952 resultados para epistemological circle
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In a 2000 report entitled "Trust in government. Ethics measures in OECD countries," OECD Secretary-General Donald J. Johnston emphasized the fact that public ethics are considered as a keystone of good governance. Moreover, public ethics are a prerequisite to public trust, which is in turn vital not only to any public service, but also to any society in general. At the same time, transparency reforms have flourished over the last few years and have several times been designed as a response to public distrust. Therefore, ethics, transparency and trust are closely linked together in a supposed virtuous circle where transparency works as a factor of better public ethics and leads to more trust in government on the citizens' side. This article explores the links between transparency and levels of trust in 10 countries between 2007 and 2014, using open data indexes and access to information requests as proxies for transparency. A national ranking of transparency, based on requests submitted by citizens to the administration and open data indexes, is then proposed. Key findings show that there is no sharp decline of trust in government in all countries considered in this article, and that transparency and trust in government are not systematically positively associated. Therefore, this article challenges the common assumption, mostly found in the normative literature, about a positive interrelation between the two, where trust in government is conceived as a beneficial effect of administrative transparency.
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Competitividad y valor compartido
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The paper concentrates on trust as a research topic that receives increasing attention from the side of different social disciplines. The author of this thesis attempts to identify the reasons of this phenomenon, as well as the decline in usage of the concepts conveying a congenial idea, such as, solidarity, cooperation, social cohesion, social capital or connectedness. The key hypotheses, such as paradigmatic change within the social sciences, emergence of risk society, proliferation of the postmodem condition, new infonnation and communication technologies and the crisis of democracy are considered through the works of the authors who now mainly responsible for the shaping of the discourse of trust. The concepts of Luhmann, Putnam, Sztompka, Fukuyama and Hardin are analyzed from an epistemological viewpoint in its ontological and political implications. The primary goal of the paper is to overview trust from the methodological viewpoint, illustrating the limitations of the concept as a research strategy as weII as it advantages in the epoch when the social sciences acquire a status of moral disciplines.
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This study explores the tension that has emerged around the rise of home schooling in a faith-community strongly committed to establishing and maintaining day schools in the tradition of John Calvin. It aims to identify and understand factors that contributed to this tension and to find ways to bridge, diffuse, reduce, or eliminate it. In line with Calvin, personal convictions, and the nature of the community, the study takes a Christian epistemological and axiological stance. Its premise is that the integrity of the commvmity is more important than the manner in which its children are taught. The study reviews relevant literature and several interviews. It considers both secular and Christian literature to understand communities, community breakdown, and community restoration. It also examines literature about the significance of home, school, and community relationships; the attraction of Reformed day schools; and the appeal of home schooling. Interviews were conducted with 4 home schooling couples and 2 focus groups. One focus group included local school representatives, and the other home schoolers and school representatives from an area with reputedly less tension on the issue. Interviews were designed for participants to give their perspectives on reasons for home schooling, the existing tension, and ways to resolve the issues. The study identifies the rise of home schooling in this particular context as the initial issue and the community's deficiency to properly deal with it as the chief cause for the rising tensions. However, I argue that, within the norms the community firmly believes in, home schooling need not jeopardize its integrity. I call for personal, social, and spiritual renewal to restore the covenant community in gratitude to God.
