The implication of a term of good faith in commercial leases

Much has been written in the past decade on the subject of the implication of a term of good faith in contracts in Australia, particularly since the judgment Priestley JA in Renard Constructions (ME) Pty Ltd v Minister for Public Works (1992) 26 NSWLR 234. Except for an early article by Rachael Mulheron, 'Good Faith and Commercial Leases: New Opportunities for the Tenant' (1996) 4 APLJ 223, very little else has been written with respect to the possible application of the doctrine to the commercial leases.With the advent of two later New South Wales Supreme Court decisions Alcatel Australia Ltd v Scarcella (1998) 44 NSWLR 349 and, more recently, Advance Fitness v Bondi Diggers [1999] NSWSC 264, the question of the application of the doctrine in the commercial leasing context has been examined. This article briefly considers the nature and substance of the doctrine against the background of the relationship of lessor and lessee and examines in some depth the Australian decisions on commercial leases where it has been sought, unsuccessfully, to apply the doctrine. The article concludes by suggesting that as a standard commercial lease usually covers the field of agreement between lessor and lessee and as a lessee has a high degree of statutory protection derived from equitable principles, there may be little room for the operation of the doctrine in this legal environment.

Beyond charity : outlines of a jurisprudence for civil society

There is not a single, coherent, jurisprudence for civil society organisations. Pressure for a clearly enuciated body of law applying to the whole of this sector of society continues to increase. The rise of third sector scholarship, the retreat of the welfare state, the rediscovery of the concept of civil society and pressures to strengthen social capital have all contributed to an ongoing stream of inquiry into the laws that regulate and favour civil society organisations. There have been almost thirty inquiries over the last sixty years into the doctrine of charitable purpose in common law countries. Those inquiries have established that problems with the law applying to civil society organisations are rooted in the common law adopting a ‘technical’ definition of charitable purpose and the failure of this body of law to develop in response to societal changes. Even though it is now well recognised that problems with law reform stem from problems inherent in the doctrine of charitable purpose, statutory reforms have merely ‘bolted on’ additions to the flawed ‘technical’ definition. In this way the scope of operation of the law has been incrementally expanded to include a larger number of civil society organisations. This piecemeal approach continues the exclusion of most civil society organisations from the law of charities discourse, and fails to address the underlying jurisprudential problems. Comprehensive reform requires revisiting the foundational problems embedded in the doctrine of charitable purpose, being informed by recent scholarship, and a paradigm shift that extends the doctrine to include all civil society organisations. Scholarly inquiry into civil society organisations, particularly from within the discipline of neoclassical economics, has elucidated insights that can inform legal theory development. This theory development requires decoupling the two distinct functions performed by the doctrine of charitable purpose which are: setting the scope of regulation, and determining entitlement to favours, such as tax exemption. If the two different functions of the doctrine are considered separately in the light of theoretical insights from other disciplines, the architecture for a jurisprudence emerges that facilitates regulation, but does not necessarily favour all civil society organisations. Informed by that broader discourse it is argued that when determining the scope of regulation, civil society organisations are identified by reference to charitable purposes that are not technically defined. These charitable purposes are in essence purposes which are: Altruistic, for public Benefit, pursued without Coercion. These charitable puposes differentiate civil society organisations from organisations in the three other sectors namely; Business, which is manifest in lack of altruism; Government, which is characterised by coercion; and Family, which is characterised by benefits being private not public. When determining entitlement to favour, it is theorised that it is the extent or nature of the public benefit evident in the pursuit of a charitable purpose that justifies entitlement to favour. Entitlement to favour based on the extent of public benefit is the theoretically simpler – the greater the public benefit the greater the justification for favour. To be entitled to favour based on the nature of a purpose being charitable the purpose must fall within one of three categories developed from the first three heads of Pemsel’s case (the landmark categorisation case on taxation favour). The three categories proposed are: Dealing with Disadvantage, Encouraging Edification; and Facilitating Freedom. In this alternative paradigm a recast doctrine of charitable purpose underpins a jurisprudence for civil society in a way similar to the way contract underpins the jurisprudence for the business sector, the way that freedom from arbitrary coercion underpins the jurisprudence of the government sector and the way that equity within families underpins succession and family law jurisprudence for the family sector. This alternative architecture for the common law, developed from the doctrine of charitable purpose but inclusive of all civil society purposes, is argued to cover the field of the law applying to civil society organisations and warrants its own third space as a body of law between public law and private law in jurisprudence.

Disclosure in insurance law : contemporary and historical economic considerations

This article examines the importance of accurate classification and identification of risk with particular reference to the problem of adverse selection. It is argued that, historically, this concern was the paramount consideration influencing standard form contract formation and disclosure laws. The scope of its relevance today however is less apparent in that contemporary insurance contracting is conducted in a vastly different environment from that which prevailed at the time Lloyd's was better known as a coffee house. Accordingly, the second part of this article looks at the contemporary framework of information disclosure and those dynamics within it designed to elicit information weighing on risk forecasting : specifically, (a) direct inquiry and testing requirements; (b) signaling - or incentive based structuring of insurance contractual and (c) bargaining in the shadow of the utmost good faith doctrine. Finally, certain conclusions arising out of contemporary and historical economic considerations underpinning disclosure in insurance law are outlined.

