964 resultados para Overt Argument
Resumo:
“One cannot analyse a legal concept outside the economic and socio-cultural context in which it was applied” – such is the longstanding thesis of António Manuel Hespanha. I argue that Hespanha’s line of argument relative to legal concepts is also applicable, mutatis mutandis, to legal agents: the magistrates, advocates, notaries, solicitors and clerks who lived and exercised their professions in a given time and place. The question, then, is how to understand the actions of these individuals in particular contexts – more specifically in late 18th century and 19th century Goa. The main goal of the present thesis was to comprehend how westernized and Catholic Goan elite of Brahman and Chardó origin who provided the majority of Goan legal agents used Portuguese law to their own advantage. It can be divided into five key points. The first one is the importance of the Constitutional liberalism regime (with all the juridical, judicial, administrative and political changes that it has brought, namely the parliamentary representation) and its relations with the perismo – a local political and ideological tendency nurtured by Goan native Catholic elite. It was explored in the chapter 2 of this thesis. The second key point is the repeated attempts made by Goan native Catholic elite to implement the jury system in local courts. It was studied in the chapter 3. Chapter 4 aims to understand the participation of the native Catholic elite in the codification process of the uses and traditions of the indigenous peoples in New Conquests territory. The fourth key point is the involvement of those elites not only in the conflict of civil and ecclesiastical jurisdictions but also in the succession of the Royal House of Sunda. It was analyzed in the chapter 5. The functions of an advocate could be delegated to someone who, though lacking a law degree, possessed sufficient knowledge to perform this role satisfactorily. Those who held a special licence to practice law were known as provisionários (from provisão, or licence, as opposed to the letrados, or lettered). In the Goa of the second half of the 18th century and the 19th century, such provisionários were abundant, the vast majority coming from the native Catholic elite. The characteristics of those provisionários, the role played by the Portuguese letrados in Goa and the difficult relations between both groups were studied in the chapter 6.
Resumo:
Using a rich and highly accurate dataset for Portugal spanning from 1986 to 2013, this paper analyzes the determinants of downward nominal wage rigidity, mainly focusing on macroeconomic factors. The data supports the hypothesis that recessionary periods alongside with low in ation contribute to a higher degree of wage rigidity, as measured by the incidence of nominal wage freezes. It is further highlighted how this lack of wage adjustments con- tributed to an increase in labor costs which culminated in a wage markup of 6-7%. This paper, thus seems to corroborate the argument that low in ation did exacerbated the downward in exibility of (real) wages after the Great Recession.
Resumo:
This article proposes an investigation of the history and memory of the Carnation Revolution through the lens of contemporary art. Drawing upon the argument according to which history and memory are investigated by visual artists by means other, but no less relevant, than those of professional historians, this article will argue for the importance of attending to the visual, auditory, textual, object- and research-based ways in which artists from several generations and geographies have been unearthing the repressed histories and memories of the Carnation Revolution in Portugal and of anticolonial struggles, decolonization and post-independence nation-building in Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau and Angola. The discussion focuses on several works by Ângela Ferreira, but attention will also be paid to precursors in imaging the Revolution, such as Ana Hatherly, and to a younger generation of artists such as Filipa César, Kiluanji Kia Henda and Daniel Barroca.
Resumo:
The Layout of My Thesis This thesis contains three chapters in Industrial Organization that build on the work outlined above. The first two chapters combine leniency programs with multimarket contact and provide a thorough analysis of the potential effects of Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus. The third chapter puts the whole discussion on leniency programs into perspective by examining other enforcement tools available to an antitrust authority. The main argument in that last chapter is that a specific instrument can only be as effective as the policy in which it is embedded. It is therefore important for an antitrust authority to know how it best accompanies the introduction or modification of a policy instrument that helps deterrence. INTRODUCTION Chapter 1 examines the efféct of Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus on the incentives of firms to report cartel activities. The main question is whether the inclusion of these policies in a leniency program undermine the effectiveness of the latter by discouraging the firms to apply for amnesty. The model is static and focus on the ex post incentives of firms to desist from collusion. The results suggest that, because Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus encourage the reporting of a second cartel after a first detection, a firm, anticipating this, may be reluctant to seek leniency and to report in the first place. However, the effect may also go in the opposite direction, and Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus may encourage the simultaneous reporting of two cartels. Chapter 2 takes this idea further to the stage of cartel formation. This chapter provides a complete characterization of the potential anticompetitive and procompetitive effects of Amnesty Plus in a infinitely repeated game framework when the firms use their multimarket contact to harshen punishment. I suggest a clear-cut policy rule that prevents potential adverse effects and thereby show that, if policy makers follow this rule, a leniency program with Amnesty Plus performs better than one without. Chapter 3 characterizes the socially optimal enforcement effort of an antitrust authority and shows how this effort changes with the introduction or modification of specific policy instruments. The intuition is that the policy instrument may increase the marginal benefit of conducting investigations. If this effect is strong enough, a more rigorous detection policy becomes socially desirable.