A nucleolar protein related to ribosomal protein L7 is required for an early step in large ribosomal subunit biogenesis

The Saccharomyces cerevisiae Rlp7 protein has extensive identity and similarity to the large ribosomal subunit L7 proteins and shares an RNA-binding domain with them. Rlp7p is not a ribosomal protein; however, it is encoded by an essential gene and therefore must perform a function essential for cell growth. In this report, we show that Rlp7p is a nucleolar protein that plays a critical role in processing of precursors to the large ribosomal subunit RNAs. Pulse–chase labeling experiments with Rlp7p-depleted cells reveal that neither 5.8SS, 5.8SL, nor 25S is produced, indicating that both the major and minor processing pathways are affected. Analysis of processing intermediates by primer extension indicates that Rlp7p-depleted cells accumulate the 27SA3 precursor RNA, which is normally the major substrate (85%) used to produce the 5.8S and 25S rRNAs, and the ratio of 27SBL to 27SBS precursors changes from approximately 1:8 to 8:1 (depleted cells). Because 27SA3 is the direct precursor to 27SBS, we conclude that Rlp7p is specifically required for the 5′ to 3′ exonucleolytic trimming of the 27SA3 into the 27SBS precursor. As it is essential for processing in both the major and minor pathways, we propose that Rlp7p may act as a specificity factor that binds precursor rRNAs and tethers the enzymes that carry out the early 5′ to 3′ exonucleolytic reactions that generate the mature rRNAs. Rlp7p may also be required for the endonucleolytic cleavage in internal transcribed spacer 2 that separates the 5.8S rRNA from the 25S rRNA.

Differential Control of Xanthophylls and Light-Induced Stress Proteins, as Opposed to Light-Harvesting Chlorophyll a/b Proteins, during Photosynthetic Acclimation of Barley Leaves to Light Irradiance

Barley (Hordeum vulgare L.) plants were grown at different photon flux densities ranging from 100 to 1800 μmol m−2 s−1 in air and/or in atmospheres with reduced levels of O2 and CO2. Low O2 and CO2 partial pressures allowed plants to grow under high photosystem II (PSII) excitation pressure, estimated in vivo by chlorophyll fluorescence measurements, at moderate photon flux densities. The xanthophyll-cycle pigments, the early light-inducible proteins, and their mRNA accumulated with increasing PSII excitation pressure irrespective of the way high excitation pressure was obtained (high-light irradiance or decreased CO2 and O2 availability). These findings indicate that the reduction state of electron transport chain components could be involved in light sensing for the regulation of nuclear-encoded chloroplast gene expression. In contrast, no correlation was found between the reduction state of PSII and various indicators of the PSII light-harvesting system, such as the chlorophyll a-to-b ratio, the abundance of the major pigment-protein complex of PSII (LHCII), the mRNA level of LHCII, the light-saturation curve of O2 evolution, and the induced chlorophyll-fluorescence rise. We conclude that the chlorophyll antenna size of PSII is not governed by the redox state of PSII in higher plants and, consequently, regulation of early light-inducible protein synthesis is different from that of LHCII.

Análisis traductológico de la obra paremiográfica de Charles Cahier, (francés-español)

This thesis contains a translatological analysis of the Spanish proverbs collected by Charles Cahier in Quelque six mille proverbes et aphorismes usuels empruntés à notre âge et aux siècles derniers. Proverbs and other sententious sayings are part of our day-to-day life, and are more or less intensely used according to cultures and their types of speech. They have always existed in every single civilisation. There is, indeed, no denying that the purpose of proverbs is to convey an old experience. They are quoted by major philosophers and writers of all times. As a result of the interest they have raised, books of proverbs have been published for many centuries in a high number of countries. Proverbs can be found everywhere, both in professional and personal settings, or in a conversation between friends. In France, these sayings are more commonly used in literature than in spoken language, whereas in Spain proverbs can be found at all levels of communication. In this regard, it is interesting to compare the translations of international works to detect a number of misunderstandings regarding the interpretation of paremiological elements. This is why translating proverbs is a genuine, complex issue. This thesis, which is aimed at Spanish and French speakers (including native and foreign speakers), has a double application (translatological and linguistic) and falls within the context of translatological and comparative paremiology...

Letters from John Murray Forbes to William Tudor,

Seven letters in which Forbes updates Tudor on relations between the provinces and provides introductions to various Argentinian diplomats sent to Brazil. He also includes a copy of a letter in Spanish sent to him from the Argentinian minister of war and foreign relations regarding peace negotiations with Brazil along with letters to the United States legation and Tudor regarding American involvement in light of the Monroe Doctrine.

