Serious games for energy social science research

This paper proposes a set of criteria for evaluation of serious games (SGs) which are intended as effective methods of engaging energy users and lowering consumption. We discuss opportunities for using SGs in energy research which go beyond existing feedback mechanisms, including use of immersive virtual worlds for learning and testing behaviours, and sparking conversations within households. From a review of existing SG evaluation criteria, we define a tailored set of criteria for energy SG development and evaluation. The criteria emphasise the need for the game to increase energy literacy through applicability to real-life energy use/management; clear, actionable goals and feedback; ways of comparing usage socially and personal relevance. Three existing energy games are evaluated according to this framework. The paper concludes by outlining directions for future development of SGs as an effective tool in social science research, including games which inspire reflection on trade-offs and usage at different scales.

Educational Games for Learning Programming Languages

A concept of educational game for learning programming languages is presented. The idea of learning programming languages and improving programming skills through programming game characters’ behavior is described. The learning course description rules for using in games are suggested. The concept is implemented in a game for learning C# programming language. A common game architecture is modified for using in the educational game. The game engine is built on the base of the graphical engine Ogre3D and extended with game logic. The game has been developed as an industry level commercial product and is planned for sale to educational institutions.

Comparing interaction techniques for serious games through brain-computer interfaces:a user perception evaluation study

This paper examines the application of commercial and non-invasive electroencephalography (EEG)-based brain-computer (BCIs) interfaces with serious games. Two different EEG-based BCI devices were used to fully control the same serious game. The first device (NeuroSky MindSet) uses only a single dry electrode and requires no calibration. The second device (Emotiv EPOC) uses 14 wet sensors requiring additional training of a classifier. User testing was performed on both devices with sixty-two participants measuring the player experience as well as key aspects of serious games, primarily learnability, satisfaction, performance and effort. Recorded feedback indicates that the current state of BCIs can be used in the future as alternative game interfaces after familiarisation and in some cases calibration. Comparative analysis showed significant differences between the two devices. The first device provides more satisfaction to the players whereas the second device is more effective in terms of adaptation and interaction with the serious game.

A Software Platform for Educational Board Games

Educational games such as quizzes, quests, puzzles, mazes and logical problems may be modeled as multimedia board games. In the scope of the ADOPTA project1 being under development at the Faculty of Mathematics and Informatics at Sofia University, a formal model for presentation of such educational board games was invented and elaborated. Educational games can be modeled as special board mini-games, with a board of any form and any types of positions. Over defined positions, figures (objects) with certain properties are placed and, next, there are to be defined formal rules for manipulation of these figures and resulted effects. The model has been found to be general enough in order to allow description and execution control of more complex logical problems to be solved by several actions delivered to/by the player according some formal rules and context conditions and, in general, of any learning activities and their workflow. It is used as a base for creation of a software platform providing facilities for easy construction of multimedia board games and their execution. The platform consists of game designer (i.e., a game authoring tool) and game run-time controller communicating each other through game repository. There are created and modeled many examples of educational board games appropriate for didactic purposes, self evaluations, etc., which are supposed to be designed easily by authors with no IT skills and experience. By means of game metadata descriptions, these games are going be included into narrative storyboards and, next, delivered to learners with appropriate profile according their learning style, preferences, etc. Moreover, usage of artificial intelligence agents is planned as well – once as playing virtual opponents of the player or, otherwise, being virtual advisers of the gamer helping him/her in finding the right problem solution within given domain such as discovering a treasure using a location map, finding best tour in a virtual museum, guessing an unknown word in a hangman game, and many others.

Serious Games in Economics

The European Leonardo da Vinci Transfer of Innovation project “Teacher training to improve attractiveness and quality of management education through the simulation tool ‘Emerald Forest’” which emphases on using the computer simulation tool for increasing attractiveness of teaching and learning in economics is presented in this paper. The observation of using computer systems and especially serious games in education is provided as well. “Education is not the filling of a pail, but the lighting of a fire” - William Butler Yeats

State of the art in business games

The use of digital games and gamification has demonstrated potential to improve many aspects of how businesses provide training to staff, and communicate with consumers. However, there is still a need for better understanding of how the adoption of games and gasification would influence the process of decision-making in organisations across different industry. This article provides a structured review of existing literature on the use of games in the business environment, and seeks to consolidate findings to address research questions regarding their perception, proven efficacy, and identifies key areas for future work. The findings highlight that serious games can have positive and effective impacts in multiple areas of a business, including training, decision-support, and consumer outreach. They also emphasise the challenges and pitfalls of applying serious games and gamification principles within a business context, and discuss the implications of development and evaluation methodologies on the success of a game-based solution.

