Computer modelling studies on the mechanism of action of ribonuclease T1

The mechanism of action of ribonuclease (RNase) T1 is still a matter of considerable debate as the results of x-ray, 2-D nmr and site-directed mutagenesis studies disagree regarding the role of the catalytically important residues. Hence computer modelling studies were carried out by energy minimisation of the complexes of RNase T1 and some of its mutants (His40Ala, His40Lys, and Glu58Ala) with the substrate guanyl cytosine (GpC), and of native RNase T1 with the reaction intermediate guanosine 2',3'-cyclic phosphate (G greater than p). The puckering of the guanosine ribose moiety in the minimum energy conformer of the RNase T1-GpC (substrate) complex was found to be O4'-endo and not C3'-endo as in the RNase T1-3'-guanylic acid (inhibitor/product) complex. A possible scheme for the mechanism of action of RNase T1 has been proposed on the basis of the arrangement of the catalytically important amino acid residues His40, Glu58, Arg77, and His92 around the guanosine ribose and the phosphate moiety in the RNase T1-GpC and RNase T1-G greater than p complexes. In this scheme, Glu58 serves as the general base group and His92 as the general acid group in the transphosphorylation step. His40 may be essential for stabilising the negatively charged phosphate moiety in the enzyme-transition state complex.

Search for innovative forest policies and programs.

XVIII IUFRO World Congress, Ljubljana 1986.

Quantification problems in the design of forest policy programs.

XVIII IUFRO World Congress, Ljubljana 1986.

Economic evaluation of forest policy programs.

XVIII IUFRO World Congress, Ljubljana 1986.

Increasing forestry investments by means of public policy programs.

XVIII IUFRO World Congress, Ljubljana 1986.

Public and private technical assistance programs for non-industrial private forest landowners in the southern United States.

XVIII IUFRO World Congress, Ljubljana 1986.

An optimal local approximation algorithm for max-min linear programs

In a max-min LP, the objective is to maximise ω subject to Ax ≤ 1, Cx ≥ ω1, and x ≥ 0 for nonnegative matrices A and C. We present a local algorithm (constant-time distributed algorithm) for approximating max-min LPs. The approximation ratio of our algorithm is the best possible for any local algorithm; there is a matching unconditional lower bound.

Local approximability of max-min and min-max linear programs

In a max-min LP, the objective is to maximise ω subject to Ax ≤ 1, Cx ≥ ω1, and x ≥ 0. In a min-max LP, the objective is to minimise ρ subject to Ax ≤ ρ1, Cx ≥ 1, and x ≥ 0. The matrices A and C are nonnegative and sparse: each row ai of A has at most ΔI positive elements, and each row ck of C has at most ΔK positive elements. We study the approximability of max-min LPs and min-max LPs in a distributed setting; in particular, we focus on local algorithms (constant-time distributed algorithms). We show that for any ΔI ≥ 2, ΔK ≥ 2, and ε > 0 there exists a local algorithm that achieves the approximation ratio ΔI (1 − 1/ΔK) + ε. We also show that this result is the best possible: no local algorithm can achieve the approximation ratio ΔI (1 − 1/ΔK) for any ΔI ≥ 2 and ΔK ≥ 2.

Rauhan atomi, sodan koodi : Suomalaisen atomivoimaratkaisun teknopolitiikka 1955-1970

This dissertation investigates the atomic power solution in Finland between 1955 - 1970. During these years a national arrangement for atomic energy technology evolved. The foundations of the Finnish atomic energy policy; the creation of basic legislation and the first governmental bodies, were laid between 1955 - 1965. In the late 1960's, the necessary technological and political decisions were made in order to purchase the first commercial nuclear reactor. A historical narration of this process is seen in the international context of "atoms for peace" policies and Cold War history in general. The geopolitical position of Finland made it necessary to become involved in the balanced participation in international scientific-technical exchange and assistive nuclear programs. The Paris Peace Treaty of 1947 categorically denied Finland acquisition of nuclear weapons. Accordingly, from the "Geneva year" of 1955, the emphasis was placed on peaceful purposes for atomic energy as well as on the education of national professionals in Finland. An initiative for the governmental atomic energy commission came from academia but the ultimate motive behind it was an anticipated structural change in the supply of national energy. Economically exploitable hydro power resources were expected to be built within ten years and atomic power was seen as a promising and complementing new energy technology. While importing fuels like coal was out of the question, because of scarce foreign currency, domestic uranium mineral deposits were considered as a potential source of nuclear fuel. Nevertheless, even then nuclear energy was regarded as just one of the possible future energy options. In the mid-1960 s a bandwagon effect of light water reactor orders was witnessed in the United States and soon elsewhere in the world. In Finland, two separate invitations for bids for nuclear reactors were initiated. This study explores at length both their preceding grounds and later phases. An explanation is given that the parallel, independent and nearly identical tenders reflected a post-war ideological rivalry between the state-owned utility Imatran Voima and private energy utilities. A private sector nuclear power association Voimayhdistys Ydin represented energy intensive paper and pulp industries and wanted to have free choice instead of being associated themselves with "the state monopoly" in energy pricing. As a background to this, a decisive change had started to happen within Finnish energy policy: private and municipal big thermal power plants became incorporated into the national hydro power production system. A characteristic phenomenon in the later history is the Soviet Union s effort to bid for the tender of Imatran Voima. A nuclear superpower was willing to take part in competition but not on a turnkey basis as Imatran Voima had presumed. As a result of many political turns and four years of negotiations the first Finnish commercial light water reactor was ordered from the East. Soon after this the private nuclear power group ordered its reactors from Sweden. This work interprets this as a reasonable geopolitical balance in choosing politically sensitive technology. Conceptually, social and political dimensions of new technology are emphasised. Negotiations on the Finnish atomic energy program are viewed as a cooperation and a struggle, where state-oriented and private-oriented regimes pose their own macro level views and goals (technopolitical imaginaries) and defend and advance their plans and practical modes of action (schemata). Here, not only technologists but even political actors are seen to contribute to technopolitical realisations.