Zoonomia; or, The Laws of Organic Life ... by Erasmus Darwin ...

2

Human Tissue Kallikrein Activity in Angiographically Documented Chronic Stable Coronary Artery Disease

AbstractBackground:Human tissue kallikrein (hK1) is a key enzyme in the kallikrein–kinin system (KKS). hK1-specific amidase activity is reduced in urine samples from hypertensive and heart failure (HF) patients. The pathophysiologic role of hK1 in coronary artery disease (CAD) remains unclear.Objective:To evaluate hK1-specific amidase activity in the urine of CAD patientsMethods:Sixty-five individuals (18–75 years) who underwent cardiac catheterism (CATH) were included. Random midstream urine samples were collected immediately before CATH. Patients were classified in two groups according to the presence of coronary lesions: CAD (43 patients) and non-CAD (22 patients). hK1 amidase activity was estimated using the chromogenic substrate D-Val-Leu-Arg-Nan. Creatinine was determined using Jaffé’s method. Urinary hK1-specific amidase activity was expressed as µM/(min · mg creatinine) to correct for differences in urine flow rates.Results:Urinary hK1-specific amidase activity levels were similar between CAD [0.146 µM/(min ·mg creatinine)] and non-CAD [0.189 µM/(min . mg creatinine)] patients (p = 0.803) and remained similar to values previously reported for hypertensive patients [0.210 µM/(min . mg creatinine)] and HF patients [0.104 µM/(min . mg creatinine)]. CAD severity and hypertension were not observed to significantly affect urinary hK1-specific amidase activity.Conclusion:CAD patients had low levels of urinary hK1-specific amidase activity, suggesting that renal KKS activity may be reduced in patients with this disease.

Zoonomia; or, The Laws of Organic Life ... by Erasmus Darwin ...

1

Growth of semi-polar GaN on high index silicon (11h) substrates by metal organic vapor phase epitaxy

Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Naturwiss., Diss., 2014

Organic buildups in the Lower Ordovician (Canadian) of Texas and Oklahoma / Donald Francis Toomey -- and Matthew H. Nitecki --.

n.s. no.2(1979)

Trophic relationships between macroinvertebrates and fish in a pampean lowland stream (Argentina)

The diet and trophic relationships between the macroinvertebrates Phyllogomphoides joaquini Rodrigues Capítulo, 1992 and Coenagrionidae (Odonata), Chironomidae (Diptera), Diplodon delodontus (Lamarck, 1919) (Bivalvia: Hyriidae), and Pomacea canaliculata (Lamarck, 1822) (Gastropoda: Ampulariidae) and the fishes Pimelodella laticeps Eigenmann, 1917 (Heptapteridae) and Bryconamericus iheringii (Boulenger, 1887) (Characidae) in a temperate lowland lotic system in Argentina were assessed on the basis of gut contents and stable-isotope analyses. The feeding strategies were analyzed by the AMUNDSEN method. Relative food items contribution for the taxa studied indicated a generalist-type trophic strategy. In macroinvertebrates, in general, the values of stable isotope confirmed the result of the analysis of gut contents. With the fish, stable-isotope analysis demonstrated that both species are predators, although B. iheringii exhibited a more omnivorous behaviour. These feeding studies allowed us to determine the trophic relationships among taxa studied. Detritus and diatoms were a principal source of food for all the macroinvertebrates studied. In La Choza stream the particulate organic matter is a major no limited food resource, has a significant influence upon the community.

Corrigendum stable matchings and preferences of couples

We correct an omission in the definition of our domain of weakly responsive preferences introduced in Klaus and Klijn (2005) or KK05 for short. The proof of the existence of stable matchings (KK05, Theorem 3.3) and a maximal domain result (KK05, Theorem 3.5) are adjusted accordingly.

Median stable matching for college admission

We give a simple and concise proof that so-called generalized median stable matchings are well-defined stable matchings for college admissions problems. Furthermore, we discuss the fairness properties of median stable matchings and conclude with two illustrative examples of college admissions markets, the lattices of stable matchings, and the corresponding generalized median stable matchings.