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The phenomenon of communitas has been described as a moment 'in and out of time' in which a collective of individuals may be experienced by one as equal and individuated in an environment stripped of structural attributes (Turner, 1 969). In these moments, emotional bonds form and an experience of perceived 'oneness' and synergy may be described. As a result of the perceived value of these experiences, it has been suggested by Sharpe (2005) that more clearly understanding how this phenomenon may be purposefully facilitated would be beneficial for leisure service providers. Consequently, the purpose of this research endeavor was to examine the ways in which a particular leisure service provider systematically employs specific methods and sets specific parameters with the intention of guiding participants toward experiences associated with communitas or "shared spirit" as described by the organization. A qualitative case study taking a phenomenological approach was employed in order to capture the depth and complexity of both the phenomenon and the purposefiil negotiation of experiences in guiding participants toward this phenomenon. The means through which these experiences were intentionally facilitated was recreational music making in a group drumming context. As such, an organization which employs specific methods of rhythm circle facilitation as well as trains other facilitators all over the world was chosen purposely for their recognition as the most respectable and credible in this field. The specific facilitator was chosen based on high recommendation by the organization due to her level of experience and expertise. Two rhythm circles were held, and participants were chosen randomly by the facilitator. Data was collected through observation in the first circle and participant- observation in the second, as well as through focus groups with circle participants. Interviews with the facilitator were held both initially to gain broad understanding of concepts and phenomenon as well as after each circle to reflect on each circle specifically. Data was read repeatedly to drawn out patterns which emerged and were coded and organized accordingly. It was found that this specific process or system of implementation lead to experiences associated with communitas by participants. In order to more clearly understand this process and the ways in which experiences associated with communitas manifest as a result of deliberate facilitator actions, these objective facilitator actions were plotted along a continuum relating to subjective participant experiences. These findings were then linked to the literature with regards to specific characteristics of communitas. In so doing, the intentional manifestation of these experiences may be more clearly understood for ftiture facilitators in many contexts. Beyond this, findings summarized important considerations with regards to specific technical and communication competencies which were found to be essential to fostering these experiences for participants within each group. Findings surrounding the maintenance of a fluid negotiation of certain transition points within a group rhythm event overall were also highlighted, and this fluidity was found to be essential to the experience of absorption and engagement in the activity and experience. Emergent themes of structure, control, and consciousness have been presented as they manifested and were found to affect experiences within this study. Discussions surrounding the ethics and authenticity of these particular methods and their implementation has also been generated throughout. In conclusion, there was a breadth as well as depth of knowledge found in unpacking this complex process of guiding individuals toward experiences associated with communitas. The implications of these findings contribute in broadening the current theoretical as well as practical understanding as to how certain intentional parameters may be set and methods employed which may lead to experiences of communitas, and as well contribute a greater knowledge to conceptualizing the manifestation of these experiences when broken down.
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During the last 30 years Aboriginal peoples in Canada have made steady progress in reclaiming the responsibility for the education of their young people, especially in primary and secondary school. In comparison the education and or training of adult populations has not kept pace and many socioeconomic and sociocultural indicators demonstrate a ' , continued confinement of those populations to the margins of the dominant society of Canada. It is the adults, the mothers and the fathers, the grandmothers and grandfathers, the aunties and uncles that are the first teachers of the next generation and the nature of these relationships replicates the culture of unwellness in each subsequent generation through those teachers. There are few examples in the Aboriginal adult education literatures that give voice to the educational experience of the Learner. This study addresses that gap by exploring the perspectives embedded in the stories of a Circle of Learners who are, or were enrolled in the Bachelor of Education in Aboriginal Adult Education program at Brock University. That Circle of 1 participants included 9 women and 1 man, 6 of whom were from various i Anishinabek nations while 4 represented the Hotinonshd:ni nations in southern Ontario. They are an eclectic group, representing many professions, age groups, spiritual traditions, and backgrounds. This then is their story, the story of the heaming and Healing pedagogy and an expanded vision of Aboriginal education and research at Brock University.
