Genetic influences on long-term memory control : COMT and retrieval-induced forgetting

Magdeburg, Univ., Med. Fak., Diss., 2014

Magnetic control of flexoelectric domains in a nematic fluid

Aus: Soft matter, Vol. 10.2014, H. 25, S. 4487 - 4497

Design, modeling and control of an autonomous field robot for white asparagus harvesting

Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Maschinenbau, Diss., 2014

City Outdoor Lighting System Control. Problems and Prospects

This review describes current problems, trends and prospects of the quasi-automatic light control system. The lighting systems of million cities.

Serotonergic modulation of action monitoring and cognitive control

Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Naturwiss., Diss., 2015

Control and model-based analysis of microaerobic processes - using Rhodospirillum rubrum as model organism

Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Elektrotechnik und Informationstechnik, Diss., 2015

Optimal control of a Stefan problem with gradient-based methods in FEniCS

Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg, Fakultät für Mathematik, Masterarbeit, 2016

Evaluación de palaemonetes argentinus (Decapoda, Natantia) en el control biológico de larvas de Culex pipiens (Diptera, Culicidae) en condiciones de laboratorio

The predator-prey relationship of Palaemonetes argentinus Nobili, 1901 and Culex pipiens s.l. larvae was studied under laboratory conditions. The prawns were separated in two groups, isolated and grouped ones. Mosquitoe larvae were offered to prawns in two forms, limited and unlimited offer to both groups. In the first analysis, values of predation did not differ significantly between males and females of P. argentinus. Predation in 24 h was 14,9 ± 4,2 larvae/prawn. A reduction of predation was observed with unlimited offer for the same hour, during all the experiment. Predation with unlimited offer was higher on the first day than on the second, but returned to high values on the third day, for both groups. In the grouped experiment, predation with limited offer was total on the first days, decreasing to the last day. As a result, P. argentinus was considered an efficient predator of C. pipiens s.l. larvae under laboratory conditions.

In search of mathematical primitives for deriving universal projective hash families

We provide some guidelines for deriving new projective hash families of cryptographic interest. Our main building blocks are so called group action systems; we explore what properties of this mathematical primitives may lead to the construction of cryptographically useful projective hash families. We point out different directions towards new constructions, deviating from known proposals arising from Cramer and Shoup's seminal work.

When does universal peace prevail? Secession and group formation in rent seeking contests and policy conflicts

This paper analyzes secession and group formation in a general model of contest inspired by Esteban and Ray (1999). This model encompasses as special cases rent seeking contests and policy conflicts, where agents lobby over the choice of a policy in a one-dimensional policy space. We show that in both models the grand coalition is the efficient coalition structure and agents are always better off in the grand coalition than in a symmetric coalition structure. Individual agents (in the rent seeking contest) and extremists (in the policy conflict) only have an incentive to secede when they anticipate that their secession will not be followed by additional secessions. Incentives to secede are lower when agents cooperate inside groups. The grand coalition emerges as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of a sequential game of coalition formation in rent seeking contests.

How universal is behavior? A four country comparison of spite, cooperation and errors in voluntary contribution mechanisms

This paper studies behavior in experiments with a linear voluntary contributions mechanism for public goods conducted in Japan, the Netherlands, Spain and the USA. The same experimental design was used in the four countries. Our 'contribution function' design allows us to obtain a view of subjects' behavior from two complementary points of view. If yields information about situations where, in purely pecuniary terms, it is a dominant strategy to contribute all the endowment and about situations where it is a dominant strategy to contribute nothing. Our results show, first, that differences in behavior across countries are minor. We find that when people play "the same game" they behave similarly. Second, for all four countries our data are inconsistent with the explanation that subjects contribute only out of confusion. A common cooperative motivation is needed to explain the date.