La reconnaissance entre échange, pouvoirs et institutions. Le républicanisme de Philip Pettit.

Cet article propose une lecture critique de l’approche néorépublicaine de la reconnaissance et du projet d’une économie de l’estime, développé par Ph. Pettit et G. Brennan. Il vise à montrer en quoi la conception de la reconnaissance qui est celle de ce dernier est trop étroite, dans la mesure où elle va de pair avec une analyse insuffisante des conditions de la visibilité sociale des performances et capacités des agents, ainsi que de la manière dont les luttes de reconnaissance peuvent contribuer à une telle visibilité. Ce texte montre ainsi en quoi il convient d’élargir la conception néorépublicaine de la reconnaissance. Il vise aussi à dégager les limites du projet d’une économie de l’estime, en montrant ses lacunes eu égard à une réflexion suffisante sur les conditions d’un pluralisme des standards d’estime.

Républicanisme et distribution de l'estime sociale: lectures croisées.

Cette recension a pour enjeu d’inviter à croiser deux lectures, celle de The Economy of Esteem. An Essay on Civil and Political Society, Oxford University Press, New York, 2004de G. Brennan et P. Pettit et celle du livre d’O. Ihl, Le mérite et la République. Essai sur la société des émules, NRF/Gallimard, Paris, 2007. Il s’agit ici de mettre en relief l’apport du second ouvrage en indiquant sur quel point il pourrait nourrir le projet d’une reformulation de l’économie de l’estime. En un premier temps, je vais rappeler les principales orientations de The Economy of Esteem avant de dégager les axes de la réflexion développée par Ihl dans Le mérite et la république. Sur cette base, j’indiquerai succinctement en quoi le travail d’O.Ihl peut contribuer au développement du projet d’une économie de l’estime.

Entretien avec Cécile Laborde

Cécile Laborde a développé le projet d’un républicanisme critique reposant sur un dialogue entre théorie républicaine normative et théorie sociale critique. Nous proposons ici une présentation et une discussion des principales orientations de ce projet.

Neutrality and the social contract

Given the fact of moral disagreement, theories of state neutrality which rely on moral premises will have limited application, in that they will fail to motivate anyone who rejects the moral premises on which they are based. By contrast, contractarian theories can be consistent with moral scepticism, and can therefore avoid this limitation. In this paper, I construct a contractarian model which I claim is sceptically consistent and includes a principle of state neutrality as a necessary condition. The principle of neutrality which I derive incorporates two conceptions of neutrality (consequential neutrality and justificatory neutrality) which have usually been thought of as distinct and incompatible. I argue that contractarianism gives us a unified account of these conceptions. Ultimately, the conclusion that neutrality can be derived without violating the constraint established by moral scepticism turns out to rely on an assumption of equal precontractual bargaining power. I do not attempt to defend this assumption here. If the assumption cannot be defended in a sceptically consistent fashion, then the argument for neutrality given here is claimed to be morally minimal, rather than fully consistent with moral scepticism.

Liberal Neutrality : Constructivist, not foundationalist

In defending the principle of neutrality, liberals have often appealed to a more general moral principle that forbids coercing persons in the name of reasons those persons themselves cannot reasonably be expected to share. Yet liberals have struggled to articulate a non-arbitrary, non-dogmatic distinction between the reasons that persons can reasonably be expected to share and those they cannot. The reason for this, I argue, is that what it means to “share a reason” is itself obscure. In this paper I articulate two different conceptions of what it is to share a reason; I call these conceptions “foundationalist” and “constructivist.” On the foundationalist view, two people “share” a reason just in the sense that the same reason applies to each of them independently. On this view, I argue, debates about the reasons we share collapse into debates about the reasons we have, moving us no closer to an adequate defense of neutrality. On the constructivist view, by contrast, “sharing reasons” is understood as a kind of activity, and the reasons we must share are just those reasons that make this activity possible. I argue that the constructivist conception of sharing reasons yields a better defense of the principle of neutrality.