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Abstract Many species of social insects have the ability to recognize their nestmates. In bees, sociality is maintained by bees that recognize which individuals should be helped and which should be hanned in order to maximize fitness (either inclusive or individual) (Hamilton 1964; Lin and Michener 1972). Since female bees generally lay eggs in a single nest, it is highly likely that bees found cohabitating in the same nest are siblings. According to the kin selection hypothesis, individuals should cooperate and avoid aggression with same sex nestmates (Hamilton 1964). However, in opposite sex pairs that are likely kin, aggression should increase among nestmates as an expression of inbreeding avoidance (Lihoreau et al. 2007). Female bees often guard nest entrances, recognizing and excluding foreign conspecific females that threaten to steal nest resources (Breed and Page 1991). Conversely, males that aggressively guard territories should avoid aggression towards other males that are likely kin (Shellman-Reeve and Gamboa 1984). In order to test whether Xy/ocopa virginica can distinguish nestmates from non-nestmates, circle tube testing arenas were used. Measures of aggression, cooperation and tolerance were evaluated to detennine the presence of nestmate recognition in this species. The results of this study indicate that male and female X virginica have the ability to distinguish nestmates from non-nestmates. Individuals in same sex pairs demonstrated increased pushing, biting, and C-posturing when faced with non-nestmates. Males in same sex pairs also attempted to pass (unsuccessfully) nOIl-nestmates more often than ncstmates, suggesting that this behaviour may be an cxpression of dominancc in males. Increased cooperation exemplified by successful passes was not observed among nestmates. However, incrcased tolerance in the [onn of head-to-head touching was observed for nestmates in female same sex and opposite sex pairs. These results supported the kin selection hypothesis. Moreover, increased tolerance among opposite sex non-nestmates suggested that X virginica do not demonstrate inbreeding avoidance among nestmates. 3 The second part of this study was conducted to establish the presence and extent of drifting, or travelling to different nests, in a Xylocopa virgillica population. Drifting in flying Hymenoptera is reported to be the result of navigation error and guard bees erroneously admitting novel individuals into the nest (Michener 1966). Since bees in this study were individually marked and captured at nest entrances, the locations where individuals were caught allowed me to determine where and how often bees travelled from nest to nest. Ifbees were captured near their home nests, changing nests may have been deliberate or explained by navigational error. However, ifbees were found in nests further away from their homes, this provides stronger evidence that flying towards a novel nest may have been deliberate. Female bees are often faithful to their own nests (Kasuya 1981) and no drifting was expected in female X virginica because they raise brood and contribute to nest maintenance activities. Contrary to females, males were not expected to remain faithful to a single nest. Results showed that many more females drifted than expected and that they were most often recaptured in a single nest, either their home nest or a novel nest. There were some females that were never caught in the same nest twice. In addition, females drifted to further nests when population density was low (in 2007), suggesting they seek out and claim nesting spaces when they are available. Males, as expected, showed the opposite pattern and most males drifted from nest to nest, never recaptured in the same location. This pattern indicates that males may be nesting wherever space is available, or nesting in benches nearest to their territories. This study reveals that both female and male X virginica are capable of nestmate recognition and use this ability in a dynamic environment, where nest membership is not as stable as once thought.
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Introduction The question of the meaning, methods and philosophical manifestations of history is currently rife with contention. The problem that I will address in an exposition of the thought of Wilhelm Dilthey and Martin Heidegger, centers around the intersubjectivity of an historical world. Specifically, there are two interconnected issues. First, since all knowledge occurs to a person from within his or her historical age how can any person in any age make truth claims? In order to answer this concern we must understand the essence and role of history. Yet how can we come to an individual understanding ofwhat history is when the meanings that we use are themselves historically enveloped? But can we, we who are well aware of the knowledge that archaeology has dredged up from old texts or even from 'living' monuments of past ages, really neglect to notice these artifacts that exist within and enrich our world? Charges of wilful blindness would arise if any attempt were made to suggest that certain things of our world did not come down to us from the past. Thus it appears more important 2 to determine what this 'past' is and therefore how history operates than to simply derail the possibility for historical understanding. Wilhelm Dilthey, the great German historicist from the 19th century, did not question the existence of historical artifacts as from the past, but in treating knowledge as one such artifact placed the onus on knowledge to show itself as true, or meaningful, in light ofthe fact that other historical periods relied on different facts and generated different truths or meanings. The problem for him was not just determining what the role of history is, but moreover to discover how knowledge could make any claim as true knowledge. As he stated, there is a problem of "historical anarchy"!' Martin Heidegger picked up these two strands of Dilthey's thought and wanted to answer the problem of truth and meaning in order to solve the problem of historicism. This problem underscored, perhaps for the first time, that societal presuppositions