Selection of information in auditory virtual reality

ERP, auditory virtual reality, dichotic listening, selective auditory attention, cocktail-party phenomenon, HRTF

Estudos sôbre o quiabeiro II: efeitos da autofecundação e do cruzamento

The present work deals with the study of the effects of selfing and crossing in pures lines of okra inbred for five generations and the methods of breeding in this plant. This work is party of a large program of this Dept. to study heterosis in plants naturally self pollinated. The technic of selfing consists of tying with a string the floral bud before anthesis. To make controlled crosses, it is necessary to emasculate the flowers removing the anthers with small forceps, and to cover the flowers with a bag and wait for 1 or 2 days until the blooming. Also, the male parents are covered with paper bags prior to flowering. Finally, the pollen is brushed lightly over the stigma of the emasculated flowers and the females unit rebagged. The authors have tried without sucess the technic of soda fountain straw used for cotton. The treatments were: I) Fl of the cross pure-line x foreign variety (not improved by breeding). II) Fl of the cross pure-line x parental variety and III) pure-line 5 generations inbred. In order to compare the production of these three treatments, a randomized blocks with 4 replications was designed; since we had 6 families in each treatment, the total number was: 4 replications x 3 treatments x 6 families: = 72. Each familiy was planted in lines of 10 plants. Owing to the design devised, the present experiment corresponds to a split-plot. The analysis of variance of the number and the weight of the pods is given in tables 2 and 4, and shows the following: 1) The production expressed in both numbers and weights of the cross, - pure lines x foreign variety - was statistically smaller than the others treatments, i, e., the cross of pure-lines x parental variety and the pure-lines; 2) The production of the treatments pure-lines x parental variety and selfed purelines was the same. It was proved that the selfing do not produce harmful effects in okra, it was benefical, since after 5 inbred generations the production was the same when compared with Fl of the parental variety. Also, the methods of pure-lines are indicated to improve varieties of okra.

Benthic macroinvertebrates as bioindicators of water quality in an Atlantic forest fragment

The objective of this study was to evaluate benthic macroinvertebrate communities as bioindicators of water quality in five streams located in the "Reserva Particular do Patrimônio Natural" (RPPN) Mata Samuel de Paula and its surroundings, in the municipality of Nova Lima near the city of Belo Horizonte, Minas Gerais State, southeastern Brazil. This region has been strongly modified by human activities including mining and urbanization. Samples were collected in the field every three months between August 2004 and November 2005, totaling six samplings in the rainy and dry seasons. This assessment identified one area ecologically altered while the other sampling sites were found to be minimally disturbed systems, with well-preserved ecological conditions. However, according to the Biological Monitoring Work Party (BMWP) and the Average Score Per Taxon (ASPT) indices, all sampling sites had excellent water quality. A total of 14,952 organisms was collected, belonging to 155 taxa (148 Insecta, two Annelida, one Bivalvia, one Decapoda, one Planariidae, one Hydracarina, and one Entognatha). The most abundant benthic groups were Chironomidae (47.9%), Simuliidae (12.3%), Bivalvia (7.5%), Decapoda (6.1%), Oligochaeta (5.2%), Polycentropodidae (3.7%), Hydropsychidae (2.5%), Calamoceratidae (1.8%), Ceratopogonidae (1.7%), and Libellulidae (1.2%). The assessment of the benthic functional feeding groups showed that 34% of the macroinvertebrates were collector-gatherers, 29% predators, 24% collector-filterers, 8% shredders, and 5% scrapers. The RPPN Mata Samuel de Paula comprises diversified freshwater habitats that are of great importance for the conservation of many benthic taxa that are intolerant to organic pollution.

Scoring rules on dichotomous preferences

In this paper, we study individual incentives to report preferences truthfully for the special case when individuals have dichotomous preferences on the set of alternatives and preferences are aggregated in form of scoring rules. In particular, we show that (a) the Borda Count coincides with Approval Voting on the dichotomous preference domain, (b) the Borda Count is the only strategy-proof scoring rule on the dichotomous preference domain, and (c) if at least three individuals participate in the election, then the dichotomous preference domain is the unique maximal rich domain under which the Borda Count is strategy-proof.

Does illegal immigration empower rightist parties?

The main goal of this paper is to analyze the political outcome in countries where the relevant issue in elections is the control of immigration. In particular we explore the consequences on the political outcome of the fact that parties are either ideological or opportunistic with respect to this issue. In order to do that we use a simple two-party political competition model in which the issues over which parties take positions are the level of border enforcement and the way it has to be ?nanced. We show that an ideological rather than a pure opportunistic behavior gives parties an advantage to win the election. In particular, in most of the cases we consider we ?nd that rightist parties have an advantage to win in countries where the relevant issue in election is illegal immigration. This result may help us to understand the recent success of anti-immigrant and rightist parties in several countries.