Neutrality as a Twofold Concept

Under the circumstances of pluralism people often claim that the state ought to be neutral towards its citizens’ conceptions of the good life. However, what it means for the state to be neutral is often unclear. This is partly because there are different conceptions of neutrality and partly because what neutrality entails depends largely on the context in which neutrality is demanded. This paper discusses three different conceptions of neutrality – neutrality of impact, neutrality as equality of opportunity and justificatory neutrality – and analyses the strengths and weaknesses of the different conceptions in different contexts. It suggests that there are two common elements of neutrality in all its exemplifications: a) an element of “hands-off” and b) an element of equal treatment. It therefore argues that while justificatory neutrality is necessary for the state to be neutral it is not sufficient and claims that while conceptions of the good must not enter thejustificationof state regulations, they must be taken into consideration when deliberating theimplementation of these regulations.

Tolérance et neutralité: incompatibles ou complémentaires?

La tolérance et la neutralité sont habituellement considérées comme des réponses interchangeables ou du moins complémentaires à des situations de conflit et de désaccord moral. Malgré cette association traditionnelle, plusieurs auteurs ont récemment contesté la complémentarité, voire même la compatibilité, de ces deux notions. Cet article examine tout d’abord deux arguments qui visent à établir l’incompatibilité de la tolérance et de la neutralité. Il montre ensuite que si ces arguments ne sont pas probants, en ce sens qu’ils ne parviennent pas à montrer l’impossibilité d’une conciliation entre tolérance et neutralité, ils mettent néanmoins en évidence deux difficultés qui se dressent sur le chemin d’une telle conciliation. Il introduit enfin une conception particulière de la tolérance fondée sur l’idée de justice et indique comment elle permet de remédier aux difficultés précédemment mises en évidence.

An Epistemic Argument in Support of Liberal Neutrality

My aim in the present paper is to develop a new kind of argument in support of the ideal of liberal neutrality. This argument combines some basic moral principles with a thesis about the relationship between the correct standards of justification for a belief/action and certain contextual factors. The idea is that the level of importance of what is at stake in a specific context of action determines how demanding the correct standards to justify an action based on a specific set of beliefs ought to be. In certain exceptional contexts –where the seriousness of harm in case of mistake and the level of an agent’s responsibility for the outcome of his action are specially high– a very small probability of making a mistake should be recognized as a good reason to avoid to act based on beliefs that we nonetheless affirm with a high degree of confidence and that actually justify our action in other contexts. The further steps of the argument consist in probing 1) that the fundamental state’s policies are such a case of exceptional context, 2) that perfectionist policies are the type of actions we should avoid, and 3) that policies that satisfy neutral standards of justification are not affected by the reasons which lead to reject perfectionist policies.

Are Cities Illiberal? Municipal Jurisdictions and the Scope of Liberal Neutrality

One of the main characteristics of today’s democratic societies is their pluralism. As a result, liberal political philosophers often claim that the state should remain neutral with respect to different conceptions of the good. Legal and social policies should be acceptable to everyone regardless of their culture, their religion or their comprehensive moral views. One might think that this commitment to neutrality should be especially pronounced in urban centres, with their culturally diverse populations. However, there are a large number of laws and policies adopted at the municipal level that contradict the liberal principle of neutrality. In this paper, I want to suggest that these perfectionistlaws and policies are legitimate at the urban level. Specifically, I will argue that the principle of neutrality applies only indirectly to social institutions within the broader framework of the nation-state. This is clear in the case of voluntary associations, but to a certain extent this rationale applies also to cities. In a liberal regime, private associations are allowed to hold and defend perfectionist views, focused on a particular conception of the good life. One problem is to determine the limits of this perfectionism at the urban level, since cities, unlike private associations, are publicinstitutions. My aim here is therefore to give a liberal justification to a limited form of perfectionism of municipal laws and policies.