about the past and present oftheir era are not immutable. Penetrating to the core of the raison d'etre of the age was an historical reflection about the past which was now conceived as separated both temporally and attitudinally from the present. But further than this, Heidegger's focus on asking the question of the meaning of Being meant that history must be ontologically explicated not merely ontically treated. Heidegger hopes to remove barriers to a genuine ontology by II 1 3 including history into an assessment ofprevious philosophical systems. He does this in order that the question of Being be more fully explicated, which necessarily for him includes the question of the Being of history. One approach to the question ofwhat history is, given the information that we get from historical knowledge, is whether such knowledge can be formalized into a science. Additionally, we can approach the question of what the essence and role of history is by revealing its underlying characteristics, that is, by focussing on historicality. Thus we will begin with an expository look at Dilthey's conception of history and historicality. We will then explore these issues first in Heidegger's Being and Time, then in the third chapter his middle and later works. Finally, we shall examine how Heidegger's conception may reflect a development in the conception of historicality over Dilthey's historicism, and what such a conception means for a contemporary historical understanding. The problem of existing in a common world which is perceived only individually has been philosophically addressed in many forms. Escaping a pure subjectivist interpretation of 'reality' has occupied Western thinkers not only in order to discover metaphysical truths, but also to provide a foundation for politics and ethics. Many thinkers accept a solipsistic view as inevitable and reject attempts at justifying truth in an intersubjective world. The problem ofhistoricality raises similar problems. We 4 -. - - - - exist in a common historical age, presumably, yet are only aware ofthe historicity of the age through our own individual thoughts. Thus the question arises, do we actually exist within a common history or do we merely individually interpret this as communal? What is the reality of history, individual or communal? Dilthey answers this question by asserting a 'reality' to the historical age thus overcoming solipsism by encasing individual human experience within the historical horizon of the age. This however does nothing to address the epistemological concern over the discoverablity of truth. Heidegger, on the other hand, rejects a metaphysical construel of history and seeks to ground history first within the ontology ofDasein, and second, within the so called "sending" of Being. Thus there can be no solipsism for Heidegger because Dasein's Being is necessarily "cohistorical", Being-with-Others, and furthermore, this historical-Being-in-the-worldwith- Others is the horizon of Being over which truth can appear. Heidegger's solution to the problem of solipsism appears to satisfy that the world is not just a subjective idealist creation and also that one need not appeal to any universal measures of truth or presumed eternal verities. Thus in elucidating Heidegger's notion of history I will also confront the issues ofDasein's Being-alongside-things as well as the Being of Dasein as Being-in-the-world so that Dasein's historicality is explicated vis-a-vis the "sending of Being" (die Schicken des S eins).
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The purpose of this qualitative study was to understand the relationships between creativity and the working artist/teacher employed by an art college. The topic emerged from my job as an instructor at The Ontario College of Art which was used as the primary data resource and provided the highest caliber of professionals to chose from. Existent data were used to facilitate the study generated by the research of Cawelti, Rappaport, and Wood (1992). The data were generated by a group of 5 faculty members from The University of Northern Iowa, recognized for their expertise in the arts (a painter, a poet, a sculptor, a novelist, and a photographer). They were asked to respond to the following statement: "In as much detail as you like, list the things that you did, thought, or felt the last time you created an artistic product. II Cawelti, Rappaport, and Wood (1992) produced three models of the creative process, each building on the previous, with the resultant third,being in my opinion, an excellent illustration (text/visual) of the creative process. Model three (Appendix D) presented a "multi-dimensional view of the creative process: time, space, observatility, and consciousnessll (p. 90). Model three utilized a visual mapping device along the bottom of the page linked to text segments above. Both the visual and the text were interrelated so that they harmonized into a comprehensive "picture." The parti'cipants of this qualitative study were asked to consider model three from their professional perspective as artist/teachers. The interpretive sciences directed the methodology. The hermeneutic circle of continuous reflection from the whole to the part and back to the whole was an important aspect of the data analyses. Four members of the Foundation Department at The Ontario College of Art were the key participants. A series of conversational interviews was the primary source of data collection, this was augmented by observation, fie,ldnotes, and follow up telephone interviews. Transcripts of interviews were returned to participants for reflection and the telephone was used to discuss any additional -points raised. Analysis consisted of coding and organizing data according to emerging themes. These themes formed the basis for the narrative stories. The text of the narrative stories were given back to each participant for further comment. Revisions were made until both the researcher and the participants felt that the stories reflected reality. The resultant whole was critiqued from the researcher's perspective. The significance of this study was discussed as it pertains to the working artist/teacher and areas in need of further study are pointed out.