Utmost good faith in insurance : reform overdue?

Considerable attention has been devoted to the duty or doctrine of utmost good faith in the academic literature and in the courts. This attention ranges from an analysis of the precise legal basis for the duty through a consideration of the continuing nature of that duty in the post-contract environment.It is quite clear that all contracts of insurance are subject to this duty of utmost good faith. What is less clear and certain are the incidents attendant upon such a duty and the scope of the obligations that such a duty imposes. This article examines the relative positions that have been reached in England and Australia and concludes with some recommendations for legislative reform to this area of the law.

Prosecution history estoppel in the UK?

The doctrine of 'prosecution history estoppel' (PH estoppel) as developed in the United States has strong intuitive appeal, especially when applied to counterbalance a related patent law principle, the doctrine of equivalents. The doctrines are receiving increasing attention in US patent decisions, to the point where one patent litigator recently compared them to "two cars that keep bumping fenders. They are frequently returned to the shop for repairs". Could PH estoppel find its way into UK patent law? This article briefly examines the doctrine, its evolution in the US and the problems associated with importing the doctrine into the UK. As the EU legislation stands, Article 69 and the Protocol to the European Patent Convention (EPC) pose serious obstacles to using the doctrine directly in claim construction. However there appears to be some scope to apply the doctrine as a limited form of defence in infringement actions.

The problem child in Australian patent law : "fair" basing

The concept of "fair basing" is widely acknowledged as a difficult area of patent law. This article maps the development of fair basing law to demonstrate how some of the difficulties have arisen. Part I of the article traces the development of the branches of patent law that were swept under the nomenclature of "fair basing" by British legislation in 1949. It looks at the early courts' approach to patent construction, examines the early origin of fair basing and what it was intended to achiever. Part II of the article considers the modern interpretation of fair basing, which provides a striking contrast to its historical context. Without any consistent judicial approach to construction the doctrine has developed inappropriately, giving rise to both over-strict and over-generous approaches.

Digital constitutionalism and the role of the rule of law in the governance of virtual communities

This project proposes a new conceptual framework for the regulation of social networks and virtual communities. By applying a model based upon the rule of law, this thesis addresses the growing tensions that revolve around the public use of private networks. This research examines the shortcomings of traditional contractual governance models and cyberlaw theory and provides a reconstituted approach that will allow public constitutional-type interests to be recognised in the interpretation and enforcement of contractual doctrine.

Introduction

The 1990s saw the United Nations, the militaries of key member states, and NGOs increasingly entangled in the complex affairs of disrupted states. Whether as deliverers of humanitarian assistance or as agents of political, social, and civic reconstruction, whether in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, or East Timor, these actors have had to learn ways of interacting with each other in order to optimize the benefits for the populations they seek to assist. Yet the challenges have proved daunting. Civil and military actors have different organizational cultures and standard operating procedures and are confronted with the need to work together to perform tasks to which different actors may attach quite different priorities. From Civil Strife to Civil Society explores the nature of these challenges, blending the experience of scholars and practitioners. It is underpinned by an understanding that recovery from disruption is a laborious process that can easily be de-railed. The first part of the book offers a rigorous examination of the dimensions of state disruption and the roles of the international community in responding to it; the second part looks at military doctrine for dealing with disorder and humanitarian emergencies; the third part examines mechanisms for ending violence and delivering justice in post-conflict times; the fourth part investigates the problems of rebuilding trust and promoting democracy; the fifth part deals with the reconstitution of the rule of law; while the sixth and seventh parts address the reestablishment of social and civil order.

Identity fraud and torrens - minimising the risks and allocating the loss to achieve a sustainable system

Immediate indefeasibility is the cornerstone of the Torrens system of land registration. However, when combined with the apparent ease in which forged mortgages become registered, the operation of this doctrine can come into question. This article seeks to argue that, rather than question indefeasibility, the focus should be on the verification of identity of parties to land transactions. Whilst no system can ever be infallible, it is suggested that by correctly imposing the responsibility for identity verification on the appropriate individual, the Torrens system can retain immediate indefeasibility as its paramount principle, yet achieve the optimum level of fairness in terms of allocation of responsibility and loss. With the dawn of a new era of electronic conveyancing about to begin, the framework suggested here provides a model for minimising the risks of forged mortgages and appropriately allocating the loss.

Immediate indefeasibility : is it under threat?

Immediate indefeasibility has been adopted in Australia for close to 40 years. Recently however, and against the backdrop of economic fragility and global deregulation, there has been a polite questioning of its place. In Australia, some may argue that case law developments and legislative reform have placed indefeasibility under the microscope — in New Zealand, a similar telescoping by the respected views of their Law Commission. This note examines these reforms. It concludes that these reforms do not place immediate indefeasibility under threat. Rather, they modify and adapt the doctrine to fit within the context of contemporary financial instruments. Nevertheless, changes have so far been piecemeal, and its time for a consistent and logical examination of this issue to occur on the national, rather than the stage of each state.