Balkan Peninsula Region, 1800 (Raster Image)

This layer is a georeferenced raster image of the historic paper map entitled: Charte vom Türkischen Reiche in Europa : nach den neuesten astronomischen Ortsbestim[m]ungen entworfen und berichtiget auf der Sternwarte Seeberg bey Gotha, gezeichnet von I. C. M. Reinecke. It was published by Verlag des Industrie-Comptoirs in 1800. Scale [ca. 1:3,500,000]. Covers the Balkan Peninsula region. Map in German.The image inside the map neatline is georeferenced to the surface of the earth and fit to the Europe Lambert Conformal Conic coordinate system. All map collar and inset information is also available as part of the raster image, including any inset maps, profiles, statistical tables, directories, text, illustrations, index maps, legends, or other information associated with the principal map. This map shows features such as drainage, cities and other human settlements, territorial boundaries, shoreline features, and more. Relief shown by hachures.This layer is part of a selection of digitally scanned and georeferenced historic maps from the Harvard Map Collection. These maps typically portray both natural and manmade features. The selection represents a range of originators, ground condition dates, scales, and map purposes.

De Gaulle and Europe: Historical Revision and Social Science Theory. Program for the Study of Germany and Europe Working Paper Series 8.5

The thousands of books and articles on Charles de Gaulle's policy toward European integration, whether written by historians, social scientists, or commentators, universally accord primary explanatory importance to the General's distinctive geopolitical ideology. In explaining his motivations, only secondary significance, if any at all, is attached to commercial considerations. This paper seeks to reverse this historiographical consensus by examining the four major decisions toward European integration during de Gaulle's presidency: the decisions to remain in the Common Market in 1958, to propose the Foucher Plan in the early 1960s, to veto British accession to the EC, and to provoke the "empty chair" crisis in 1965-1966, resulting in the "Luxembourg Compromise." In each case, the overwhelming bulk of the primary evidence-speeches, memoirs, or government documents-suggests that de Gaulle's primary motivation was economic, not geopolitical or ideological. Like his predecessors and successors, de Gaulle sought to promote French industry and agriculture by establishing protected markets for their export products. This empirical finding has three broader implications: (1) For those interesred in the European Union, it suggests that regional integration has been driven primarily by economic, not geopolitical considerations--even in the "least likely" case. (2) For those interested in the role of ideas in foreign policy, it suggests that strong interest groups in a democracy limit the impact of a leader's geopolitical ideology--even where the executive has very broad institutional autonomy. De Gaulle was a democratic statesman first and an ideological visionary second. (3) For those who employ qualitative case-study methods, it suggests that even a broad, representative sample of secondary sources does not create a firm basis for causal inference. For political scientists, as for historians, there is in many cases no reliable alternative to primary-source research.

Does ASEM work? CEPS Policy Brief No. 321, 14 October 2014

This CEPS Policy Brief is based on a larger study for the EEAS and European Commission, written by the same authors in the run-up of the Milan ASEM summit of 16-17 October 2014. The main idea of the study is to assess whether ASEM works and how, by verifying the factual evidence in detail. After all, ASEM has no institutions, no budget and no treaty, whilst dialogues and a loose improvement over time in Asia-Europe relations refer to process much more than genuine ‘results’. The stocktaking covers all ASEM activities since the 2006 Helsinki summit. Summit and foreign ministers’ declarations and ASEM calendar of activities (and interviews) are used to trace ASEM activities in the three ASEM pillars (political, economic, and peoples-to-peoples/cultural). All the ‘regular’ ASEM meetings at ministerial and other levels (many of which are only known to relatively few) have been mapped. Also the ASEM working methods, based on the 2000 AECF framework and many subsequent initiatives, have been scrutinised, including whether they are actually implemented or not or partially. Such methods refer to how to work together in areas of cooperation (beyond the typical ASEM dialogue), organisation, coordination and ASEM visibility. The main conclusion is that ASEM works reasonably well, once one accepts the ASEM of today, although some inefficiencies still characterise the ‘system’. There is a host of secondary conclusions on the three pillars, the foreign ministers, the strong government-to-government nature of ASEM and the working methods. We recommend that today’s ASEM needs no reform and that not having ASEM would entail political and diplomatic costs. We emphasise that ASEM is well placed to stimulate exchange of information between the mega-FTAs such as TPP, RCEP and TTIP. However, the ASEM of tomorrow might be different, given the great changes in geo-political and economic conditions since ASEM began in the mid-1990s. Moreover, the size of ASEM has become such that classical ways of operating with (after Milano) 53 countries (including the EU and ASEAN) cannot possibly be effective all the time. We suggest that, in the run-up to the 20th ASEM birthday (2016), EU and Asian independent think-tanks get together to write an ‘options report’ reconsidering options for a new ASEM, as the basis for a profound and wide debate how to get more value-added out of ASEM.