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It is our intention in the course of the development of this thesis to give an account of how intersubjectivity is "eidetically" constituted by means of the application of the phenomenological reduction to our experience in the context of the thought of Edmund Husserl; contrasted with various representative thinkers in what H. Spiegelberg refers to as "the wider scene" of phenomenology. That is to say, we intend to show those structures of both consciousness and the relation which man has to the world which present themselves as the generic conditions for the possibility of overcoming our "radical sol itude" in order that we may gain access to the mental 1 ife of an Other as other human subject. It is clear that in order for us to give expression to these accounts in a coherent manner, along with their relative merits, it will be necessary to develop the common features of any phenomenological theory of consdousness whatever. Therefore, our preliminary inquiry, subordinate to the larger theme, shall be into some of the epistemological results of the application of the phenomenological method used to develop a transcendental theory of consciousness. Inherent in this will be the deliniation of the exigency for making this an lIintentional ll theory. We will then be able to see how itis possible to overcome transcendentally the Other as an object merely given among other merely given objects, and further, how this other is constituted specifically as other ego. The problem of transcendental intersubjectivity and its constitution in experience can be viewed as one of the most compelling, if not the most polemical of issues in phenomenology. To be sure, right from the beginning we are forced to ask a number of questions regarding Husserl's responses to the problem within the context of the methodological genesis of the Cartesian Meditations, and The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. This we do in order to set the stage for amplification. First, we ask, has Husserl lived up to his goal, in this connexion, of an apodictic result? We recall that in his Logos article of 1911 he adminished that previous philosophy does not have at its disposal a merely incomplete and, in particular instances, imperfect doctrinal system; it simply has none whatever. Each and every question is herein controverted, each position is a matter of individual conviction, of the interpretation given byaschool, of a "point of view". 1. Moreover in the same article he writes that his goal is a philosophical system of doctrine that, after the gigantic preparatory work. of generations, really be- . gins from the ground up with a foundation free from doubt and rises up like any skilful construction, wherein stone is set upon store, each as solid as the other, in accord with directive insights. 2. Reflecting upon the fact that he foresaw "preparatory work of generations", we perhaps should not expect that he would claim that his was the last word on the matter of intersubjectivity. Indeed, with 2. 'Edmund Husserl, lIPhilosophy as a Rigorous Science" in Phenomenology and theCrisis6fPhilosophy, trans". with an introduction by Quentin Lauer (New York.: Harper & Row, 1965) pp. 74 .. 5. 2Ibid . pp. 75 .. 6. 3. the relatively small amount of published material by Husserl on the subject we can assume that he himself was not entirely satisfied with his solution. The second question we have is that if the transcendental reduction is to yield the generic and apodictic structures of the relationship of consciousness to its various possible objects, how far can we extend this particular constitutive synthetic function to intersubjectivity where the objects must of necessity always remain delitescent? To be sure, the type of 'object' here to be considered is unlike any other which might appear in the perceptual field. What kind of indubitable evidence will convince us that the characteristic which we label "alter-ego" and which we attribute to an object which appears to resemble another body which we have never, and can never see the whole of (namely, our own bodies), is nothing more than a cleverly contrived automaton? What;s the nature of this peculiar intentional function which enables us to say "you think just as I do"? If phenomenology is to take such great pains to reduce the takenfor- granted, lived, everyday world to an immanent world of pure presentation, we must ask the mode of presentation for transcendent sub .. jectivities. And in the end, we must ask if Husserl's argument is not reducible to a case (however special) of reasoning by analogy, and if so, tf this type of reasoning is not so removed from that from whtch the analogy is made that it would render all transcendental intersubjective understandtng impos'sible? 