Order supported by law : the enforcement of norms in virtual communities

As online social spaces continue to grow in importance, the complex relationship between users and the private providers of the platforms continues to raise increasingly difficult questions about legitimacy in online governance. This article examines two issues that go to the core of egitimate governance in online communities: how are rules enforced and punishments imposed, and how should the law support legitimate governance and protect participants from the illegitimate exercise of power? Because the rules of online communities are generally ultimately backed by contractual terms of service, the imposition of punishment for the breach of internal rules exists in a difficult conceptual gap between criminal law and the predominantly compensatory remedies of contractual doctrine. When theorists have addressed the need for the rules of virtual communities to be enforced, a dichotomy has generally emerged between the appropriate role of criminal law for 'real' crimes, and the private, internal resolution of 'virtual' or 'fantasy' crimes. In this structure, the punitive effect of internal measures is downplayed and the harm that can be caused to participants by internal sanctions is systemically undervalued.

Joinder to a later unsigned document?

It is well known that a statutory requirement of formality is associated with contracts concerning land. In this regard, s 59 of the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) provides: No action may be brought upon any contract for the sale or other disposition of land or any interest in land unless the contract upon which such action is brought, or some memorandum or note of the contract, is in writing, and signed by the party to be charged, or by some person by the party lawfully authorised. In addition to the possibility of a formal contract, the statutory wording clearly contemplates reliance on an informal note or memorandum. To constitute a sufficient note or memorandum for the purposes of the statute, the signed note or memorandum must contain details of the parties to the contract, an adequate description of the property, the price and any other essential terms. It is also accepted that the doctrine of joinder may be invoked in circumstances where the document signed by the party to be charged contains an express or implied reference to any other document. In this way, a sufficient note or memorandum may be constituted by the joinder of a number of documents.

Responsibility to Protect and Sovereignty

The responsibility to protect ('R2P') principle articulates the obligations of the international community to prevent conflict occurring, to intervene in conflicts, and to assist in rebuilding after conflicts. The doctrine is about protecting civilians in armed conflicts from four mass atrocity crimes: genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. This book examines interventions in East Timor, Sri Lanka, Sudan and Kosovo. The chapters explore and question UN debates with respect to the doctrine both before and after its adoption in 2005; contrasting state attitudes to international military intervention; and what takes place after intervention. It also discusses the ability of the Security Council to access reliable information and credible and transparent processes to enable it to make a determination on the occurrence of atrocities in a Member State. Questioning whether there is a need to find a closer operational link between the responsibilities to prevent and react and a normative link between R2P and principles of international law, the contributions examine the effectiveness of the framework of R2P for international decision-making in response to mass atrocity crimes and ask how an international system to deal with threats and mass atrocities can be developed in the absence of a central authority. This book will be valuable to those interested in international law, human rights, and security, peace and conflict studies

Intention, foresight and ending life : a response to "The Double Effect effect" by Charles Foster, Jonathan Herring, Karen Melham and Tony Hope, (CQ 20(1))

In this paper I examine the recent arguments by Charles Foster, Jonathan Herring, Karen Melham and Tony Hope against the utility of the doctrine of double effect. One basis on which they reject the utility of the doctrine is their claim that it is notoriously difficult to apply what they identify as its 'core' component, namely, the distinction between intention and foresight. It is this contention that is the primarily focus of my article. I argue against this claim that the intention/foresight distinction remains a fundamental part of the law in those jurisdictions where intention remains an element of the offence of murder and that, accordingly, it is essential ro resolve the putative difficulties of applying the intention/foresight distinction so as to ensure the integrity of the law of murder. I argue that the main reasons advanced for the claim that the intention/foresight distinction is difficult to apply are ultimately unsustainable, and that the distinction is not as difficult to apply as the authors suggest.

Palliative care, double effect and the law in Australia

Care and decision-making at the end of life that promotes comfort and dignity is widely endorsed by public policy and the law. In ethical analysis of palliative care interventions that are argued potentially to hasten death, these may be deemed to be ethically permissible by the application of the doctrine of double effect, if the doctor’s intention is to relieve pain and not cause death. In part because of the significance of ethics in the development of law in the medical sphere, this doctrine is also likely to be recognized as part of Australia’s common law, although hitherto there have been no cases concerning palliative care brought before a court in Australia to test this. Three Australian States have, nonetheless, created legislative defences that are different from the common law with the intent of clarifying the law, promoting palliative care, and distinguishing it from euthanasia. However, these defences have the potential to provide less protection for doctors administering palliative care. In addition to requiring a doctor to have an appropriate intent, the defences insist on adherence to particular medical practice standards and perhaps require patient consent. Doctors providing end-of-life care in these States need to be aware of these legislative changes. Acting in accordance with the common law doctrine of double effect may not provide legal protection. Similar changes are likely to occur in other States and Territories as there is a trend towards enacting legislative defences that deal with the provision of palliative care.