, the transportation system and the armed forces. This victory through air concept would be supported by carefully planned psychological operations. This concept was in accordance with the Royal Air Force doctrine, which promoted a bomber offensive against selected target categories. General Keightley s plan was accepted despite suspicions at every planning level. The Joint Planning Staff and the Task Force Commanders opposed the concept from the beginning to the end because of its unpredictability. There was no information that suggested the bombing would persuade the Egyptians to submit. This problem was worsened by the fact that British intelligence was unable to provide reliable strategic information. The Task Force Commanders, who were responsible for the tactical plans, were not able to change Keightley s mind, but the concept was expanded to include a traditional amphibious assault on Port Said due to their resistance. The bombing campaign was never tested as the Royal Air Force was denied authorisation to destroy the transportation and oil targets. The Chiefs of Staff and General Keightley were too slow to realise that the execution of the plan depended on the determination of the Prime Minister. However, poor health, a lack of American and domestic support and the indecisiveness of the military had ruined Eden s resolve. In the end, a very traditional amphibious assault, which was bound to succeed at the tactical level but fail at the strategic level, was launched against Port Said.