2. HistoticalandEidetic Priority: The Necessity of Abstraction 4. The problem is not a simple one. What is being sought are the conditions for the poss ibili:ty of experi encing other subjects. More precisely, the question of the possibility of intersubjectivity is the question of the essence of intersubjectivity. What we are seeking is the absolute route from one solitude to another. Inherent in this programme is the ultimate discovery of the meaning of community. That this route needs be lIabstract" requires some explanation. It requires little explanation that we agree with Husserl in the aim of fixing the goal of philosophy on apodictic, unquestionable results. This means that we seek a philosophical approach which is, though, not necessarily free from assumptions, one which examines and makes explicit all assumptions in a thorough manner. It would be helpful at this point to distinguish between lIeidetic ll priority, and JlhistoricallJpriority in order to shed some light on the value, in this context, of an abstraction.3 It is true that intersubjectivity is mundanely an accomplished fact, there havi.ng been so many mi.llions of years for humans to beIt eve in the exi s tence of one another I s abili ty to think as they do. But what we seek is not to study how this proceeded historically, but 3Cf• Maurice Natanson;·TheJburne in 'Self, a Stud in Philoso h and Social Role (Santa Cruz, U. of California Press, 1970 . rather the logical, nay, "psychological" conditions under which this is possible at all. It is therefore irrelevant to the exigesis of this monograph whether or not anyone should shrug his shoulders and mumble IIwhy worry about it, it is always already engaged". By way of an explanation of the value of logical priority, we can find an analogy in the case of language. Certainly the language 5. in a spoken or written form predates the formulation of the appropriate grammar. However, this grammar has a logical priority insofar as it lays out the conditions from which that language exhibits coherence. The act of formulating the grammar is a case of abstraction. The abstraction towards the discovery of the conditions for the poss; bi 1 ity of any experiencing whatever, for which intersubjective experience is a definite case, manifests itself as a sort of "grammar". This "grammar" is like the basic grammar of a language in the sense that these "rulesil are the ~ priori conditions for the possibility of that experience. There is, we shall say, an "eidetic priority", or a generic condition which is the logical antecedent to the taken-forgranted object of experience. In the case of intersubjectivity we readily grant that one may mundanely be aware of fellow-men as fellowmen, but in order to discover how that awareness is possible it is necessary to abstract from the mundane, believed-in experience. This process of abstraction is the paramount issue; the first step, in the search for an apodictic basis for social relations. How then is this abstraction to be accomplished? What is the nature of an abstraction which would permit us an Archimedean point, absolutely grounded, from which we may proceed? The answer can be discovered in an examination of Descartes in the light of Husserl's criticism. 3. The Impulse for Scientific Philosophy. The Method to which it Gives Rise. 6. Foremost in our inquiry is the discovery of a method appropriate to the discovery of our grounding point. For the purposes of our investigations, i.e., that of attempting to give a phenomenological view of the problem of intersubjectivity, it would appear to be of cardinal importance to trace the attempt of philosophy predating Husserl, particularly in the philosophy of Descartes, at founding a truly IIscientific ll philosophy. Paramount in this connexion would be the impulse in the Modern period, as the result of more or less recent discoveries in the natural sciences, to found philosophy upon scientific and mathematical principles. This impulse was intended to culminate in an all-encompassing knowledge which might extend to every realm of possible thought, viz., the universal science ot IIMathexis Universalis ll •4 This was a central issue for Descartes, whose conception of a universal science would include all the possible sciences of man. This inclination towards a science upon which all other sciences might be based waS not to be belittled by Husserl, who would appropriate 4This term, according to Jacab Klein, was first used by Barocius, the translator of Proclus into Latin, to designate the highest mathematical discipline. . 7. it himself in hopes of establishing, for the very first time, philosophy as a "rigorous science". It bears emphasizing that this in fact was the drive for the hardening of the foundations of philosophy, the link between the philosophical projects of Husserl and those of the philosophers of the modern period. Indeed, Husserl owes Descartes quite a debt for indicating the starting place from which to attempt a radical, presupositionless, and therefore scientific philosophy, in order not to begin philosophy anew, but rather for the first time.5 The aim of philosophy for Husserl is the search for apodictic, radical certitude. However while he attempted to locate in experience the type of necessity which is found in mathematics, he wished this necessity to be a function of our life in the world, as opposed to the definition and postulation of an axiomatic method as might be found in the unexpurgated attempts to found philosophy in Descartes. Beyond the necessity which is involved in experiencing the world, Husserl was searching for the certainty of roots, of the conditi'ons which underl ie experience and render it pOssible. Descartes believed that hi~ MeditatiOns had uncovered an absolute ground for knowledge, one founded upon the ineluctable givenness of thinking which is present even when one doubts thinking. Husserl, in acknowledging this procedure is certainly Cartesian, but moves, despite this debt to Descartes, far beyond Cartesian philosophy i.n his phenomenology (and in many respects, closer to home). 