Essential features of serious games design in higher education:linking learning attributes to game mechanics

This paper consolidates evidence and material from a range of specialist and disciplinary fields to provide an evidence-based review and synthesis on the design and use of serious games in higher education. Search terms identified 165 papers reporting conceptual and empirical evidence on how learning attributes and game mechanics may be planned, designed and implemented by university teachers interested in using games, which are integrated into lesson plans and orchestrated as part of a learning sequence at any scale. The findings outline the potential of classifying the links between learning attributes and game mechanics as a means to scaffold teachers’ understanding of how to perpetuate learning in optimal ways while enhancing the in-game learning experience. The findings of this paper provide a foundation for describing methods, frames and discourse around experiences of design and use of serious games, linked to methodological limitations and recommendations for further research in this area.

Price vs. quantity in oligopoly games

Price-setting and quantity-setting oligopoly games lead to extremely dierent outcomes in the market. One natural way to address this problem is to formulate a model in which some rms use price while the remaining rms use quantity as their decision variable. We introduce a mixed oligopoly game of this type and determine its equilibria. In addition, we consider an extension of this mixed oligopoly game through which the choice of the decision variables can be endogenized. We prove the emergence of the Cournot game.

Quantity-setting games with a dominant firm

We consider a possible game-theoretic foundation of Forchheimer's model of dominant-firm price leadership based on quantity-setting games with one large firm and many small firms. If the large firm is the exogenously given first mover, we obtain Forchheimer's model. We also investigate whether the large firm can emerge as a first mover of a timing game.

Generalized correlated equilibrium for two-person games in extensive form with perfect information

A correlation scheme (leading to a special equilibrium called “soft” correlated equilibrium) is applied for two-person finite games in extensive form with perfect information. Randomization by an umpire takes place over the leaves of the game tree. At every decision point players have the choice either to follow the recommendation of the umpire blindly or freely choose any other action except the one suggested. This scheme can lead to Pareto-improved outcomes of other correlated equilibria. Computational issues of maximizing a linear function over the set of soft correlated equilibria are considered and a linear-time algorithm in terms of the number of edges in the game tree is given for a special procedure called “subgame perfect optimization”.

On the implementation of the L-Nash bargaining solution in two-person bargaining games

The “Nash program” initiated by Nash (Econometrica 21:128–140, 1953) is a research agenda aiming at representing every axiomatically determined cooperative solution to a game as a Nash outcome of a reasonable noncooperative bargaining game. The L-Nash solution first defined by Forgó (Interactive Decisions. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 229. Springer, Berlin, pp 1–15, 1983) is obtained as the limiting point of the Nash bargaining solution when the disagreement point goes to negative infinity in a fixed direction. In Forgó and Szidarovszky (Eur J Oper Res 147:108–116, 2003), the L-Nash solution was related to the solution of multiciteria decision making and two different axiomatizations of the L-Nash solution were also given in this context. In this paper, finite bounds are established for the penalty of disagreement in certain special two-person bargaining problems, making it possible to apply all the implementation models designed for Nash bargaining problems with a finite disagreement point to obtain the L-Nash solution as well. For another set of problems where this method does not work, a version of Rubinstein’s alternative offer game (Econometrica 50:97–109, 1982) is shown to asymptotically implement the L-Nash solution. If penalty is internalized as a decision variable of one of the players, then a modification of Howard’s game (J Econ Theory 56:142–159, 1992) also implements the L-Nash solution.

Az ellenzék ereje - általánosított súlyozott szavazási játékok (Minority power - generalized weighted voting games)

A hagyományos szavazási játékok speciális átruházható hasznosságú, kooperatív játékok, úgynevezett egyszerű játékok, ahol a játékosok a pártok, és az egyes koalíciók értéke 1 vagy 0 attól függően, hogy az adott koalíció elég erős-e az adott jogszabály elfogadásához, vagy sem. Ebben a cikkben bevezetjük az általánosított súlyozott szavazási játékok fogalmát, ahol a pártok mandátumainak száma a valószínűségi változó. Magyar példákon keresztül mutatjuk be az új megközelítés használhatóságát. / === / Voting games are cooperative games with transferable utility, so-called simple games, where the players are parties and the value of a coalition may be 0 or 1 depending on its ability to pass a new law. The authors introduce the concept of generalized weighted voting games where the parties' strengths are random variables. taking examples from Hungary to illustrate the use of this approach.

The Shapley value for shortest path games

In this paper shortest path games are considered. The transportation of a good in a network has costs and benet too. The problem is to divide the prot of the transportation among the players. Fragnelli et al (2000) introduce the class of shortest path games, which coincides with the class of monotone games. They also give a characterization of the Shapley value on this class of games. In this paper we consider further four characterizations of the Shapley value (Shapley (1953)'s, Young (1985)'s, Chun (1989)'s, and van den Brink (2001)'s axiomatizations), and conclude that all the mentioned axiomatizations are valid for shortest path games. Fragnelli et al (2000)'s axioms are based on the graph behind the problem, in this paper we do not consider graph specic axioms, we take TU axioms only, that is, we consider all shortest path problems and we take the view of abstract decision maker who focuses rather on the abstract problem than on the concrete situations.