Entwicklungsprojekt MCUI13 : Machbarkeitsstudie/ Konzept zum Bau und Betrieb einer „Power to Methanol“-Anlage

[s.c.]

Serotonergic modulation of action monitoring and cognitive control

Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Naturwiss., Diss., 2015

Understanding and monitoring attitudes of product properties over time

Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Informatik, Diss., 2015

Forward rates : predictive power and trading strategies

Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Wirtschaftswiss., Diss., 2014

Improved cardiac gating and patient monitoring in high field magnetic resonance imaging by means of electrocardiogram signal processing

Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Elektrotechnik und Informationstechnik, Diss., 2015

Impact of a power plant cooling system on copepod and meroplankton survival (Bahía Blanca estuary, Argentina)

The impact of a power plant cooling system in the Bahía Blanca estuary (Argentina) on the survival of target zooplanktonic organisms (copepods and crustacean larvae) and on overall mesozooplankton abundance was evaluated over time. Mortality rates were calculated for juveniles and adults of four key species in the estuary: Acartia tonsa Dana, 1849 and Eurytemora americana Williams, 1906 (native and invading copepods), and larvae of the crab Chasmagnathus granulata Dana, 1851 and the invading cirriped Balanus glandula Darwin, 1854. Mean total mortality values were up to four times higher at the water discharge site than at intake, though for all four species, significant differences were only registered in post-capture mortality. The findings show no evidence of greater larval sensitivity. As expected, the sharpest decrease in overall mesozooplankton abundance was found in areas close to heated water discharge.

Optimal technology policy: subsidies versus monitoring

We analyze the optimal technology policy to solve a free-riding problem between the members of a RJV. We assume that when intervening the Government suffers an additional adverse selection problem because it is not able to distinguish the value of the potential innovation. Although subsidies and monitoring may be equivalent policy tools to solve firms' free-riding problem, they imply different social losses if the Government is not able to perfectly distinguish the value of the potential innovation. The supremacy of monitoring tools over subsidies is proved to depend on which type of information the Government is able to obtain about firms' R&D performance.

Countervailing power? Collusion in markets with decentralized trade

We consider the collective incentives of buyers and sellers to form cartels in markets where trade is realized through decentralized pairwise bargaining. Cartels are coalitions of buyers or sellers that limit market participation and compensate inactive members for abstaining from trade. In a stable market outcome, cartels set Nash equilibrium quantities and cartel memberships are immune to defections. We prove that the set of stable market outcomes is non-empty and we provide its full characterization. Stable market outcomes are of two types: (i) at least one cartel actively restrains trade and the levels of market participation are balanced, or (ii) only one cartel, eventually the cartel that forms on the long side of the market, is active and it reduces trade slightly below the opponent's.

Can competition in the credit market be excessive?

We study how market power affects investment and welfare when banks choose between restricting loan sizes and monitoring, in order to alleviate an underlying moral hazard problem. The impact of market power on aggregate welfare is the result of two countervailing effects. An increase in banks' market power results in: (i) higher lending rates, which worsens the borrower's incentive problem and reduces investment by unmonitored firms, (ii) higher monitoring effort, which reduces the proportion of credit-constrained firms. Whenever the second effect dominates, it is optimal to provide banks with some degree of market power.

Taxation of banks: a theoretical framework

The goal of this paper is to develop a model of financial intermediation analyze the impact of various forms of taxation. The model considers in a unified framework various functions of banks: monitoring, transaction services and asset transformation. Particular attention is devoted to conditions for separability between deposits and loans. The analysis focuses on: (i) competition between banks and alternative financial arrangements (investment funds and organized security markets), (ii) regulation, and (iii) bank's monopoly power and risk taking behavior.