An Approach to the stability of international environmental agreements: the absorbing sets solution

We study international environmental negotiations when agreements between countries can not be binding. A problem with this kind of negotiations is that countries have incentives for free-riding from such agreements. We develope a notion of equilibrium based on the assumption that countries can create and dissolve agreements in their seeking of a larger welfare. This approach leads to a larger degree of cooperation compared to models based on the internal-external stability approach.

Another Look to the Price-Dividend Ratio: A Markov-Switching Approach

This paper analyzes the stationarity of this ratio in the context of a Markov-switching model à la Hamilton (1989) where an asymmetric speed of adjustment is introduced. This particular specification robustly supports a nonlinear reversion process and identifies two relevant episodes: the post-war period from the mid-50’s to the mid-70’s and the so called “90’s boom” period. A three-regime Markov-switching model displays the best regime identification and reveals that only the first part of the 90’s boom (1985-1995) and the post-war period are near-nonstationary states. Interestingly, the last part of the 90’s boom (1996-2000), characterized by a growing price-dividend ratio, is entirely attributed to a regime featuring a highly reverting process.