The Pro-Western Turn in Russia's Foreign Policy: Causes, Consequences and Prospects. OSW Point of View, September 2002

From Europe and Poland's point of view, one of the most important recent developments in international politics was the re-orientation of Russia's foreign policy. This paper aims to answer three important questions relating to this issue: 4. When and why did the "pro-Western turn" in the Russian Federation's policy take place? 5. Has it been profitable for Russia? 6. What goals will the Russian policy pursue in the future? An analysis of the last two years in Russia's foreign policy leads to the several conclusions, including those: 5. Clearly, the Russian leaders realise that in the longer term, Russia - in its desire for more influence in the world - will not be able to survive as an independent pole of power in international politics and it will have to join forces with the West (most likely, the European Union). 6. September 11 was not the cause of Russia's pro-Western turn, but rather a catalyst that put the process which started when Vladimir Putin took his office in sharp focus. 7. In the nearest future, this new direction of Russia's foreign policy seems not be challenged by internal opposition in Russia. 8. The "pro-Western turn" proved to be beneficial for Russia, although: d. Russia has not become a strategic ally of the US e. There has been no breakthrough in the relations between Russia and the European Union, and Moscow has not gained any real influence on NATO's important decisions. f. Russia has not become a major decision-maker of international politics. 5. Russia's closing to the West is in Poland's and Europe's interest.

The "Pro-Western Turn" in Russia's Foreign Policy: Causes, Consequences and Prospects. OSW Point of View (unspecified), September 2002

From Europe and Poland's point of view, one of the most important recent developments in international politics was the re-orientation of Russia's foreign policy. This paper aims to answer three important questions relating to this issue: 1. When and why did the "pro-Western turn" in the Russian Federation's policy take place? 2. Has it been profitable for Russia? 3. What goals will the Russian policy pursue in the future? An analysis of the last two years in Russia's foreign policy leads to the several conclusions, including those: a. Clearly, the Russian leaders realise that in the longer term, Russia - in its desire for more influence in the world - will not be able to survive as an independent pole of power in international politics and it will have to join forces with the West (most likely, the European Union). b. September 11 was not the cause of Russia's pro-Western turn, but rather a catalyst that put the process which started when Vladimir Putin took his office in sharp focus. 7. In the nearest future, this new direction of Russia's foreign policy seems not be challenged by internal opposition in Russia. c. The "pro-Western turn" proved to be beneficial for Russia, although: d. Russia has not become a strategic ally of the US e. There has been no breakthrough in the relations between Russia and the European Union, and Moscow has not gained any real influence on NATO's important decisions. f. Russia has not become a major decision-maker of international politics. g. Russia's closing to the West is in Poland's and Europe's interest.

Tunisia. Supervising Tunisian Elections by civil society: How to improve it? Arab Citizenship Review No. 7. January 2015

Introduction. On October 26, 2014, Tunisia held its second democratic legislative elections. Participation among more than 5 million registered voters was at about 60%, a relatively good turnout for the country, compared to the 52% voters in 2011. Preliminary results for the 33 constituencies (27 within the country and 6 for expatriates) reveal that secular frontrunner Nidaa Tounes (Call of Tunisia) won around 37% percent of votes while moderate Islamist party Ennahdha, winner of the 2011 elections and leader of Tunisia’s post-revolution government, received 27% of votes. Other parties with notable percentages are the Free Patriotic Union (French: UPL) with 4.4% and the leftist party, Popular Front, with 3.7%. Legislative were immediately followed by two round presidential elections the first one held on November 23, the second one after one month. Conversely to what was expected, people were more attracted by presidential elections even though president has notably less prerogatives than the parliament: representing the state, he is mainly responsible for determining the general state policies in the domains of defense, foreign relations and national security (article 76.) This paradox is ascribed to national imaginary more confident in a “Zaïm” (leader) rather than a collective institution such as a parliament. The turnout was at about 64% within the national 27 constituencies. Out of 70 candidates (including 5 female), 27 (with only one female) met the legal requirements to run for the presidency. The result confirms the legislative trend and Beji Caid Essebsi, leader of Nidaa, was proclaimed the third President of Tunisia. He gained 39.46% of the votes at the first round elections. Essebsi was followed by Moncef Marzouki who received an unexpected score (33.43%) at the first round, thanks to the support of Ennahdha audience and to an active and insistent campaign focused on the idea that revolution is threatened by old regime guard “come-back.” Rewarded for his long militant live, the extreme leftist Hamma Hammami in a new look gained 7,8% of the votes while the new comer Slim Riahi received 5,5% despite rumors circulating on his personal reputation. Notably, Kalthoum Kennou gained 0,55% (18.287 votes) but listed eleventh out of 27.

