Patterns of cooperation, conflict, and domination in children's collaborative problem-solving

This study examined the influence of age, expertise, and task difficulty on children's patterns of collaboration. Six- and eight-year-old children were individually pretested for ability to copy a Lego model and then paired with each other and asked to copy two more models. The design was a 3 (dyad skill level: novice, expert, or mixed) X 2 (age: six or eight) X 2 (task difficulty: moderate or complex) factorial. Results indicated that cooperation increased with age and expertise and decreased with task difficulty. However, expertise had a greater influence on younger than older children's interaction styles. It is argued that with age, social skills may become as important as expertise in determining styles of collaboration. The issue is raised of whether cooperation, domination, and independence represent developmental sequences (i.e., independence precedes cooperation) or whether they represent personal styles of interaction. Finally, it is suggested that an important goal for future research is to assess the relationship between patterns of collaboration and learning.

Accuracy of a method based on atomic absorption spectrometry to determine inorganic arsenic in food : Outcome of the collaborative trial IMEP-41

Peer reviewed

Assessing the relative validity of the Scottish Collaborative Group Food Frequency Questionnaire for measuring dietary intake in adults

Peer reviewed

Ph.D. graduate student, Shelby Servais and REU, Julio Pachon conducted collaborative research in the wetland mesocosms during summer 2013.

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Three Essays on the Economics of Defense Contracting, Output and Income Inequality

This dissertation analyzes both the economics of the defense contracting process and the impact of total dollar obligations on the economies of U.S. states. Using various econometric techniques, I will estimate relationships across individual contracts, state level output, and income inequality. I will achieve this primarily through the use of a dataset on individual contract obligations. The first essay will catalog the distribution of contracts and isolate aspects of the process that contribute to contract dollar obligations. Accordingly, this study describes several characteristics about individual defense contracts, from 1966-2006: (i) the distribution of contract dollar obligations is extremely rightward skewed, (ii) contracts are unevenly distributed in a geographic sense across the United States, (iii) increased duration of a contract by 10 percent is associated with an increase in costs by 4 percent, (iv) competition does not seem to affect dollar obligations in a substantial way, (v) contract pre-payment financing increases the obligation of contracts from anywhere from 62 to 380 percent over non-financed contracts. The second essay will turn to an aggregate focus, and look the impact of defense spending on state economic output. The analysis in chapter two attempts to estimate the state level fiscal multiplier, deploying Difference-in-Differences estimation as an attempt to filter out potential endogeneity bias. Interstate variation in procurement spending facilitates utilization of a natural experiment scenario, focusing on the spike in relative spending in 1982. The state level relative multiplier estimate here is 1.19, and captures the short run, impact effect of the 1982 spending spike. Finally I will look at the relationship between defense contracting and income inequality. Military spending has typically been observed to have a negative relationship with income inequality. The third chapter examines the existence of this relationship, combining data on defense procurement with data on income inequality at the state level, in a longitudinal analysis across the United States. While the estimates do not suggest a significant relationship exists for the income share of the top ten percent of households, there is a significant positive relationship for the income share of top one percent households for an increase in defense procurement.