Hearing to review food aid and agriculture trade programs operated by the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the U.S. Agency for International Development : hearing before the Subcommittee on Specialty Crops, Rural Development, and Foreign Agriculture of the Committee on Agriculture, House of Representatives, One Hundred Tenth Congress, first session, May 10, 2007.

"Serial no. 110-21."

United States-Japan Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) : hearings before the Subcommittee on International Trade of the Committee on Finance, United States Senate, One Hundred First Congress, first session.

Item 1038-A, 1038-B (MF)

Fast-Track Authority and International Trade Negotiations

Fast Track Authority (FTA) is the institutional procedure in the Unites States whereby Congress grants to the President the power to negotiate international trade agreements. Under FTA, Congress can only approve or reject negotiated trade deals, with no possibility of amending them. In this paper, we examine the determinants of FTA voting decisions and the implications of this institutional procedure for trade negotiations. We describe a simple two-country trade model, in which industries are unevenly distributed across con- stituencies. In the foreign country, trade negotiating authority is delegated to the executive, while in the home country Congress can retain the power to amend trade agreements. We show that legislators’ FTA voting behavior depends on the trade policy interests of their own constituencies as well as those of the majority of Congress. Empirical analysis of the determinants of all FTA votes between 1974 (when fast track was first introduced) and 2002 (when it was last granted) provides strong support for the predictions of our model.

Tomorrow’s Silk Road: Assessing an EU-China Free Trade Agreement

The Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) is an independent policy research institute in Brussels. Its mission is to produce sound policy research leading to constructive solutions to the challenges facing Europe. The views expressed in this book are entirely those of the authors and should not be attributed to CEPS or any other institution with which they are associated or to the European Union. This book, commissioned by the Foreign Trade Association, aims to provide an independent and in-depth contribution on the status of bilateral economic exchanges and persistent trade barriers between the European Union and China. A second objective is to encourage a frank and open dialogue, based on a scientific evaluation and without prejudice, of the possibility of a preferential trade agreement between the two sides. The study was carried out by CEPS, in cooperation with the World Trade Institute at the University of Bern.

The Winnipeg principles, WTO and sustainable development: Proposed policies for reconciling trade and the environment

There is, a widespread belief that the WTO has made virtually no concessions to environmentalists about their concerns arising from free trade and the process of globalization. There are concerns that these processes may undermine prospects for sustainable development. Following, the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, the International Institute for Sustainable Development was established to advocate policies to support sustainable development within Canada and globally. In 1994, it proposed the Winnipeg Principles as. a means for reconciling international trade and development so as to: achieve sustainable development (ISD, 1994a,b). These seven principles are outlined in this article and assessed:. Although the International Institute for Sustainable Development had hoped: through these principles to influence the work programme of the Environment and Trade Committee of WTO, it seems to have little effect. Probably if these principles had been seriously considered by WTO, the serious social conflicts which emerged globally at the beginning of this century would have been avoided, and we would be in a better position to understand the complex links between trade, environment and sustainable development and adopt relevant policies. Copyright (C) 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment.

Brazil and the nuclear issues in the years of the Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva government (2003-2010)

The present article is an analysis of Brazilian nuclear diplomacy and of the international relevance of the national nuclear program adopted during the two Presidential terms of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. Particular attention will be given to the Brazilian position in the agreement on nuclear non-proliferation, to the role of mediation between Iran and the nuclear powers, and finally to the national ambitions concerning the industrial and military uses of the nuclear technologies.

Brazil's rise on the international scene: Brazil and the World

Since Cardoso and during Lula's Administration, the international order has undergone significant changes. These changes have allowed the Brazilian foreign policy to mitigate internal effects of an order established by others and, at the same time, to become an active participant in the formulation of the new order. To democratize globalization became the mainspring of Brazilian foreign policy. In the scope, President Lula has maintained the tradition of formulating and programming foreign policy as a State policy, and also has fostered the logistic strategy of incorporation of Brazil into the international scene.

Brazil's strategic partnerships: an assessment of the Lula era (2003-2010)

This article examines the priority bilateral relations of Brazil, named "strategic partnerships", both because of their tradition and historical relevance and due to the existence of political and economic cooperation projects. An assessment of these relationships, especially under Lula's administration, is made in this work, bearing in mind the concept of "strategic partnerships" and its development in Brazilian foreign policy. There will be considered partnerships with the US; Argentina; Japan; China; India; South Africa and the European Union. In the article, the meaning of the increase in these relationships is interpreted on the grounds of its significance to the international insertion strategy of Brazil

Brazil, China, US: a triangular relation?

This article is divided in three sections. The first one explores the so-called "strategic partnership" between Brazil and China. In the second section we shall examine how US-China relations in the global system could affect both Brazil-US, and Brazil-China bilateral relations. A final section presents some recommendations for Brazil strategic orientations regarding the current systemic transition in the allotment of global power.

Signalling in an international cournot model

We consider a trade policy model, where the costs of the home firm are private information but can be signaled through the output levels of the firm to a foreign competitor and a home policymaker. We study the influences of the non-homogeneity of the goods and of the uncertainty on the production costs of the home firm in the signalling strategies by the home firm. We show that some results obtained for homogeneous goods are not robust under non-homogeneity.

