Memorias sobre la historia natural de la isla de Cuba, acompañadas de sumarios latinos y extractos en frances, por Felipe Poey

1

Bibliothecae Upsaliensis historia / auctore O. O. Celsio, &c.

1745

Protoptychus hatcheri Scott, 1895 : the mammalian faunas of the Washakie Formation, Eocene age, of southern Wyoming. William D. Turnbull --.

n.s. no.21(1991)

In search of mathematical primitives for deriving universal projective hash families

We provide some guidelines for deriving new projective hash families of cryptographic interest. Our main building blocks are so called group action systems; we explore what properties of this mathematical primitives may lead to the construction of cryptographically useful projective hash families. We point out different directions towards new constructions, deviating from known proposals arising from Cramer and Shoup's seminal work.

Plantae Brasiliae centralis a Glaziou lectae = Liste des plantes du Brésil central recueillies en 1861-1895 / par A.-F.-M. Glaziou.

3

Historia general y natural de las Indias, islas y tierra-firme del mar oceano,

3

Historia general y natural de las Indias, islas y tierra-firme del mar oceano,

1

When does universal peace prevail? Secession and group formation in rent seeking contests and policy conflicts

This paper analyzes secession and group formation in a general model of contest inspired by Esteban and Ray (1999). This model encompasses as special cases rent seeking contests and policy conflicts, where agents lobby over the choice of a policy in a one-dimensional policy space. We show that in both models the grand coalition is the efficient coalition structure and agents are always better off in the grand coalition than in a symmetric coalition structure. Individual agents (in the rent seeking contest) and extremists (in the policy conflict) only have an incentive to secede when they anticipate that their secession will not be followed by additional secessions. Incentives to secede are lower when agents cooperate inside groups. The grand coalition emerges as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of a sequential game of coalition formation in rent seeking contests.

How universal is behavior? A four country comparison of spite, cooperation and errors in voluntary contribution mechanisms

This paper studies behavior in experiments with a linear voluntary contributions mechanism for public goods conducted in Japan, the Netherlands, Spain and the USA. The same experimental design was used in the four countries. Our 'contribution function' design allows us to obtain a view of subjects' behavior from two complementary points of view. If yields information about situations where, in purely pecuniary terms, it is a dominant strategy to contribute all the endowment and about situations where it is a dominant strategy to contribute nothing. Our results show, first, that differences in behavior across countries are minor. We find that when people play "the same game" they behave similarly. Second, for all four countries our data are inconsistent with the explanation that subjects contribute only out of confusion. A common cooperative motivation is needed to explain the date.