Home is Where the Human is?:Ethics, Intervention and Hospitality in Kosovo

The human is frequently made central to the way international ethics is thought and practiced. Yet, frequently, the human can be used to close down ethical options rather than open them up. This article examines the case of British foreign policy in Kosovo. It argues that the human in this context was placed at the centre of ethical action, but was discursively constructed as a silent, biopolitial mass which could only be saved close to its territorially qualified home. It could not be protected by being brought to the UK. To remain human, the subject of ethical concern, the Kosovan refugee, had to remain near Kosovo. This construction of the human-home relationship meant that military humanitarian intervention became the only ethical policy available; hospitality, a welcoming of the Kosovan refugee into the British home, was ruled out. This article questions such a construction of the human, listening to the voices of Kosovan refugees to open up the relationship between the human and its home. The complexity that results shows that a more nuanced view of the human would not allow itself to be co-opted so easily to a simplistic logic of intervention. Rather, it could enable the possibility of hospitality as another way of practicing international ethics.

Annotation of Case C-272/94, Criminal proceedings against Michel Guiot and Climatec SA, ECR 1996 I-1905

Employer's contributions - Loyalty stamps - Bad-weather stamps - Freedom to provide services - Posted Workers

Sticks, Stones and Words: Emotional Harm and the English Criminal Law

This article discusses the rule that criminal liability does not normally attach for the causing of emotional harm or mental distress in the absence of proof of a 'recognised psychiatric injury'. It considers what is involved in the diagnosis of psychiatric injury, and to what extent the difference between such injury and 'ordinary' mental distress is one of degree rather than one of kind. It reviews the situations in which the law already criminalises the infliction of emotional harm without proof of psychiatric injury, and assesses the policy arguments for drawing the distinction in the normal case. The article concludes that the law can and should adopt a more flexible approach to cases of this sort.