Environmental Risks : Should Banks Be Liable?

This paper studies the impact of banks' liability for environmental damages caused by their borrowers. Laws or court decisions that declare banks liable for environmental damages have two objectives : (1) finding someone to pay for the damages and (2) exerting a pressure on a firm's stakeholders to incite them to invest in environmental risk prevention. We study the effect that such legal decisions can have on financing relationships and especially on the incentives to reduce environmental risk in an environment where banks cannot commit to refinance the firm in all circumstances. Following an environmental accident, liable banks more readily agree to refinance the firm. We then show that bank liability effectively makes refinancing more attractive to banks, therefore improving the firm's risk-sharing possibilities. Consequently, the firm's incentives to invest in environmental risk reduction are weakened compared to the (bank) no-liability case. We also show that, when banks are liable, the firm invests at the full-commitment optimal level of risk reduction investment. If there are some externalities such that some damages cannot be accounted for, the socially efficient level of investment is greater than the privately optimal one. in that case, making banks non-liable can be socially desirable.

Bootstrapping Autoregressions with Conditional Heteroskedasticity of Unknown Form

Conditional heteroskedasticity is an important feature of many macroeconomic and financial time series. Standard residual-based bootstrap procedures for dynamic regression models treat the regression error as i.i.d. These procedures are invalid in the presence of conditional heteroskedasticity. We establish the asymptotic validity of three easy-to-implement alternative bootstrap proposals for stationary autoregressive processes with m.d.s. errors subject to possible conditional heteroskedasticity of unknown form. These proposals are the fixed-design wild bootstrap, the recursive-design wild bootstrap and the pairwise bootstrap. In a simulation study all three procedures tend to be more accurate in small samples than the conventional large-sample approximation based on robust standard errors. In contrast, standard residual-based bootstrap methods for models with i.i.d. errors may be very inaccurate if the i.i.d. assumption is violated. We conclude that in many empirical applications the proposed robust bootstrap procedures should routinely replace conventional bootstrap procedures for autoregressions based on the i.i.d. error assumption.

Standardized Latin and Medieval Economic Growth

Traditional explanations for Western Europe's demographic growth in the High Middle Ages are unable to explain the rise in per-capita income that accompanied observed population changes. Here, we examine the hypothesis that an innovation in information technology changed the optimal structure of contracts and raised the productivity of human capital. We present historical evidence for this thesis, offer a theoretical explanation based on transaction costs, and test the theory's predictions with data on urban demographic growth. We find that the information-technology hypothesis significantly increases the capacity of the neoclassical growth model to explain European economic expansion between 1000 and 1300.

Environmental Risk: Should Banks Be Liable?

This paper studies the impact of banks' liability for environmental damages caused by their borrowers. Laws or court decisions that declare banks liable for environmental damages have two objectives : (1) finding someone to pay for the damages and (2) exerting a pressure on a firm's stakeholders to incite them to invest in environmental risk prevention. We study the effect that such legal decisions can have on financing relationships and especially on the incentives to reduce environmental risk in an environment where banks cannot commit to refinance the firm in all circumstances. Following an environmental accident, liable banks more readily agree to refinance the firm. We then show that bank liability effectively makes refinancing more attractive to banks, therefore improving the firm's risk-sharing possibilities. Consequently, the firm's incentives to invest in environmental risk reduction are weakened compared to the (bank) no-liability case. We also show that, when banks are liable, the firm invests at the full-commitment optimal level of risk reduction investment. If there are some externalities such that some damages cannot be accounted for, the socially efficient level of investment is greater than the privately optimal one. in that case, making banks non-liable can be socially desirable.

Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets in Matching Problems

The following properties of the core of a one well-known: (i) the core is non-empty; (ii) the core is a lattice; and (iii) the set of unmatched agents is identical for any two matchings belonging to the core. The literature on two-sided matching focuses almost exclusively on the core and studies extensively its properties. Our main result is the following characterization of (von Neumann-Morgenstern) stable sets in one-to-one matching problem only if it is a maximal set satisfying the following properties : (a) the core is a subset of the set; (b) the set is a lattice; (c) the set of unmatched agents is identical for any two matchings belonging to the set. Furthermore, a set is a stable set if it is the unique maximal set satisfying properties (a), (b) and (c). We also show that our main result does not extend from one-to-one matching problems to many-to-one matching problems.

Moral Hazard and Marshallian Inefficiency: Evidence from Tunisia.

In the presence of moral hazard, received agency theory predicts the Marshallian inefficiency of agricultural tenancy contracts, meaning that inputs per hectare on sharecropped land will differ from that on owned land. in this paper, we test for the presence of Marshallian inefficiency using a unique data set collected in the Tunisian village of El Oulja in 1993.

Les obligations du franchiseur : étude du droit civil et du guide d'Unidroit sur les accords internationaux de franchise principale

"Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de Maîtrise en droit (LL.M.)". Ce mémoire a été accepté à l'unanimité et classé parmi les 15% des mémoires de la discipline.

L'obligation de non-concurrence dans les sociétés de professionnels : vers une théorie de liberté de choix contractuelle

"Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de Maître en droit (LL.M.)"

Les investissements étrangers directs en Chine : vers un équilibre entre la protection des investisseurs et la protection du marché chinois

"Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de Maîtrise en droit, option droit commercial". Ce mémoire a été accepté à l'unanimité et classé parmi les 10% des mémoires de la discipline.

Le hardship : vers une reconnaissance du principe par les tribunaux arbitraux du commerce international

"Mémoire présenté à la faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de maîtrise, option droit des affaires (LL.M.)". Ce mémoire a été accepté à l'unanimité et classé parmi les 10% des mémoires de la discipline.