How new online communication tools and the availability of content influence the audiences and the creative process

We live in a changing world. At an impressive speed, every day new technological resources appear. We increasingly use the Internet to obtain and share information, and new online communication tools are emerging. Each of them encompasses new potential and creates new audiences. In recent years, we witnessed the emergence of Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and other media platforms. They have provided us with an even greater interactivity between sender and receiver, as well as generated a new sense of community. At the same time we also see the availability of content like it never happened before. We are increasingly sharing texts, videos, photos, etc. This poster intends to explore the potential of using these new online communication tools in the cultural sphere to create new audiences, to develop of a new kind of community, to provide information as well as different ways of building organizations’ memory. The transience of performing arts is accompanied by the need to counter that transience by means of documentation. This desire to ‘save’ events reaches its expression with the information archive of the different production moments as well as the opportunity to record the event and present it through, for instance, digital platforms. In this poster we intend to answer the following questions: which online communication tools are being used to engage audiences in the cultural sphere (specifically between theater companies in Lisbon)? Is there a new relationship with the public? Are online communication tools creating a new kind of community? What changes are these tools introducing in the creative process? In what way the availability of content and its archive contribute to the organization memory? Among several references, we will approach the two-way communication model that James E. Grunig & Todd T. Hunt (1984) already presented and the concept of mass self-communication of Manuel Castells (2010). Castells also tells us that we have moved from traditional media to a system of communication networks. For Scott Kirsner (2010), we have entered an era of digital creativity, where artists have the tools to do what they imagined and the public no longer wants to just consume cultural goods, but instead to have a voice and participate. The creativity process is now depending on the public choice as they wander through the screen. It is the receiver who owns an object which can be exchanged. Virtual reality has encouraged the receiver to abandon its position of passive observer and to become a participant agent, which implies a challenge to organizations: inventing new forms of interfaces. Therefore, we intend to find new and effective online tools that can be used by cultural organizations; the best way to manage them; to show how organizations can create a community with the public and how the availability of online content and its archive can contribute to the organizations’ memory.

Angolan cymbopogon citratus used for therapeutic benefits: nutritional composition and influence of solvents in phytochemicals content and antioxidant activity of leaf extracts

Folk medicine is a relevant and effective part of indigenous healthcare systems which are, in practice, totally dependent on traditional healers. An outstanding coincidence between indigenous medicinal plant uses and scientifically proved pharmacological properties of several phytochemicals has been observed along the years. This work focused on the leaves of a medicinal plant traditionally used for therapeutic benefits (Angolan Cymbopogon citratus), in order to evaluate their nutritional value. The bioactive phytochemical composition and antioxidant activity of leaf extracts prepared with different solvents (water, methanol and ethanol) were also evaluated. The plant leaves contained ~60% of carbohydrates, protein (~20%), fat (~5%), ash (~4%) and moisture (~9%). The phytochemicals screening revealed the presence of tannins, flavonoids, and terpenoids in all extracts. Methanolic extracts also contained alkaloids and steroids. Several methods were used to evaluate total antioxidant capacity of the different extracts (DPPH; NO; and H2O2 scavenging assays, reducing power, and FRAP). Ethanolic extracts presented a significantly higher antioxidant activity (p < 0.05) except for FRAP, in which the best results were achieved by the aqueous extracts. Methanolic extracts showed the lowest radical scavenging activities for both DPPH; and NO; radicals.

On lattices from combinatorial game theory modularity and a representation theorem: finite case

We show that a self-generated set of combinatorial games, S. may not be hereditarily closed but, strong self-generation and hereditary closure are equivalent in the universe of short games. In [13], the question "Is there a set which will give a non-distributive but modular lattice?" appears. A useful necessary condition for the existence of a finite non-distributive modular L(S) is proved. We show the existence of S such that L(S) is modular and not distributive, exhibiting the first known example. More, we prove a Representation Theorem with Games that allows the generation of all finite lattices in game context. Finally, a computational tool for drawing lattices of games is presented. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Bertrand model under incomplete information

We consider a Bertrand duopoly model with unknown costs. The firms' aim is to choose the price of its product according to the well-known concept of Bayesian Nash equilibrium. The chooses are made simultaneously by both firms. In this paper, we suppose that each firm has two different technologies, and uses one of them according to a certain probability distribution. The use of either one or the other technology affects the unitary production cost. We show that this game has exactly one Bayesian Nash equilibrium. We analyse the advantages, for firms and for consumers, of using the technology with highest production cost versus the one with cheapest production cost. We prove that the expected profit of each firm increases with the variance of its production costs. We also show that the expected price of each good increases with both expected production costs, being the effect of the expected production costs of the rival dominated by the effect of the own expected production costs.

