Distortion of surface groups in Cat (0) free-by-cyclic groups

Given a non-positively curved 2-complex with a circle-valued Morse function satisfying some extra combinatorial conditions, we describe how to locally isometrically embed this in a larger non- positively curved 2-complex with free-by-cyclic fundamental group. This embedding procedure is used to produce examples of CAT(0) free-by-cyclic groups that contain closed hyperbolic surface subgroups with polynomial distortion of arbitrary degree. We also produce examples of CAT(0) hyperbolic free-by-cyclic groups that contain closed hyperbolic surface subgroups that are exponentially distorted.

An illustrated flora of the northern United States, Canada and the British possessions, from Newfoundland to the parallel of the southern boundary of Virginia, and from the Atlantic Ocean westward to the 102d meridian, by Nathaniel Lord Britton and Addison Brown. The descriptive text chiefly prepared by Britton, with the assistance of specialists in several groups; the figures also drawn under his supervision.

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Historia general y natural de las Indias, islas y tierra-firme del mar oceano,

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A proof that all Seifert 3-manifold groups and all virtual surface groups are conjugacy separable

We prove that the fundamental group of any Seifert 3-manifold is conjugacy separable. That is, conjugates may be distinguished infinite quotients or, equivalently, conjugacy classes are closed in the pro-finite topology.

Metrics on diagram groups and uniform embeddings in a Hilbert space

"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt".

Historia general y natural de las Indias, islas y tierra-firme del mar oceano,

1

An illustrated flora of the northern United States, Canada and the British possessions, from Newfoundland to the parallel of the southern boundary of Virginia, and from the Atlantic Ocean westward to the 102d meridian, by Nathaniel Lord Britton and Addison Brown. The descriptive text chiefly prepared by Britton, with the assistance of specialists in several groups; the figures also drawn under his supervision.

3

The private and fiscal returns to schooling and the effect of public policies on private incentives to invest in education: a general framework and some results for the EU

This paper develops a comprehensive framework for the quantitative analysis of the private and fiscal returns to schooling and of the effect of public policies on private incentives to invest in education. This framework is applied to 14 member states of the European Union. For each of these countries, we construct estimates of the private return to an additional year of schooling for an individual of average attainment, taking into account the effects of education on wages and employment probabilities after allowing for academic failure rates, the direct and opportunity costs of schooling, and the impact of personal taxes, social security contributions and unemployment and pension benefits on net incomes. We also construct a set of effective tax and subsidy rates that measure the effects of different public policies on the private returns to education, and measures of the fiscal returns to schooling that capture the long-term effects of a marginal increase in attainment on public finances under c

When does universal peace prevail? Secession and group formation in rent seeking contests and policy conflicts

This paper analyzes secession and group formation in a general model of contest inspired by Esteban and Ray (1999). This model encompasses as special cases rent seeking contests and policy conflicts, where agents lobby over the choice of a policy in a one-dimensional policy space. We show that in both models the grand coalition is the efficient coalition structure and agents are always better off in the grand coalition than in a symmetric coalition structure. Individual agents (in the rent seeking contest) and extremists (in the policy conflict) only have an incentive to secede when they anticipate that their secession will not be followed by additional secessions. Incentives to secede are lower when agents cooperate inside groups. The grand coalition emerges as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of a sequential game of coalition formation in rent seeking contests.

General equilibrium with asymmetric information: a dual approach

We study markets where the characteristics or decisions of certain agents are relevant but not known to their trading partners. Assuming exclusive transactions, the environment is described as a continuum economy with indivisible commodities. We characterize incentive efficient allocations as solutions to linear programming problems and appeal to duality theory to demonstrate the generic existence of external effects in these markets. Because under certain conditions such effects may generate non-convexities, randomization emerges as a theoretic possibility. In characterizing market equilibria we show that, consistently with the personalized nature of transactions, prices are generally non-linear in the underlying consumption. On the other hand, external effects may have critical implications for market efficiency. With adverse selection, in fact, cross-subsidization across agents with different private information may be necessary for optimality, and so, the market need not even achieve an incentive efficient allocation. In contrast, for the case of a single commodity, we find that when informational asymmetries arise after the trading period (e.g. moral hazard; ex post hidden types) external effects are fully internalized at a market equilibrium.

Pressure groups and experts in environmental regulation

We study a problem of adverse selection in the context of environmental regulation, where the firm may suffer from a certain degree of ignorance about its own type. In a framework like the construction of a certain infrastructure project, the presence of ignorance about its impact on the environment, can play an important role in the determination of the regulatory policy. First, an optimal contract is constructed for any exogenous level of ignorance. Second, the presence of potentially informed third-parties is studied from the perspective of the regulator, which allows us to analyze the impact on the efficiency of the contract, of the presence of environmentalists and of experts. Then, we obtain some insights on how the problem differs when the degree of ignorance is a choice variable for the firm. We finally use our results to derive policy implications concerning the existing envoronmental regulation, and the potential role of interested parties as information providers.

Bidding for the surplus: realizing efficient outcomes in general economic environments

In this paper, we consider two classes of economic environments. In the first type, agents are faced with the task of providing local public goods that will benefit some or all of them. In the second type, economic activity takes place via formation of links. Agents need both to both form a network and decide how to share the output generated. For both scenarios, we suggest a bidding mechanism whereby agents bid for the right to decide upon the organization of the economic activity. The subgame perfect equilibria of this game generate efficient outcomes.

Pure braid subgroups of braided Thompson's groups

"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt."

Endogenous population subgroups: the best population partition and optimal number of groups

The aim of this paper is to suggest a method to find endogenously the points that group the individuals of a given distribution in k clusters, where k is endogenously determined. These points are the cut-points. Thus, we need to determine a partition of the N individuals into a number k of groups, in such way that individuals in the same group are as alike as possible, but as distinct as possible from individuals in other groups. This method can be applied to endogenously identify k groups in income distributions: possible applications can be poverty