Choosing how to choose: self-stable majority rules and constitutions

Constitutional arrangements affect the decisions made by a society. We study how this effect leads to preferences of citizens over constitutions; and ultimately how this has a feedback that determines which constitutions can survive in a given society. Constitutions are stylized here, to consist of a voting rule for ordinary business and possibly different voting rule for making changes to the constitution. We deffine an equilibrium notion for constitutions, called self-stability, whereby under the rules of a self-stable constitution, the society would not vote to change the constitution. We argue that only self-stable constitutions will endure. We prove that self-stable constitutions always exist, but that most constitutions (even very prominent ones) may not be self-stable for some societies. We show that constitutions where the voting rule used to amend the constitution is the same as the voting rule used for ordinary business are dangerously simplistic, and there are (many) societies for which no such constitution is self-stable rule. We conclude with a characterization of the set of self-stable constitutions that use majority rule for ordinary business.

The Instrumental voter goes to the news-agent: demand for information, election closeness, and the media

This paper studies the impact of instrumental voting on information demand and mass media behaviour during electoral campaigns. If voters act instrumentally then information demand should increase with the closeness of an election. Mass media are modeled as profit-maximizing firms that take into account information demand, the value of customers to advertisers and the marginal cost of customers. Information supply should be larger in electoral constituencies where the contest is expected to be closer, there is a higher population density, and customers are on average more profitable for advertisers. The impact of electorate size is theoretically undetermined. These conclusions are then tested with comfortable results on data from the 1997 general election in Britain.

Selecting negotiation processes with Health Care

We address the question of how a third-party payer (e.g. an insurer) decides what providers to contract with. Three different mechanisms are studied and their properties compared. A first mechanism consists in the third-party payer setting up a bargaining procedure with both providers jointly and simultaneously. A second mechanism envisages the outcome of the same simultaneous bargaining but independently with every provider. Finally, the last mechanism is of different nature. It is the so-called "any willing provider" where the third-party payer announces a contract and every provider freely decides to sign it or not. The main finding is that the decision of the third-party payer depends on the surplus to be shared. When it is relatively high the third-party payer prefers the any willing provider system. When, on the contrary, the surplus is relatively low, the third-party payer will select one of the other two systems accor ing to how bargaining power is distributed.

Negotiation advantages of professional associations in health care

In several instances, third-party payers negotiate prices of health care services with providers. We show that a third-party payer may prefer to deal with a professional association than with the sub-set constituted by the more efficient providers, and then apply the same price to all providers. The reason for it is the increase in the bargaining position of providers. The more efficient providers are also the ones with higher profits in the event of negotiation failure. This allows them to ext act a higher surplus from the third-party payer.

Stability and manipulation in representative democracies

This paper is devoted to the analysis of all constitutions equipped with electoral systems involving two step procedures. First, one candidate is elected in every jurisdiction by the electors in that jurisdiction, according to some aggregation procedure. Second, another aggregation procedure collects the names of the jurisdictional winners in order to designate the final winner. It appears that whenever individuals are allowed to change jurisdiction when casting their ballot, they are able to manipulate the result of the election except in very few cases. When imposing a paretian condition on every jurisdictions voting rule, it is shown that, in the case of any finite number of candidates, any two steps voting rule that is not manipulable by movement of the electors necessarily gives to every voter the power of overruling the unanimity on its own. A characterization of the set of these rules is next provided in the case of two candidates.

Organisational structure, communication and group ethics

This paper investigates experimentally how organisational decision processes affect the moral motivations of actors inside a firm that must forego profits to reduce harming a third party. In a "vertical" treatment, one insider unilaterally sets the harm-reduction strategy; the other can only accept or quit. In a "horizontal" treatment, the insiders decide by consensus. Our 2-by-2 design also controls for communication effects. In our data, communication makes vertical firms more ethical; voice appears to mitigate "responsibility-alleviation" in that subordinates with voice feel responsible for what their firms do. Vertical firms are then more ethical than the horizontal firms for which our bargaining data reveal a dynamic form of responsibility-alleviation and our chat data indicate a strong "insider-outsider" effect.

Political autonomy and independence: theory and experimental evidence

We study the process by which subordinated regions of a country can obtain a more favourable political status. In our theoretical model a dominant and a dominated region first interact through a voting process that can lead to different degrees of autonomy. If this process fails then both regions engage in a costly political conflict which can only lead to the maintenance of the initial subordination of the region in question or to its complete independence. In the subgame-perfect equilibrium the voting process always leads to an intermediate arrangement acceptable for both parts. Hence, the costly political struggle never occurs. In contrast, in our experiments we observe a large amount of fighting involving high material losses, even in a case in which the possibilities for an arrangement without conflict are very salient. In our experimental environment intermediate solutions are feasible and stable, but purely emotional elements prevent them from being reached.