5Cf. Husserl, Philosophy as a Rigorous Science, pp. 74ff. 8 But wherein lies this Cartesian jumping off point by which we may vivify our theme? Descartes, through inner reflection, saw that all of his convictions and beliefs about the world were coloured in one way or another by prejudice: ... at the end I feel constrained to reply that there is nothing in a all that I formerly believed to be true, of which I cannot in some measure doubt, and that not merely through want of thought or through levity, but for reasons which are very powerful and maturely considered; so that henceforth I ought not the less carefully to refrain from giving credence to these opinions than to that which is manifestly false, if I desire to arrive at any certainty (in the sciences). 6 Doubts arise regardless of the nature of belief - one can never completely believe what one believes. Therefore, in order to establish absolutely grounded knowledge, which may serve as the basis fora "universal Science", one must use a method by which one may purge oneself of all doubts and thereby gain some radically indubitable insight into knowledge. Such a method, gescartes found, was that, as indicated above by hi,s own words, of II radical doubt" which "forbids in advance any judgemental use of (previous convictions and) which forbids taking any position with regard to their val idi'ty. ,,7 This is the method of the "sceptical epoche ll , the method of doubting all which had heretofor 6Descartes,Meditations on First Philosophy, first Med., (Libera 1 Arts Press, New York, 1954) trans. by L. LaFl eur. pp. 10. 7Husserl ,CrisiS of Eliroeari SCiences and Trariscendental Phenomenology, (Northwestern U. Press, Evanston, 1 7 ,p. 76. 9. been considered as belonging to the world, including the world itself. What then is left over? Via the process of a thorough and all-inclusive doubting, Descartes discovers that the ego which performs the epoche, or "reduction", is excluded from these things which can be doubted, and, in principle provides something which is beyond doubt. Consequently this ego provides an absolute and apodictic starting point for founding scientific philosophy. By way of this abstention. of bel ief, Desca'rtes managed to reduce the worl d of everyday 1 ife as bel ieved in, to mere 'phenomena', components of the rescogitans:. Thus:, having discovered his Archimedean point, the existence of the ego without question, he proceeds to deduce the 'rest' of the world with the aid of innate ideas and the veracity of God. In both Husserl and Descartes the compelling problem is that of establ ishing a scientific, apodictic phi'losophy based upon presuppos itionless groundwork .. Husserl, in thi.s regard, levels the charge at Descartes that the engagement of his method was not complete, such that hi.S: starting place was not indeed presupositionless, and that the validity of both causality and deductive methods were not called into question i.'n the performance of theepoche. In this way it is easy for an absolute evidence to make sure of the ego as: a first, "absolute, indubitablyexisting tag~end of the worldll , and it is then only a matter of inferring the absolute subs.tance and the other substances which belon.g to the world, along with my own mental substance, using a logically val i d deductive procedure. 8 8Husserl, E.;' Cartesian 'Meditation;, trans. Dorion Cairns (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1970), p. 24 ff.
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Thesis (M.Ed.)-- Brock University, 1995.
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- The present study was an investigation into the effect ofschool integration on the friendships ofyouth with developmental disabilities and their peers without disabilities. The youths, their parents, and their teachers provided insights into the youths' friendships. A qualitative paradigm was used in this research. The researcher guided the collection and analysis ofthe data with the phenomenologicallifeworld existentials of body, space, time, and human relation (Van Manen, 1990). Individual interviews were conducted with each youth, and group interviews were conducted with each triad (a youth, their parent(s), and their teacher) to discuss the youth's friendships and the supports necessary to facilitate the friendships. Through phenomenological analysis of the data, four thematic statements emerged: friendships are far from perfect, to have a friend you have to be a friend, parents as choreographers offriendship, and teachers as reluctant partners in friendship facilitation. Based on the results ofthis study, it was concluded that the development of friendships between youth with developmental disabilities and their peers without disabilities was happening in integrated school settings. However, it was also evident that the support ofteachers and parents alike were required to facilitate the development and maintenance ofsuch friendships. Recommendations for practice are discussed, including the need for active participation by the youth's parents in the facilitation offriendships, and the use ofa "circle offriends" to facilitate friendship development. Also discussed are the recommendations for further research, including the need for the youth's friends to be interviewed regarding their friendships with the youth with disabilities, and the need for researcher observation ofth~ friendships in action. Further research could also explore the role ofthe mother versus the father in facilitating friendships, and the role of recreation and leisure opportunities in the ,development offriendships.