Bertrand oligopoly when rivals' costs are unknown

We study a Bertrand oligopoly model with incomplete information about rivals' costs, where the uncertainty is given by a uniform distribution. We compute the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of this game, the ex-ante expected profit and the ex-post profit of each firm. We see that, even though only one firm produces in equilibrium, all firms have a positive ex-ante expected profit.

Signalling in an international cournot model

We consider a trade policy model, where the costs of the home firm are private information but can be signaled through the output levels of the firm to a foreign competitor and a home policymaker. We study the influences of the non-homogeneity of the goods and of the uncertainty on the production costs of the home firm in the signalling strategies by the home firm. We show that some results obtained for homogeneous goods are not robust under non-homogeneity.

Privatization and entry of a foreign firm with demand uncertainty

We investigate the effects of trade with a foreign firm and privatization of the domestic pubUc firm on an incentive for the domestic firm to reduce costs by undertaking R&D investment, under demand uncertainty. We suppose that the domestic firm is less efficient than the foreign firm. However, the domestic firm can lower its marginal costs by conducting cost-reducing R&D investment. We examine the impacts of entry of a foreign firm, and the effects of demand uncertainty, on decisions upon cost-reducing R&D investment by the domestic firm and how these affect the domestic welfare.

Environmental policies in an international mixed duopoly

The purpose of this paper is to study the effects of environmental and trade policies in an international mixed duopoly serving two markets. We suppose that the firm in the home country is a welfare-maximizing public firm, while the firm in the foreign country is its own profit-maximizing private firm. We find that the environmental tax can be a strategic instrument for the home government to distribute production from the foreign private firm to the home public firm. An additional effect of the home environmental tax is the reduction of the foreign private firm's output for local consumption, thereby expanding the foreign market for the home public firm.

Bertrand and Cournot oligopolies when rivals' costs are unknown

We study Bertrand and Cournot oligopoly models with incomplete information about rivals’ costs, where the uncertainty is given by a uniform distribution. We compute the Bayesian- Nash equilibrium of both games, the ex-ante expected profits and the ex-post profits of each firm. We see that, in the price competition, even though only one firm produces in equilibrium, all firms have a positive ex-ante expected profit.

Simultaneous decisions or leadership in an international competition

In this paper, we study an international market with demand uncertainty. The model has two stages. In the first stage, the home government chooses an import tariff to maximize the revenue. Then, the firms engage in a Cournot or in a Stackelberg competition. The uncertainty is resolved between the decisions made by the home government and by the firms. We compare the results obtained in the three different ways of moving on the decision make of the firms.

Two-production-period in a duopoly with nonprofit and for-profit firms

We investigate endogenous roles in a competition between a nonprofit firm and a for-profit firm in a homogeneous goods market, by allowing two production periods. We find that the Cournot-type equilibrium and one Stackelberg-type equilibrium where the nonprofit firm becomes the follower exist; however, another tackelberg-type equilibrium where the nonprofit firm becomes the leader does not exist.

A expressão dramática no desenvolvimento da formação pessoal e social da criança em idade pré-escolar

Relatório da Prática Profissional Supervisionada Mestrado em Educação Pré-Escolar

Desirable role in a price-setting international mixed duopoly

In this paper, we study the order of moves in a mixed international duopoly for differentiated goods, where firms choose whether to set prices sequentially or simultaneously. We discuss the desirable role of the public firm by comparing welfare among three games. We find that, in the three possible roles, the domestic public firm put a lower price, and then produces more than the foreign private firm.

Desirable role in an international duopoly model with tariffs

In this paper, we study an international market model in which the home government imposes a tariff on the imported goods. The model has two stages. In the first stage, the home government chooses an import tariff to maximize a function that cares about the home firm’s profit and the total revenue. Then, the firms engage in a Cournot or in a Stackelberg competition. We compare the results obtained in the three different ways of moving on the decision make of the firms.

International Stackelberg model with tariffs

This paper analyses the effects of tariffs on an international economy with a monopolistic sector with two firms, located in two countries, each one producing a homogeneous good for both home consumption and export to the other identical country. We consider a game among governments and firms. First, the government imposes a tariff on imports and then we consider the two types of moving: simultaneous (Cournot-type model) and sequential (Stackelberg-type model) decisions by the firms. We also compare the results obtained in each model.