963 resultados para Greenback Labor Party (U.S.)
Resumo:
In the months following the reopening of the Japanese market to imports of U.S. beef on July 26, 2006, Japanese importers were unable to procure adequate supplies. This paper discusses reasons for early supply shortages and some of the policy and trade issues that will affect demand for U.S. beef in the short to medium term. The paper also discusses current marketing efforts for domestic and imported beef, new marketing technologies, and general consumer trends. The information presented in this paper includes on-site observations and data from meetings with Japanese importers and retailers and industry experts during market research in Tokyo and Osaka in November 2006.
Resumo:
Projections of U.S. ethanol production and its impacts on planted acreage, crop prices, livestock production and prices, trade, and retail food costs are presented under the assumption that current tax credits and trade policies are maintained. The projections were made using a multi-product, multi-country deterministic partial equilibrium model. The impacts of higher oil prices, a drought combined with an ethanol mandate, and removal of land from the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) relative to baseline projections are also presented. The results indicate that expanded U.S. ethanol production will cause long-run crop prices to increase. In response to higher feed costs, livestock farmgate prices will increase enough to cover the feed cost increases. Retail meat, egg, and dairy prices will also increase. If oil prices are permanently $10-per-barrel higher than assumed in the baseline projections, U.S. ethanol will expand significantly. The magnitude of the expansion will depend on the future makeup of the U.S. automobile fleet. If sufficient demand for E-85 from flex-fuel vehicles is available, corn-based ethanol production is projected to increase to over 30 billion gallons per year with the higher oil prices. The direct effect of higher feed costs is that U.S. food prices would increase by a minimum of 1.1% over baseline levels. Results of a model of a 1988-type drought combined with a large mandate for continued ethanol production show sharply higher crop prices, a drop in livestock production, and higher food prices. Corn exports would drop significantly, and feed costs would rise. Wheat feed use would rise sharply. Taking additional land out of the CRP would lower crop prices in the short run. But because long-run corn prices are determined by ethanol prices and not by corn acreage, the long-run impacts on commodity prices and food prices of a smaller CRP are modest. Cellulosic ethanol from switchgrass and biodiesel from soybeans do not become economically viable in the Corn Belt under any of the scenarios. This is so because high energy costs that increase the prices of biodiesel and switchgrass ethanol also increase the price of cornbased ethanol. So long as producers can choose between soybeans for biodiesel, switchgrass for ethanol, and corn for ethanol, they will choose to grow corn. Cellulosic ethanol from corn stover does not enter into any scenario because of the high cost of collecting and transporting corn stover over the large distances required to supply a commercial-sized ethanol facility.
Resumo:
Previous studies have found evidence of a self-serving bias in bargaining and dispute resolution. We use experimental data to test for this effect in a simulated labor relatonship. We finda consistent discrepancy between employer beliefs and employee actions that can only be attributed to self-serving biases. This discrepancy is evident through stated beliefs, revealed satisfaction, and actual actions. We present evidenceand discuss implications.
Resumo:
While papers such as Akerlof and Yellen (1990) and Rabin (1993) argue that psychological considerations such as fairness and reciprocity are important in individual decision-making, there is little explicit empirical evidence of reciprocal altruism in economic environments. This paper tests whether attribution of volition in choosing a wage has a significant effect on subsequent costly effort provision. An experiment was conducted in which subjects are first randomly divided into groups of employers and employees. Wages were selected and employees asked to choose an effort level, where increased effort is costly to the employee, but highly beneficial to the employer. The wage-determination process was common knowledge and wages were chosen either by the employer or by an external process. There is evidence for both distributional concerns and reciprocal altruism. The slope of the effort/wage profile is clearly positive in all cases, but is significantly higher when wages are chosen by the employer, offering support for the hypothesis of reciprocity. There are implications for models of utility and a critique of some current models is presented.
