Innis Lecture: Can the Theory of Incentives Explain Decentralization?

This survey presents within a single model three theories of decentralization of decision-making within organizations based on private information and incentives. Renegotiation, collusion, and limits on communication are three sufficient conditions for decentralization to be optimal.

Efficiency in Uncertain Cooperative Games

A contingent contract in a transferable utility game under uncertainty specifies an outcome for each possible state. It is assumed that coalitions evaluate these contracts by considering the minimal possible excesses. A main question of the paper concerns the existence and characterization of efficient contracts. It is shown that they exist if and only if the set of possible coalitions contains a balanced subset. Moreover, a characterization of values that result in efficient contracts in the case of minimally balanced collections is provided.

Some Additional Specification Tests for Generalized Method of Moments Estimators with Macro-Economic Applications Part I : Theory

In This Paper Several Additional Gmm Specification Tests Are Studied. a First Test Is a Chow-Type Test for Structural Parameter Stability of Gmm Estimates. the Test Is Inspired by the Fact That \"Taste and Technology\" Parameters Are Uncovered. the Second Set of Specification Tests Are Var Encompassing Tests. It Is Assumed That the Dgp Has a Finite Var Representation. the Moment Restrictions Which Are Suggested by Economic Theory and Exploited in the Gmm Procedure Represent One Possible Characterization of the Dgp. the Var Is a Different But Compatible Characterization of the Same Dgp. the Idea of the Var Encompassing Tests Is to Compare Parameter Estimates of the Euler Conditions and Var Representations of the Dgp Obtained Separately with Parameter Estimates of the Euler Conditions and Var Representations Obtained Jointly. There Are Several Ways to Construct Joint Systems Which Are Discussed in the Paper. Several Applications Are Also Discussed.

Reported Job Satisfaction : What Does It Mean?

By reporting his satisfaction with his job or any other experience, an individual does not communicate the number of utils that he feels. Instead, he expresses his posterior preference over available alternatives conditional on acquired knowledge of the past. This new interpretation of reported job satisfaction restores the power of microeconomic theory without denying the essential role of discrepancies between one’s situation and available opportunities. Posterior human wealth discrepancies are found to be the best predictor of reported job satisfaction. Static models of relative utility and other subjective well-being assumptions are all unambiguously rejected by the data, as well as an \"economic\" model in which job satisfaction is a measure of posterior human wealth. The \"posterior choice\" model readily explains why so many people usually report themselves as happy or satisfied, why both younger and older age groups are insensitive to current earning discrepancies, and why the past weighs more heavily than the present and the future.