Agenda power in Brazil's Câmara dos Deputados , 1989 to 1999

This paper examines the structure of agenda power in the Brazilian Câmara dos Deputados (Chamber of Deputies). Our main question concerns when consistent agenda control by a single majority coalition, as opposed to agenda control by shifting majorities, has emerged in the post-1988 Câmara. Consistent agenda control emerges routinely in parliamentary regimes: the government commands a majority in the assembly; the legislative agenda is negotiated among the governing parties, typically with each able to “veto” the placement of bills on the agenda. However, the Câmara faces an external executive, the president, with substantial formal powers to set its agenda. Consistent agenda control thus can emerge only if the president chooses to ally with a majority coalition in the assembly. If the president always chose to form such an alliance—a presidentially-led agenda cartel—then one would expect some consistently parliamentary patterns in Brazil: the appointment of legislative party leaders to the cabinet; the use of statutes rather than decrees to achieve policy goals; the avoidance of bills that would pass and split the governing coalition. We find that only the Cardoso presidency displays consistent evidence of such a presidentiallyled agenda cartel. In this sense, our argument differs from that of Figueiredo and Limongi (1999; 2000), who argue that presidents have consistently pursued a parliamentary mode of governance in Brazil. Yet it also differs from those who argue that presidents have consistently pursued a shifting-coalitions strategy. Our results suggest that presidents make a strategic choice, with much hinging on that choice.

Deunionization in the US: a panel data analysis from 1973 to 1999

There are four different hypotheses analyzed in the literature that explain deunionization, namely: the decrease in the demand for union representation by the workers; the impaet of globalization over unionization rates; teehnieal ehange and ehanges in the legal and politieal systems against unions. This paper aims to test alI ofthem. We estimate a logistie regression using panel data proeedure with 35 industries from 1973 to 1999 and eonclude that the four hypotheses ean not be rejeeted by the data. We also use a varianee analysis deeomposition to study the impaet of these variables over the drop in unionization rates. In the model with no demographic variables the results show that these economic (tested) variables can account from 10% to 12% of the drop in unionization. However, when we include demographic variables these tested variables can account from 10% to 35% in the total variation of unionization rates. In this case the four hypotheses tested can explain up to 50% ofthe total drop in unionization rates explained by the model.