Resumo:
OBJECTIVE: To compare the adverse neonatal and maternal outcomes after medically indicated and elective labor induction. Both induction groups were also compared to women with spontaneous onset of labor. METHOD: Retrospective cohort study of 13 971 women with live, cephalic singleton pregnancies who delivered at term (from 1997 to 2007). Adverse maternal and neonatal outcomes were compared between women who underwent an induction of labor in the presence and absence of standard medical indications. RESULTS: Among 5090 patients with induced labor, 2059 (40.5%) underwent elective labor inductions, defined as inductions without any medical or obstetrical indication. Risks of cesarean or instrumental delivery, postpartum hemorrhage >500 ml, prolonged maternal hospitalization >6 days, Apgar<7 at 5 min of life, arterial umbilical cord pH<7.1, admission in neonatal intensive care unit (NICU) and prolonged NICU hospitalization >7 days were similar between nulliparous who underwent elective and medical labor induction. Similar results were obtained for multiparous. All the above mentioned risks, but the Apgar<7 at 5 min of life, were significantly increased after induction in comparison to spontaneous labor. CONCLUSION: Elective induction of labor carries similar obstetrical and neonatal risks as a medically indicated labor induction. Thus, elective induction of labor should be strongly discouraged.
Resumo:
In this work we study older workers (50 64) labor force transitions after a health/disability shock. We find that the probability of keeping working decreases with both age and severity of the shock. Moreover, we find strong interactions between age and severity in the 50 64 age range and none in the 30 49 age range. Regarding demographics we find that being female and married reduce the probability of keeping work. On the contrary, being main breadwinner, education and skill levels increase it. Interestingly, the effect of some demographics changes its sign when we look at transitions from inactivity to work. This is the case of being married or having a working spouse. Undoubtedly, leisure complementarities should play a role in the latter case. Since the data we use contains a very detailed information on disabilities, we are able to evaluate the marginal effect of each type of disability either in the probability of keeping working or in returning back to work. Some of these results may have strong policy implications.
Resumo:
Standard economic analysis holds that labor market rigidities are harmfulfor job creation and typically increase unemployment. But many orthodoxreforms of the labor market have proved difficult to implement because ofpolitical opposition. For these reasons it is important to explain why weobserve such regulations. In this paper I outline a theory of how they may arise and why they fit together. This theory is fully developed in aforthcoming book (Saint-Paul (2000)), to which the reader is referred forfurther details.
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Unemployment rates in developed countries have recently reached levels not seenin a generation, and workers of all ages are facing increasing probabilities of losingtheir jobs and considerable losses in accumulated assets. These events likely increasethe reliance that most older workers will have on public social insurance programs,exactly at a time that public finances are suffering from a large drop in contributions.Our paper explicitly accounts for employment uncertainty and unexpectedwealth shocks, something that has been relatively overlooked in the literature, butthat has grown in importance in recent years. Using administrative and householdlevel data we empirically characterize a life-cycle model of retirement and claimingdecisions in terms of the employment, wage, health, and mortality uncertainty facedby individuals. Our benchmark model explains with great accuracy the strikinglyhigh proportion of individuals who claim benefits exactly at the Early RetirementAge, while still explaining the increased claiming hazard at the Normal RetirementAge. We also discuss some policy experiments and their interplay with employmentuncertainty. Additionally, we analyze the effects of negative wealth shocks on thelabor supply and claiming decisions of older Americans. Our results can explainwhy early claiming has remained very high in the last years even as the early retirementpenalties have increased substantially compared with previous periods, andwhy labor force participation has remained quite high for older workers even in themidst of the worse employment crisis in decades.
Resumo:
Firms select not only how many, but also which workers to hire. Yet, in standardsearch models of the labor market, all workers have the same probability of being hired.We argue that selective hiring crucially affects welfare analysis. Our model is isomorphicto a search model under random hiring but allows for selective hiring. With selectivehiring, the positive predictions of the model change very little, but the welfare costsof unemployment are much larger because unemployment risk is distributed unequallyacross workers. As a result, optimal unemployment insurance may be higher and welfareis lower if hiring is selective.
Resumo:
Using new quarterly data for hours worked in OECD countries, Ohanian and Raffo (2011) argue that in many OECD countries, particularly in Europe, hours per worker are quantitatively important as an intensive margin of labor adjustment, possibly because labor market frictions are higher than in the US. I argue that this conclusion is not supported by the data. Using the same data on hours worked, I find evidence that labor market frictions are higher in Europe than in the US, like Ohanian and Raffo, but also that these frictions seem to affect the intensive margin at least as much as the extensive margin of labor adjustment.