Spinning welfare: The gains from process innovation in cotton and car production

Economists and economic historians want to know how much better life is today than in the past.Fifty years ago economic historians found surprisingly small gains from 19th century US railroads,while more recently economists have found relatively large gains from electricity, computers and cellphones. In each case the implicit or explicit assumption is that researchers were measuring the valueof a new good to society. In this paper we use the same techniques to find the value to society ofmaking existing goods cheaper. Henry Ford did not invent the car, and the inventors of mechanisedcotton spinning in the industrial revolution invented no new product. But both made existing productsdramatically cheaper, bringing them into the reach of many more consumers. That in turn haspotentially large welfare effects. We find that the consumer surplus of Henry Ford s production linewas around 2% by 1923, 15 years after Ford began to implement the moving assembly line, while themechanisation of cotton spinning was worth around 6% by 1820, 34 years after its initial invention.Both are large: of the same order of magnitude as consumer expenditure on these items, and as largeor larger than the value of the internet to consumers. On the social savings measure traditionally usedby economic historians, these process innovations were worth 15% and 18% respectively, makingthem more important than railroads. Our results remind us that process innovations can be at least asimportant for welfare and productivity as the invention of new products.

Discrete devaluations and multiple equilibria in a first generation model of currency crises

The first generation models of currency crises have often been criticized because they predict that, in the absence of very large triggering shocks, currency attacks should be predictable and lead to small devaluations. This paper shows that these features of first generation models are not robust to the inclusion of private information. In particular, this paper analyzes a generalization of the Krugman-Flood-Garber (KFG) model, which relaxes the assumption that all consumers are perfectly informed about the level of fundamentals. In this environment, the KFG equilibrium of zero devaluation is only one of many possible equilibria. In all the other equilibria, the lack of perfect information delays the attack on the currency past the point at which the shadow exchange rate equals the peg, giving rise to unpredictable and discrete devaluations.

Bands width, credibility and exchange risk: Lessons from the EMS experience

This paper presents an analysis of the credibility of the EMScurrencies that covers the period before and after the increase in thebands of fluctuation. Our credibility indicator is based on the inferredprobabilities derived from the estimation of a Markov-switching model(Hamilton (1989)) applied to the expected rate of depreciation. Theresults show that, for most of the currencies, credibility has improved,at least transitorily, after the increase in the bands. However, for allcurrencies, the credibility measured by the indicator proposed in thispaper has been eroded recently even with the widened bands.

Population by Age Group and Perecnt of Total Popluation by County, 2006

The Department of Elder Affairs maintains and provides population and demographic estimates/projections for age 60+ for the state and for its counties and incorporated places. DEA also provides population estimates on poverty, race and ethnicity, and urban and rural for age 60+. This statistical information is obtained from numerous resources, including the State Data Center of Iowa, US Census Bureau, the Administration on Aging, and Iowa State University Census Services. "The Census Bureau uses the latest available estimates as starting points for population projections. Sometimes the user may see both an estimate and a projection available for the same reference date, which may not agree because they were produced at different times. In such cases, estimates are the preferred data." (Source: State Data Center)

Stare decisis: Rhetoric and substance

Stare decisis allows common law to develop gradually and incrementally. We show howjudge-made law can steadily evolve and tend to increase efficiency even in the absence ofnew information. Judges' opinions must argue that their decisions are consistent withprecedent: this is the more costly, the greater the innovation they are introducing. As aresult, each judge effects a cautious marginal change in the law. Alternative models inwhich precedents are either strictly obeyed or totally discarded would instead predictabrupt large swings in legal rules. Thus we find that the evolution of case law isgrounded not in binary logic fixing judges' constraints, but in costly rhetoric shapingtheir incentives. We apply this finding to an assessment of the role of analogicalreasoning in shaping the joint development of different areas of law.

Turnout, political preferences and information: Experimental evidence from Perú

Electoral institutions that encourage citizens to vote are widely used around the world. Yet littleis known about the effects of such institutions on voter participation and the composition of the electorate.In this paper, I combine a field experiment with a change in Peruvian voting laws to identify theeffect of monetary (dis-)incentives on voting. Using the random variation in the fine for abstention andan objective measure of turnout at the individual level, I estimate the elasticity of voting with respectto cost to be -0.21. Consistent with the theoretical model presented, the reduction in turnout inducedby the reduction in the fine is driven by voters who (i) are in the center of the political spectrum, (ii)are less interested in politics, and (iii) hold less political information. However, voters who respondto changes in the cost of abstention do not have different preferences for policies than those who voteregardless of the cost. Further, involvement in politics, as measured by the decision to acquire politicalinformation, seems to be independent of the level of the fine. Additional results indicate that thereduction in the fine does not affect the incidence of vote buying, but increases the price paid for avote.