Choosing how to choose: self-stable majority rules and constitutions

Constitutional arrangements affect the decisions made by a society. We study how this effect leads to preferences of citizens over constitutions; and ultimately how this has a feedback that determines which constitutions can survive in a given society. Constitutions are stylized here, to consist of a voting rule for ordinary business and possibly different voting rule for making changes to the constitution. We deffine an equilibrium notion for constitutions, called self-stability, whereby under the rules of a self-stable constitution, the society would not vote to change the constitution. We argue that only self-stable constitutions will endure. We prove that self-stable constitutions always exist, but that most constitutions (even very prominent ones) may not be self-stable for some societies. We show that constitutions where the voting rule used to amend the constitution is the same as the voting rule used for ordinary business are dangerously simplistic, and there are (many) societies for which no such constitution is self-stable rule. We conclude with a characterization of the set of self-stable constitutions that use majority rule for ordinary business.

Procedurally fair and stable matching

We motivate procedural fairness for matching mechanisms and study two procedurally fair and stable mechanisms: employment by lotto (Aldershof et al., 1999) and the random order mechanism (Roth and Vande Vate, 1990, Ma, 1996). For both mechanisms we give various examples of probability distributions on the set of stable matchings and discuss properties that differentiate employment by lotto and the random order mechanism. Finally, we consider an adjustment of the random order mechanism, the equitable random order mechanism, that combines aspects of procedural and "endstate'' fairness. Aldershof et al. (1999) and Ma (1996) that exist on the probability distribution induced by both mechanisms. Finally, we consider an adjustment of the random order mechanism, the equitable random order mechanism.

Some things couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask)

It is well-known that couples that look jointly for jobs in the same centralized labor market may cause instabilities. We demonstrate that for a natural preference domain for couples, namely the domain of responsive preferences, the existence of stable matchings can easily be established. However, a small deviation from responsiveness in one couple's preference relation that models the wish of a couple to be closer together may already cause instability. This demonstrates that the nonexistence of stable matchings in couples markets is not a singular theoretical irregularity. Our nonexistence result persists even when a weaker stability notion is used that excludes myopic blocking. Moreover, we show that even if preferences are responsive there are problems that do not arise for singles markets. Even though for couples markets with responsive preferences the set of stable matchings is nonempty, the lattice structure that this set has for singles markets does not carry over. Furthermore we demonstrate that the new algorithm adopted by the National Resident Matching Program to fill positions for physicians in the United States may cycle, while in fact a stable matchings does exist, and be prone to strategic manipulation if the members of a couple pretend to be single.

Stable condorcet rules

We consider the following allocation problem: A fixed number of public facilities must be located on a line. Society is composed of $N$ agents, who must be allocated to one and only one of these facilities. Agents have single peaked preferences over the possible location of the facilities they are assigned to, and do not care about the location of the rest of facilities. There is no congestion. In this context, we observe that if a public decision is a Condorcet winner, then it satisfies nice properties of internal and external stability. Though in many contexts and for some preference profiles there may be no Condorcet winners, we study the extent to which stability can be made compatible with the requirement of choosing Condorcet winners whenever they exist.

Stable coalition structures with fixed decision scheme

This paper studies the stability of a finite local public goods economy in horizontal differentiation, where a jurisdiction's choice of the public good is given by an exogenous decision scheme. In this paper, we characterize the class of decision schemes that ensure the existence of an equilibrium with free mobility (that we call Tiebout equilibrium) for monotone distribution of players. This class contains all the decision schemes whose choice lies between the Rawlsian decision scheme and the median voter with mid-distance of the two median voters when there are ties. We show that for non-monotone distribution, there is no decision scheme that can ensure the stability of coalitions. In the last part of the paper, we prove the non-emptiness of the core of this coalition formation game