979 resultados para ABSTRACT PARABOLIC PROBLEMS


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Voucher #7 from the Engineer Department of Port Dalhousie and Thorold Railway Extension to W.G. Thompson accompanied by an abstract of vouchers and summaries of account paid by W.G. Thompson for surveys, Jan. 31, 1857.

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Voucher #9 from the Engineer Department of Port Dalhousie and Thorold Railway Extension to W. G. Thompson accompanied by an abstract of vouchers for surveys, Feb. 28, 1857

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Abstract of the forging (1 page, handwritten) n.d.

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Abstract of estimates, June 13, 1856.

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Abstract of estimates given to Andrew Mains for ditching on the main drain of marsh lands for 1855 and 1856. This is signed by S.D. Woodruff, May 1, 1857.

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Abstract of tenders received for the Welland Canal, Sept. 23, 1847.

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Abstract of quantity of excavation for lock no.12, July 4, 1854.

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List (1 page, handwritten) of Sarnia Branch for which no abstract of the title has been furnished. This was signed by H. [illegible] in 1839 and a note was added to this list on Nov. 15, 1859.

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Abstract (1 page, handwritten) of title of part of Lots no. 10 and 11 in the township of Grantham no. 8756, n.d.

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Letter to Henry Nelles from Michael Harris regarding estate problems (3 pages, handwritten with writing going in 2 directions on the last page), May 30, 1821.

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We study a simple model of assigning indivisible objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We completely describe all rules satisfying efficiency and resource-monotonicity. The characterized rules assign the objects in a sequence of steps such that at each step there is either a dictator or two agents who “trade” objects from their hierarchically specified “endowments.”

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The following properties of the core of a one well-known: (i) the core is non-empty; (ii) the core is a lattice; and (iii) the set of unmatched agents is identical for any two matchings belonging to the core. The literature on two-sided matching focuses almost exclusively on the core and studies extensively its properties. Our main result is the following characterization of (von Neumann-Morgenstern) stable sets in one-to-one matching problem only if it is a maximal set satisfying the following properties : (a) the core is a subset of the set; (b) the set is a lattice; (c) the set of unmatched agents is identical for any two matchings belonging to the set. Furthermore, a set is a stable set if it is the unique maximal set satisfying properties (a), (b) and (c). We also show that our main result does not extend from one-to-one matching problems to many-to-one matching problems.