Brazil's global aspirations and their implications for the relationship with Argentina in the framework of MERCOSUR

Dissertação de mestrado em Relações Internacionais

Three Essays on the Formation and Impact of Economic Policy

Introduction In my thesis I argue that economic policy is all about economics and politics. Consequently, analysing and understanding economic policy ideally has at least two parts. The economics part, which is centered around the expected impact of a specific policy on the real economy both in terms of efficiency and equity. The insights of this part point into which direction the fine-tuning of economic policies should go. However, fine-tuning of economic policies will be most likely subject to political constraints. That is why, in the politics part, a much better understanding can be gained by taking into account how the incentives of politicians and special interest groups as well as the role played by different institutional features affect the formation of economic policies. The first part and chapter of my thesis concentrates on the efficiency-related impact of economic policies: how does corporate income taxation in general, and corporate income tax progressivity in specific, affect the creation of new firms? Reduced progressivity and flat-rate taxes are in vogue. By 2009, 22 countries are operating flat-rate income tax systems, as do 7 US states and 14 Swiss cantons (for corporate income only). Tax reform proposals in the spirit of the "flat tax" model typically aim to reduce three parameters: the average tax burden, the progressivity of the tax schedule, and the complexity of the tax code. In joint work, Marius Brülhart and I explore the implications of changes in these three parameters on entrepreneurial activity, measured by counts of firm births in a panel of Swiss municipalities. Our results show that lower average tax rates and reduced complexity of the tax code promote firm births. Controlling for these effects, reduced progressivity inhibits firm births. Our reading of these results is that tax progressivity has an insurance effect that facilitates entrepreneurial risk taking. The positive effects of lower tax levels and reduced complexity are estimated to be significantly stronger than the negative effect of reduced progressivity. To the extent that firm births reflect desirable entrepreneurial dynamism, it is not the flattening of tax schedules that is key to successful tax reforms, but the lowering of average tax burdens and the simplification of tax codes. Flatness per se is of secondary importance and even appears to be detrimental to firm births. The second part of my thesis, which corresponds to the second and third chapter, concentrates on how economic policies are formed. By the nature of the analysis, these two chapters draw on a broader literature than the first chapter. Both economists and political scientists have done extensive research on how economic policies are formed. Thereby, researchers in both disciplines have recognised the importance of special interest groups trying to influence policy-making through various channels. In general, economists base their analysis on a formal and microeconomically founded approach, while abstracting from institutional details. In contrast, political scientists' frameworks are generally richer in terms of institutional features but lack the theoretical rigour of economists' approaches. I start from the economist's point of view. However, I try to borrow as much as possible from the findings of political science to gain a better understanding of how economic policies are formed in reality. In the second chapter, I take a theoretical approach and focus on the institutional policy framework to explore how interactions between different political institutions affect the outcome of trade policy in presence of special interest groups' lobbying. Standard political economy theory treats the government as a single institutional actor which sets tariffs by trading off social welfare against contributions from special interest groups seeking industry-specific protection from imports. However, these models lack important (institutional) features of reality. That is why, in my model, I split up the government into a legislative and executive branch which can both be lobbied by special interest groups. Furthermore, the legislative has the option to delegate its trade policy authority to the executive. I allow the executive to compensate the legislative in exchange for delegation. Despite ample anecdotal evidence, bargaining over delegation of trade policy authority has not yet been formally modelled in the literature. I show that delegation has an impact on policy formation in that it leads to lower equilibrium tariffs compared to a standard model without delegation. I also show that delegation will only take place if the lobby is not strong enough to prevent it. Furthermore, the option to delegate increases the bargaining power of the legislative at the expense of the lobbies. Therefore, the findings of this model can shed a light on why the U.S. Congress often practices delegation to the executive. In the final chapter of my thesis, my coauthor, Antonio Fidalgo, and I take a narrower approach and focus on the individual politician level of policy-making to explore how connections to private firms and networks within parliament affect individual politicians' decision-making. Theories in the spirit of the model of the second chapter show how campaign contributions from lobbies to politicians can influence economic policies. There exists an abundant empirical literature that analyses ties between firms and politicians based on campaign contributions. However, the evidence on the impact of campaign contributions is mixed, at best. In our paper, we analyse an alternative channel of influence in the shape of personal connections between politicians and firms through board membership. We identify a direct effect of board membership on individual politicians' voting behaviour and an indirect leverage effect when politicians with board connections influence non-connected peers. We assess the importance of these two effects using a vote in the Swiss parliament on a government bailout of the national airline, Swissair, in 2001, which serves as a natural experiment. We find that both the direct effect of connections to firms and the indirect leverage effect had a strong and positive impact on the probability that a politician supported the government bailout.

The Quest for Regulating the Global Diamond Trade

Campaign efforts by NGOs initially put conflict diamonds on the global radar screen in the late 1990s. In response, the Kimberley Process (KP), a negotiation forum between states, NGOs, and industry, was formed to discuss possible solutions to curb the trade in conflict diamonds. Less than three years later, a voluntary, global certification named the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) was adopted. The KPCS regulates the trade of rough diamonds by certifying all legitimate diamonds. This paper outlines the problem of conflict diamonds, how a global campaign raised awareness about the issue, and how the process of solution building unfolded in the KP. My analysis focuses on the diverse set of actors (NGOs, states, and industry) and their changing interactions over the course of the campaign and global regulation efforts. I conclude with several key lessons that capture important elements observed in this case study.