Development of a new isogeometric finite element and its application for Lamb wave based structural health monitoring

Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Maschinenbau, Diss., 2012

Hausman tests for inefficient estimators: application to demand for health care service (revised)

The Hausman (1978) test is based on the vector of differences of two estimators. It is usually assumed that one of the estimators is fully efficient, since this simplifies calculation of the test statistic. However, this assumption limits the applicability of the test, since widely used estimators such as the generalized method of moments (GMM) or quasi maximum likelihood (QML) are often not fully efficient. This paper shows that the test may easily be implemented, using well-known methods, when neither estimator is efficient. To illustrate, we present both simulation results as well as empirical results for utilization of health care services.

Preventive health care and payment systems to providers

Prevention has been a main issue of recent policy orientations in health care. This renews the interest on how different organizational designs and the definition of payment schemes to providers may affect the incentives to provide preventive health care. We present, both the normative and the positive analyses of the change from independent providers to integrated services. We show the evaluation of that change to depend on the particular way payment to providers is done. We focus on the externality resulting from referral decisions from primary to acute care providers. This makes our analysis complementary to most works in the literature allowing to address in a more direct way the issue of preventive health care.

Venture capital meets contract theory: risky claims or formal control?

This paper develops a theory of the joint allocation of formal control and cash-flow rights in venture capital deals. We argue that when the need for investor support calls for very high-powered outside claims, entrepreneurs should optimally retain formal control in order to avoid excessive interference. Hence, we predict that risky claims should be be negatively correlated to control rights, both along the life of a start-up and across deals. This challenges the idea that risky claims should a ways be associated to more formal control, and is in line with contractual terms increasingly used in venture capital, in corporate venturing and in partnership deals between biotech start-ups and large drug companies. The paper provides a theoretical explanation to some puzzling evidence documented in Gompers (1997) and Kaplan and Stromberg (2000), namely the inclusion in venture capital contracts of contingencies that trigger both a reduction in VC control and the conversion! of her preferred stocks into common stocks.

Selecting negotiation processes with Health Care

We address the question of how a third-party payer (e.g. an insurer) decides what providers to contract with. Three different mechanisms are studied and their properties compared. A first mechanism consists in the third-party payer setting up a bargaining procedure with both providers jointly and simultaneously. A second mechanism envisages the outcome of the same simultaneous bargaining but independently with every provider. Finally, the last mechanism is of different nature. It is the so-called "any willing provider" where the third-party payer announces a contract and every provider freely decides to sign it or not. The main finding is that the decision of the third-party payer depends on the surplus to be shared. When it is relatively high the third-party payer prefers the any willing provider system. When, on the contrary, the surplus is relatively low, the third-party payer will select one of the other two systems accor ing to how bargaining power is distributed.

Negotiation advantages of professional associations in health care

In several instances, third-party payers negotiate prices of health care services with providers. We show that a third-party payer may prefer to deal with a professional association than with the sub-set constituted by the more efficient providers, and then apply the same price to all providers. The reason for it is the increase in the bargaining position of providers. The more efficient providers are also the ones with higher profits in the event of negotiation failure. This allows them to ext act a higher surplus from the third-party payer.

Violence: les femmes font confiance au milieu médical [Partner violence: women trust health professionals]

In 2008, the department of gynaecology and obstetrics of a university hospital centre implemented a program addressing interpersonal partner violence (screening, prevention and care of the patient victims). A qualitative survey was conducted to identify the needs and feelings of patients. The results show that patients are in favour of being actively and directly questioned about violence during the consultation and that they trust medical doctors and nurses to help and support them.

Screening primary-care patients forgoing health care for economic reasons.

BACKGROUND: Growing social inequities have made it important for general practitioners to verify if patients can afford treatment and procedures. Incorporating social conditions into clinical decision-making allows general practitioners to address mismatches between patients' health-care needs and financial resources. OBJECTIVES: Identify a screening question to, indirectly, rule out patients' social risk of forgoing health care for economic reasons, and estimate prevalence of forgoing health care and the influence of physicians' attitudes toward deprivation. DESIGN: Multicenter cross-sectional survey. PARTICIPANTS: Forty-seven general practitioners working in the French-speaking part of Switzerland enrolled a random sample of patients attending their private practices. MAIN MEASURES: Patients who had forgone health care were defined as those reporting a household member (including themselves) having forgone treatment for economic reasons during the previous 12 months, through a self-administered questionnaire. Patients were also asked about education and income levels, self-perceived social position, and deprivation levels. KEY RESULTS: Overall, 2,026 patients were included in the analysis; 10.7% (CI95% 9.4-12.1) reported a member of their household to have forgone health care during the 12 previous months. The question "Did you have difficulties paying your household bills during the last 12 months" performed better in identifying patients at risk of forgoing health care than a combination of four objective measures of socio-economic status (gender, age, education level, and income) (R(2) = 0.184 vs. 0.083). This question effectively ruled out that patients had forgone health care, with a negative predictive value of 96%. Furthermore, for physicians who felt powerless in the face of deprivation, we observed an increase in the odds of patients forgoing health care of 1.5 times. CONCLUSION: General practitioners should systematically evaluate the socio-economic status of their patients. Asking patients whether they experience any difficulties in paying their bills is an effective means of identifying patients who might forgo health care.