Perfectionism, Economic (dis)Incentives, and Political Coercion

May a government attempt to improve the lives of its citizens by promoting the activities it deems valuable and discouraging those it disvalues? May it engage in such a practice even when doing so is not a requirement of justice in some strict sense, and even when the judgments of value and disvalue in question are likely to be subject to controversy among its citizens? These questions have long stood at the center of debates between political perfectionists and political neutralists. In what follows I address a prominent cluster of arguments against political perfectionism—namely, arguments that focus on the coercive dimensions of state action. My main claim is simple: whatever concerns we might have about coercion, arguments from coercion fall short of supporting a thoroughgoing rejection of perfectionism, for the reason that perfectionist policies need not be coercive. Thlist challenges to this last claim.

Beyond Equality of What: Sen and Neutrality

Based on a close reading of the debate between Rawls and Sen on primary goods versus capabilities, I argue that liberal theory cannot adequately respond to Sen’s critique within a conventionally neutralist framework. In support of the capability approach, I explain why and how it defends a more robust conception of opportunity and freedom, along with public debate on substantive questions about well-being and the good life. My aims are: (i) to show that Sen’s capability approach is at odds with Rawls’s political liberal version of neutrality; (ii) to carve out a third space in the neutrality debate; and (iii) to begin to develop, from Sen’s approach, the idea of public value liberalism as a position that falls within that third space.

La moralité implicite du marché

Dans cet article, je mets en avant une approche de l’éthique du commerce centrée sur la notion de « moralité implicite du marché ». J’essaie d’identifier les grands traits de cette moralité implicite du marché en plus d’exposer les avantages d’adopter une telle approche pour penser les obligations des firmes. Pour ce faire, je tente, en m’inspirant de travaux récents de Joseph Heath, de mettre en lumière le rôle proprement normatif que peut jouer le concept de défaillances des marchés tel que développé dans la théorie économique. Je termine en examinant trois problèmes auxquels fait face l’approche proposée ici. In this article, I put forward an approach to business ethics that focuses on the notion of “implicit morality of the market”. I therefore try to identify the main components of this implicit morality of the market and expose the advantages of taking such a stance to think about the obligations of firms. In order to do so, I try to shed some light, drawing on recent works by Joseph Heath, on the potential normative role of the concept of market failures as articulated in economic theory. I finish by examining three problems that this approach is facing.

Imagining Evil

It is in a way easier to imagine evil actions than we often suppose, but what it is thus relatively easy to do is not what we want to understand about evil. To argue for this conclusion I distinguish between imagining why someone did something and imagining how they could have done it, and I try to grasp partial understanding, in part by distinguishing different imaginative perspectives we can have on an act. When we do this we see an often unnoticed asymmetry: we do not put the same demands on our understanding of wrongdoing as on that of most everyday, morally acceptable, actions. Il est relativement facile d’imaginer des actes maléfiques, plus facile que ce que nous sommes prêts à supposer. Mais ce qui est ainsi facile à imaginer n’est pas ce que nous souhaitons comprendre à propos des actes maléfiques. Pour étayer cette conclusion, je distingue entre comprendre pourquoi quelqu'un fait ce qu'il fait et imaginer comment cette personne aurait fait une telle chose; j'essaie aussi de saisir ce qu'est la compréhension partielle, du moins en partie, en distinguant entre elles les différentes perspectives imaginaires d’un même acte. C’est ainsi qu’apparaît une asymétrie qui passe souvent inaperçue: nous n'imposons pas les mêmes exigences à l'égard de notre compréhension d’actes répréhensibles qu'à l’égard d’actions quotidiennes moralement acceptables.

Imagining Others

It is often argued that the ability to imagine what others think and feel is central to moral functioning. In this paper, I consider to what extent this is true. I argue that neither the ability to think of others as having representational mental states, nor the ability to imagine being in their position, is necessary for moral understanding or moral motivation. I go on to argue that the area in which thinking about others’ thoughts and feelings appears to play the largest role is that of supererogatory actions. Being able to get on well with others seems to be importantly predicated on our ability to think about their thoughts and feelings and being able to take up their perspective. However, when it comes to grosser moral norms and restrictions, such as harm norms, there is little reason to think that thinking about others’ thoughts and feelings plays a central role in understanding such norms or being motivated by them.