De Gaulle and Europe: Historical Revision and Social Science Theory. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 08.5, 1998

The thousands of books and articles on Charles de Gaulle's policy toward European integration, whether written by historians, political scientists, or commentators, universally accord primary explanatory importance to the General's distinctive geopolitical ideology. In explaining his motivations, only secondary significance, if any at all, is attached to commercial considerations. This paper seeks to reverse this historiographical consensus by the four major decisions toward European integration taken under de Gaulle's Presidency: the decisions to remain in the Common Market in 1958, to propose the Fouchet Plan in the early 1960s, to veto British accession to the EC, and to provoke the "empty chair" crisis in 1965-1966, resulting in Luxembourg Compromise. In each case, the overwhelming bulk of the primary evidence speeches, memoirs, or government documents suggests that de Gaulle's primary motivation was economic, not geopolitical or ideological. Like his predecessors and successors, de Gaulle sought to promote French industry and agriculture by establishing protected markets for their export products. This empirical finding has three broader implications: (1) For those interested in the European Union, it suggests that regional integration has been driven primarily by economic, not geopolitical considerations even in the least likely case. (2) For those interested in the role of ideas in foreign policy, it suggests that strong interest groups in a democracy limit the impact of a leaders geopolitical ideology even where the executive has very broad institutional autonomy. De Gaulle was a democratic statesman first and an ideological visionary second. (3) For those who employ qualitative case-study methods, it suggests that even a broad, representative sample of secondary sources does not create a firm basis for causal inference. For political scientists, as for historians, there is in many cases no reliable alternative to primary source research.

When Labour and Capital Collude: The Varieties of Welfare Capitalism and Early Retirement in Europe, Japan and the USA. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 00.4, 2000

The institutionalisation of early retirement has become a universal feature of postwar industrial economies, though there are significant cross-national variations. This paper studies the impact of different types of welfare regimes, production systems and labour relations on early exit from work. After an analysis of the main trends, the paper discusses the costs and benefits of early retirement for the various actors — labour, capital and the state — at different levels. The paper outlines both the "pull” and "push” factors of early exit. It first compares the distinct welfare state regimes and private occupational pensions in their impact on early retirement. Then it looks at the labour-shedding strategies inherent to particular employment regimes, production systems and financial governance structures. Finally, the impact of particular industrial relations systems, and especially the role of unions is discussed. The paper finds intricate "institutional complementarities” between particular welfare states, production regimes and industrial relations systems, and these structure the incentives under which actors make decisions on work and retirement. The paper argues that the "collusion” between capital, labour and the state in pursuing early retirement is not merely following a labour-shedding strategy to ease mass unemployment, but also caused by the need for economic restructuration, the downsizing pressures from financial markets, the maintenance of peaceful labour relations, and the consequences of a seniority employment system.

Social Content of the International Sphere: Symbols and Meaning in Franco-German Relations, CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 02.2, 2002

“The Franco-German friendship is rich in memories and gestures that are at once important and symbolic, and that characterize the exceptional nature of the relationship between our two countries,” reflects former French economics minister and European Commission President Jacques Delors. Such symbolic acts and joint memories are not primarily about cooperation in specific instances. Rather, more generally, they denote what it means to act together. They lend significance to a relationship; they signify what is “at stake,” or what it is “all about.” They are about a deeper and more general social purpose underlying specific instances of cooperation. They are about the value and intrinsic importance that social relations incorporate. Symbols contribute to the institutionalization of social meaning and social purpose in dealing with one another. In this paper I clarify the concept of “predominantly symbolic acts and practices among states,” systematically explore such acts for the bilateral Franco-German relationship between the late 1950s and the mid-1990s, and scrutinize the specific meaning and effects that these practices have helped to generate and perpetuate.

Five things we need to know about the on-demand economy. CEPS Essay No. 21/8 January 2016

The last few years have witnessed the exponential growth of platforms like Uber and Airbnb and the creation of countless other less well-known examples. The expansion of the on-demand economy puts huge pressure on regulators to adapt it to the existing frameworks for labour and taxation. The rapid growth of the sector also divides experts: it is seen by many as threat for working conditions, and by others as an incredible opportunity. The purpose of this essay is to take a balanced perspective on what we know about the on-demand economy and what needs further investigation. More research is needed on the individual cases before one can draw conclusions on how this new sector works. The political economy of the sector is made even more interesting by the fact that the technology is developing faster than the regulation. Yet, our plea to policy-makers is to refrain from legislating too early and to take the time to understand how the supply and the demand of these services behave and their equilibrium.

Alternatives to bilateral economic aid.

At head of title: 93d Congress, 1st session. Committee print.