Simple Mediation in a Cheap-Talk Game

In the Crawford-Sobel (uniform, quadratic utility) cheap-talk model, we consider a simple mediation scheme (a communication device) in which the informed agent reports one of N possible elements of a partition to the mediator and then the mediator suggests one of N actions to the uninformed decision-maker according to the probability distribution of the device. We show that such a simple mediated equilibrium cannot improve upon the unmediated N-partition Crawford-Sobel equilibrium when the preference divergence parameter (bias) is small.

Local Conventions in Game Play in an Evolving Dual Social Network Framework

People usually perform economic interactions within the social setting of a small group, while they obtain relevant information from a broader source. We capture this feature with a dynamic interaction model based on two separate social networks. Individuals play a coordination game in an interaction network, while updating their strategies using information from a separate influence network through which information is disseminated. In each time period, the interaction and influence networks co-evolve, and the individuals’ strategies are updated through a modified naive learning process. We show that both network structures and players’ strategies always reach a steady state, in which players form fully connected groups and converge to local conventions. We also analyze the influence exerted by a minority group of strongly opinionated players on these outcomes.

The player and video game interplay in the gameplay experience construct

Among the many discussions and studies related to video games, one of the most recurrent, widely debated and important relates to the experience of playing video games. The gameplay experience – as appropriated in this study – is the result of the interplay between two essential elements: a video game and a player. Existing studies have explored the resulting experience of video game playing from the perspective of the video game or the player, but none appear to equally balance both of these elements. The study presented here contributes to the ongoing debate with a gameplay experience model. The proposed model, which looks to equally balance the video game and the player elements, considers the gameplay experience to be both an interactive experience (related to the process of playing the video game) and an emotional experience (related to the outcome of playing the video game). The mutual influence of these two experiences during video game play ultimately defines the gameplay experience. To this gameplay experience contributes several dimensions, related to both the video game and player: the video game includes a mechanics, interface and narrative dimension; the player includes a motivations, expectations and background dimension. Also, the gameplay experience is initially defined by a gameplay situation, conditioned by an ambient in which gameplay takes place and a platform on which the video game is played. In order to initially validate the proposed model and attempt to show a relationship among the multiple model dimensions, a multi-case study was carried out using two different video games and player samples. In one study, results show significant correlations between multiple model dimensions, and evidence that video game related changes influence player motivations as well as player visual behavior. In specific player related analysis, results show that while players may be different in terms of background and expectations regarding the game, their motivation to play are not necessarily different, even if their performance in the game is weak. While further validation is necessary, this model not only contributes to the gameplay experience debate, but also demonstrates in a given context how player and video game dimensions evolve during video game play.

Bertrand model under incomplete information

We consider a Bertrand duopoly model with unknown costs. The firms' aim is to choose the price of its product according to the well-known concept of Bayesian Nash equilibrium. The chooses are made simultaneously by both firms. In this paper, we suppose that each firm has two different technologies, and uses one of them according to a certain probability distribution. The use of either one or the other technology affects the unitary production cost. We show that this game has exactly one Bayesian Nash equilibrium. We analyse the advantages, for firms and for consumers, of using the technology with highest production cost versus the one with cheapest production cost. We prove that the expected profit of each firm increases with the variance of its production costs. We also show that the expected price of each good increases with both expected production costs, being the effect of the expected production costs of the rival dominated by the effect of the own expected production costs.

Signalling in an international cournot model

We consider a trade policy model, where the costs of the home firm are private information but can be signaled through the output levels of the firm to a foreign competitor and a home policymaker. We study the influences of the non-homogeneity of the goods and of the uncertainty on the production costs of the home firm in the signalling strategies by the home firm. We show that some results obtained for homogeneous goods are not robust under non-homogeneity.

Desirable role in an international duopoly model with tariffs

In this paper, we study an international market model in which the home government imposes a tariff on the imported goods. The model has two stages. In the first stage, the home government chooses an import tariff to maximize a function that cares about the home firm’s profit and the total revenue. Then, the firms engage in a Cournot or in a Stackelberg competition. We compare the results obtained in the three different ways of moving on the decision make of the firms.

International Stackelberg model with tariffs

This paper analyses the effects of tariffs on an international economy with a monopolistic sector with two firms, located in two countries, each one producing a homogeneous good for both home consumption and export to the other identical country. We consider a game among governments and firms. First, the government imposes a tariff on imports and then we consider the two types of moving: simultaneous (Cournot-type model) and sequential (Stackelberg-type model) decisions by the firms. We also compare the results obtained in each model.

Strategic Bidding in Electricity Markets: An agent-based simulator with game theory for scenario analysis

Electricity markets are complex environments, involving a large number of different entities, with specific characteristics and objectives, making their decisions and interacting in a dynamic scene. Game-theory has been widely used to support decisions in competitive environments; therefore its application in electricity markets can prove to be a high potential tool. This paper proposes a new scenario analysis algorithm, which includes the application of game-theory, to evaluate and preview different scenarios and provide players with the ability to strategically react in order to exhibit the behavior that better fits their objectives. This model includes forecasts of competitor players’ actions, to build models of their behavior, in order to define the most probable expected scenarios. Once the scenarios are defined, game theory is applied to support the choice of the action to be performed. Our use of game theory is intended for supporting one specific agent and not for achieving the equilibrium in the market. MASCEM (Multi-Agent System for Competitive Electricity Markets) is a multi-agent electricity market simulator that models market players and simulates their operation in the market. The scenario analysis algorithm has been tested within MASCEM and our experimental findings with a case study based on real data from the Iberian Electricity Market are presented and discussed.