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The crystal structure of Cu(PM)2(N03hoH20 (where PM is pyridoxamine, CSHI2N202) has been determined from three dimensional x-ray diffraction data. The crystals are triclinic, space group pI, a = 14.248 (2), b = 8.568 (1), c = 9.319 (1) 1, a = 94.08 (1), e = 89.73 (1), y~~ 99.18 (1)°, z = 2, jl(MoK) = 10.90 em-I, Po = 1.61 g/cm3 and Pc = 1.61 g/em3• The structure a was solved by Patterson techniques from data collected on a Picker 4-circle diffractometer to 26max = 45°. All atoms, including hydrogens, have been located. Anisotropic thermal parameters have been refined for all nonhydrogen atoms. For the 2390 independent reflections with F ? 3cr(F) , R = 0.0408. The results presented here provide the first detailed structural information of a metal complex with PM itself. The copper atoms are located on centres of symmetry and each is chela ted by two PM zwitterions through the amino groups and phenolate oxygen atoms. The zwitterionic form found in this structure involves the loss of a proton from the phenolate group and protonation of the pyridine ring nitrogen atoms. The two independent Cu(PM)2 moieties are symmetrically bridged by a single oxygen atom from one of the nitrate groups. The second nitrate group is not coordinated to the copper atoms but is central to an extensive hydrogen bonding network involving the water molecule and uncoordinated functional groups of PM.
Resumo:
The x-ray crystal structure of thiamine hydroiodide,C1ZH18N40S12' has been determined. The unit cell parameters are a = 13.84 ± 0.03, o b = 7.44 ± 0.01, c = 20.24 ± 0.02 A, 8 = 120.52 ± 0.07°, space group P2/c, z = 4. A total of 1445 reflections having ,2 > 2o(F2), 26 < 40° were collected on a Picker four-circle diffractometer with MoKa radiation by the 26 scan technique. The structure was solved by the heavy atom method. The iodine and sulphur atoms were refined anisotropically; only the positional parameters were refined for the hydrogen atoms. Successive least squares cycles yielded an unweighted R factor of 0.054. The site of protonation of the pyrimidine ring is the nitrogen opposite the amino group. The overall structure conforms very closely to the structures of other related thiamine compounds. The bonding surrounding the iodine atoms is distorted tetrahedral. The iodine atoms make several contacts with surrounding atoms most of them at or near the van der Waal's distances A thiaminium tetrachlorocobaltate salt was produced whose molecular and crystal structure was j~dged to be isomorphous to thiaminium tetrachlorocadmate.
Resumo:
In this thesis I outline a critical approach to interpreting the considerable academic literature on Aboriginal women in North America. I locate the scholarship concerning Native women within an understanding of three developments related to a philosophy of science: (I) paradigmatic shifts concerning the philosophy of science, (2) materialist-idealist debates and (3) transitions in feminist theory characterized by what is tenned the shift from second to third wave feminism. My exploration of emergent themes suggests that the elements indicated above provide overlapping frameworks within which most scholarship about Indigenous women is positioned. I illustrate my finding that employing critical discourse analysis and postcolonial feminism as both method and theory provides a useful approach in attending to intersecting experiences of 'race, class, and gender.' I view these intersecting experiences as central to the socio-political positioning of Indigenous women within contemporary feminist theorizing. I conclude my thesis by reflecting on the conceptual struggles I experienced in fonnulating and organizing the thesis and the significance of my underlying epistemological position and value-orientation as both a feminist and Native woman.