Amino acid availability in ruminants of cereals and cereal co-products

Microbial corrected in situ estimatesof the ruminal undegraded fraction (RU) and intestinal effectivedigestibility (IED) of amino acids (AA), except tryptophan, of rye, wheat and corn grains, wheat bran, wheat and barley distilled dried grains and corn gluten feed were measured on three rumen- and duodenum-cannulated wethers using 15N-labelling techniques and considering ruminal rates of particle comminution and outflow.

Diet of Common Chiffchaffs Phylloscopus collybita wintering in a wetland in south-east Spain

The diet of Common Chiffchaffs Phylloscopus collybita wintering in a Mediterranean wetland (El Hondo Natural Park, SE Spain) was studied by analysing the gizzard content of 17 individuals that died accidentally when trapped for ringing. Prey availability was assessed via water-trap sampling over two winters. The bulk of the diet was composed of midges (Chironomidae), which were found in all the gizzards and represented approximately 95% of the prey. Brachycera flies were one of the most captured taxa in the water-traps but represented less than 0.5% of the total number of prey consumed. Compositional analysis revealed very strong prey selection, with Chiffchaffs selecting clumped and less mobile prey, such as chironomids, and avoiding abundant but fast-escaping prey, such as Brachycera.

To the Justices of the Police Court of Boston, 1828 April

Draft of a complaint against the boys in Croswell's neighborhood.

Complaint to the Police Court of Boston, 1831 November 18

One draft of a complaint regarding noisy neighbors.

Notes of proceedings and cases determined in the high court of errors and appeals, the court of chancery, and the orphans court of the state of Delaware, 1792-1832

Contains summaries of cases heard by the Delaware Supreme Court and the Delaware Appeals Court in the counties of Sussex, Kent, and Newcastle covering a variety of legal topics. Supposedly based on Wilson's Red Book.

Records of cases before the Mayor's Court of Albany, 1786-1796

Contains a summary of cases before the court beginning with the litigants and the damages sought, the legal action, names of counsel, actions taken, and the final disposition of the case. Most actions taken relate to debt, assault and battery, and slander and libel. At the back of the manuscript are "an account of law books by me purchased in the year 1784 & 1785" [p. 120], and"a list miscellanious books bought in the year 1784 & 1785" [p. 132].

Cases adjudged in the General Court of Virginia, 1733-1741

A copy of the reports by Edward Barradall of decisions of the general court of Virginia made by Gustavus A. Myers for William Green from a copy lent him by Conway Robinson.

Proceedings in the Court of Chancery of Grenada: during the government of his excellency Lord Macartney, 1776-1778

Contains summaries of cases before the Chancery Court of Grenada arranged chronologically and preceded by an index.

Letter of recommendation for Amos Main from Joseph Moodey to Nathan Prince, 1725 July 2

Handwritten letter sent by Joseph Moody, schoolmaster in York, to Harvard Tutor Nathan Prince recommending student Amos Main for acceptance to the College. In the letter, Moody requests Prince give Main an examination for admission, with the caveat that though Main has been studying Latin and Greek he has a difficult home life and is "somewhat Raw; yet I hope you'l wink at it." The letter, dated July 2, 1725, is written on a folded folio-sized leaf; there are handwritten notes about Massachusetts towns on the verso.

At a court of admiralty held at Boston ... the 22d day of 1704 was condemned the briggantine Charles whereof John Quelch was late commander ... , 1704

Attestation regarding the trial of Quelch and other defendants, who were convicted of piracy. Signed: John Valentine, registrar.

The European Court of Justice and process-oriented review. Research Paper in Law, 01/2012

Structuralism is a theory of U.S. constitutional adjudication according to which courts should seek to improve the decision-making process of the political branches of government so as to render it more democratic.1 In words of John Hart Ely, courts should exercise their judicial-review powers as a ‘representation-reinforcing’ mechanism.2 Structuralism advocates that courts must eliminate the elements of the political decision-making process that are at odds with the structure set out by the authors of the U.S. Constitution. The advantage of this approach, U.S. scholars posit, lies in the fact that it does not require courts to second-guess the policy decisions adopted by the political branches of government. Instead, they limit themselves to enforcing the constitutional structure within which those decisions must be adopted. Of course, this theory of constitutional adjudication, like all theories, has its shortcomings. For example, detractors of structuralism argue that it is difficult, if not impossible, to draw the dividing line between ‘substantive’ and ‘structural’ matters.3 In particular, they claim that, when identifying the ‘structure’ set out by the authors of the U.S. Constitution, courts necessarily base their determinations not on purely structural principles, but on a set of substantive values, evaluating concepts such as democracy, liberty and equality. 4 Without claiming that structuralism should be embraced by the ECJ as the leading theory of judicial review, the purpose of my contribution is to explore how recent case-law reveals that the ECJ has also striven to develop guiding principles which aim to improve the way in which the political institutions of the EU adopt their decisions. In those cases, the ECJ decided not to second-guess the appropriateness of the policy choices made by the EU legislator. Instead, it preferred to examine whether, in reaching an outcome, the EU political institutions had followed the procedural steps mandated by the authors of the Treaties. Stated simply, I argue that judicial deference in relation to ‘substantive outcomes’ has been counterbalanced by a strict ‘process review’. To that effect, I would like to discuss three recent rulings of the ECJ, delivered after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, where an EU policy measure was challenged indirectly, i.e. via the preliminary reference procedure, namely Vodafone, Volker und Markus Schecke and Test-Achats.5 Whilst in the former case the ECJ ruled that the questions raised by the referring court disclosed no factor of such a kind as to affect the validity of the challenged act, in the latter cases the challenged provisions of an EU act were declared invalid.

Talking with the “pouvoir constituant” in times of constitutional reform: The European Court of Justice on Private Applicants’ Access to Justice. Research Paper in Law 3/2003

[From the Introduction]. European lawyers, at least those dealing predominantly with institutional matters, are living particularly interesting times since the setting-up of the “European Convention on the Future of Europe” in December 2001.1 As the Convention’s mandate, spelled out in rather broad terms in the European Council’s declaration of Laeken,2 is potentially unlimited, and as the future constitution of the European Union (EU) will be ultimately adopted by the subsequent Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), there appears to be a great possibility to clarify, to simplify and also to reform many of the more controversial elements in the European legal construction. The present debate on the future of the European constitution also highlights the relationship between the pouvoir constituant3 and the European Courts, the Court of Justice (ECJ) and its Court of First Instance (CFI), who have to interpret the basic rules and principles of the EU.4 In that light, the present article will focus on a classic theme of the Court’s case law: the relationship between judges and pouvoir constituant. In the EU, this relationship has traditionally been marked by the ECJ’s role as driving force in the “constitutionalisation” of the EC Treaties – which has, to a large extent, been accepted and even codified by the Member States in subsequent treaty revisions. However, since 1994, the ECJ appears to be more reluctant to act as a “law-maker.”5 The recent judgment in Unión de Pequeños Agricultores (UPA)6 – an important decision by which the ECJ refused to liberalize individuals’ access to the Community Courts – is also interesting in this context. UPA may be seen as another proof of judicial restraint - or even as indicator of the beginning of a new phase in the “constitutional dialogue” between the ECJ and the “Masters of the Treaties.”