Cournot model with investments to change the market size

We present a new deterministic dynamical model on the market size of Cournot competitions, based on Nash equilibria of R&D investment strategies to increase the size of the market of the firms at every period of the game. We compute the unique Nash equilibrium for the second subgame and the profit functions for both firms. Adding uncertainty to the R&D investment strategies, we get a new stochastic dynamical model and we analyse the importance of the uncertainty to reverse the initial advantage of one firm with respect to the other.

Coalition of distributed generation units to Virtual Power Players - a game theory approach

Smart Grids (SGs) have emerged as the new paradigm for power system operation and management, being designed to include large amounts of distributed energy resources. This new paradigm requires new Energy Resource Management (ERM) methodologies considering different operation strategies and the existence of new management players such as several types of aggregators. This paper proposes a methodology to facilitate the coalition between distributed generation units originating Virtual Power Players (VPP) considering a game theory approach. The proposed approach consists in the analysis of the classifications that were attributed by each VPP to the distributed generation units, as well as in the analysis of the previous established contracts by each player. The proposed classification model is based in fourteen parameters including technical, economical and behavioural ones. Depending of the VPP strategies, size and goals, each parameter has different importance. VPP can also manage other type of energy resources, like storage units, electric vehicles, demand response programs or even parts of the MV and LV distribution network. A case study with twelve VPPs with different characteristics and one hundred and fifty real distributed generation units is included in the paper.

Evolution of reputation in networks: A mean field game approach

This work models the competitive behaviour of individuals who maximize their own utility managing their network of connections with other individuals. Utility is taken as a synonym of reputation in this model. Each agent has to decide between two variables: the quality of connections and the number of connections. Hence, the reputation of an individual is a function of the number and the quality of connections within the network. On the other hand, individuals incur in a cost when they improve their network of contacts. The initial value of the quality and number of connections of each individual is distributed according to an initial (given) distribution. The competition occurs over continuous time and among a continuum of agents. A mean field game approach is adopted to solve the model, leading to an optimal trajectory for the number and quality of connections for each individual.

Mobile E-commerce business model – A value web based approach to business models in mobile gaming industry

Tämän tutkimuksen tavoitteena oli tutkia langattomien internet palveluiden arvoverkkoa ja liiketoimintamalleja. Tutkimus oli luonteeltaan kvalitatiivinen ja siinä käytettiin strategiana konstruktiivista case-tutkimusta. Esimerkkipalveluna oli Treasure Hunters matkapuhelinpeli. Tutkimus muodostui teoreettisesta ja empiirisestä osasta. Teoriaosassa liitettiin innovaatio, liiketoimintamallit ja arvoverkko käsitteellisesti toisiinsa, sekä luotiin perusta liiketoimintamallien kehittämiselle. Empiirisessä osassa keskityttiin ensin liiketoimintamallien luomiseen kehitettyjen innovaatioiden pohjalta. Lopuksi pyrittiin määrittämään arvoverkko palvelun toteuttamiseksi. Tutkimusmenetelminä käytettiin innovaatiosessiota, haastatteluja ja lomakekyselyä. Tulosten pohjalta muodostettiin useita liiketoimintakonsepteja sekä kuvaus arvoverkon perusmallista langattomille peleille. Loppupäätelmänä todettiin että langattomat palvelut vaativat toteutuakseen useista toimijoista koostuvan arvoverkon.

When the Beautiful Game Turns Ugly: A Study of Fan Experiences of Perceived Match Fixing in Soccer

Limited academic attention has been given to the nexus between corruption in soccer and its impact on fandom. Consequently, the purpose of this qualitative study was to better understand the lived experiences of highly identified soccer fanatics living through this era of match fixing in the sport. Social networking site Twitter was utilized to recruit participants from three continents – Africa, Europe, and North America – based on submissions to the site in response to a perceived fix from a high-profile March, 2013 match. A total of 12 semi-structured interviews were conducted with highly identified soccer fans in accordance with Funk and James’ (2001) Psychological Continuum Model (PCM). Despite the majority of participants feeling skepticism about the purity of soccer today, half of the participants’ fandom remained unchanged in the face of perceived match fixing. Directions for future research and recommendations are considered and discussed.

Does the Barro-Gordon Model Explain the Behavior of US Inflation? a Reexamination of the Empirical Evidence

This paper tests the predictions of the Barro-Gordon model using US data on inflation and unemployment. To that end, it constructs a general game-theoretical model with asymmetric preferences that nests the Barro-Gordon model and a version of Cukierman’s model as special cases. Likelihood Ratio tests indicate that the restriction imposed by the Barro-Gordon model is rejected by the data but the one imposed by the version of Cukierman’s model is not. Reduced-form estimates are consistent with the view that the Federal Reserve weights more heavily positive than negative unemployment deviations from the expected natural rate.

Conflict and negotiation: a game theoretical approach

We study economic conflicts using a game theoretical approach. We model a conflict between two agents where each one has two possible strategies: cease-fire or neglect the truce. Under this setting, we use the concept of pre-donations, namely, a redefinition of the game where agents commit to transfer a share of their output to the other agent (Sertel, 1992), and explain under which conditions a system of pre-donations can facilitate a truce. We find that for conflicts involving high costs there is a distributive mechanism, acceptable for both parties, such that, the best strategy for both parties is Cease-Fire. However, in many cases there are no sufficient conditions for the scheme or pre-donations to be effective. We also analyze some limitations of this framework and extend the model in order to deal with some of these flaws. Finally, in order to illustrate the relevance of the theoretical results we briefly describe some of the circumstances that characterized the negotiation processes between the Colombian government and different illegal groups.