Perception of affordances in multi-scale dynamics as an alternative explanation for equivalence of analogical and inferential reasoning in animals and humans

Recent claims of equivalence of animal and human reasoning are evaluated and a study of avian cognition serves as an exemplar of weaknesses in these arguments. It is argued that current research into neurobiological cognition lacks theoretical breadth to substantiate comparative analyses of cognitive function. Evaluation of a greater range of theoretical explanations is needed to verify claims of equivalence in animal and human cognition. We conclude by exemplifying how the notion of affordances in multi-scale dynamics can capture behavior attributed to processes of analogical and inferential reasoning in animals and humans.

The role of social skills and school connectedness in preadolescent depressive symptoms

In the current study, we tested whether school connectedness mediates more distal deficits in social skills in influencing depressive symptoms in a sample of 127 sixth- and seventh-grade students. Results demonstrated that school connectedness and social skills accounted for 44% and 26% of variance in depressive symptoms respectively and 49% in a combined model. Although the full mediation model hypothesis was not supported, follow-up analyses revealed that school connectedness partially mediated the link between social skills and preadolescent depressive symptoms. Thus, school connectedness appears to play as strong a role in depressive symptoms in this younger preadolescent age group.

Validation of the Algase Wandering Scale (Version 2) in a cross cultural sample

This study examined the psychometric properties of an expanded version of the Algase Wandering Scale (Version 2) (AWS-V2) in a cross-cultural sample. A cross-sectional survey design was used. Study subjects were 172 English-speaking persons with dementia (PWD) from long-term care facilities in the USA, Canada, and Australia. Two or more facility staff rated each subject on the AWS-V2. Demographic and cognitive data (MMSE) were also obtained. Staff provided information on their own knowledge of the subject and of dementia. Separate factor analyses on data from two samples of raters each explained greater than 66% of the variance in AWS-V2 scores and validated four (persistent walking, navigational deficit, eloping behavior, and shadowing) of five factors in the original scale. Items added to create the AWS-V2 strengthened the shadowing subscale, failed to improve the routinized walking subscale, and added a factor, attention shifting as compared to the original AWS. Evidence for validity was found in significant correlations and ANOVAs between the AWS-V2 and most subscales with a single item indicator of wandering and with the MMSE. Evidence of reliability was shown by internal consistency of the AWS-V2 (0.87, 0.88) and its subscales (range 0.88 to 0.66), with Kappa for individual items (17 of 27 greater than 0.4), and ANOVAs comparing ratings across rater groups (nurses, nurse aids, and other staff). Analyses support validity and reliability of the AWS-V2 overall and for persistent walking, spatial disorientation, and eloping behavior subscales. The AWS-V2 and its subscales are an appropriate way to measure wandering as conceptualized within the Need-driven Dementia-compromised Behavior Model in studies of English-speaking subjects. Suggestions for further strengthening the scale and for extending its use to clinical applications are described.

Vulnerability factors for disaster-induced child post-traumatic stress disorder : the case for low family resilience and previous mental illness

Objective: The aim of the present study was to investigate whether parent report of family resilience predicted children’s disaster-induced post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and general emotional symptoms, independent of a broad range of variables including event-related factors, previous child mental illness and social connectedness. ---------- Methods: A total of 568 children (mean age = 10.2 years, SD = 1.3) who attended public primary schools, were screened 3 months after Cyclone Larry devastated the Innisfail region of North Queensland. Measures included parent report on the Family Resilience Measure and Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire (SDQ)–emotional subscale and child report on the PTSD Reaction Index, measures of event exposure and social connectedness. ---------- Results: Sixty-four students (11.3%) were in the severe–very severe PTSD category and 53 families (28.6%) scored in the poor family resilience range. A lower family resilience score was associated with child emotional problems on the SDQ and longer duration of previous child mental health difficulties, but not disaster-induced child PTSD or child threat perception on either bivariate analysis, or as a main or moderator variable on multivariate analysis (main effect: adjusted odds ratio (ORadj) = 0.57, 95% confidence interval (CI) = 0.13–2.44). Similarly, previous mental illness was not a significant predictor of child PTSD in the multivariate model (ORadj = 0.75, 95%CI = 0.16–3.61). ---------- Conclusion: In this post-disaster sample children with existing mental health problems and those of low-resilience families were not at elevated risk of PTSD. The possibility that the aetiological model of disaster-induced child PTSD may differ from usual child and adolescent conceptualizations is discussed.

Remembering beliefs

Optimal decision-making requires us to accurately pinpoint the basis of our thoughts, e.g. whether they originate from our memory or our imagination. This paper argues that the phenomenal qualities of our subjective experience provide permissible evidence to revise beliefs, particularly as it pertains to memory. I look to the source monitoring literature to reconcile circumstances where mnemic beliefs and mnemic qualia conflict. By separating the experience of remembering from biological facts of memory, unusual cases make sense, such as memory qualia without memory (e.g. déjà vu, false memories) or a failure to have memory qualia with memory (e.g. functional amnesia, unintentional plagiarism). I argue that a pragmatic, probabilistic approach to belief revision is a way to rationally incorporate information from conscious experience, whilst acknowledging its inherent difficulties as an epistemic source. I conclude with a Bayesian defense of source monitoring based on C.I. Lewis’ coherence argument for memorial knowledge.

Some problems with a behavioristic account of early group pretense

In normal child development, both individual and group pretense first emerges at approximately two years of age. The metarepresentational account of pretense holds that children already have the concept PRETEND when they first engage in early group pretense. A behavioristic account suggests that early group pretense is analogous to early beliefs or desires and thus require no mental state concepts. I argue that a behavioral account does not explain the actual behavior observed in children and it cannot explain how children come to understand that a specific action is one of pretense versus one of belief. I conclude that a mentalistic explanation of pretense best explains the behavior under consideration.

The nonconceptual gateway to early word learning

My research investigates why nouns are learned disproportionately more frequently than other kinds of words during early language acquisition (Gentner, 1982; Gleitman, et al., 2004). This question must be considered in the context of cognitive development in general. Infants have two major streams of environmental information to make meaningful: perceptual and linguistic. Perceptual information flows in from the senses and is processed into symbolic representations by the primitive language of thought (Fodor, 1975). These symbolic representations are then linked to linguistic input to enable language comprehension and ultimately production. Yet, how exactly does perceptual information become conceptualized? Although this question is difficult, there has been progress. One way that children might have an easier job is if they have structures that simplify the data. Thus, if particular sorts of perceptual information could be separated from the mass of input, then it would be easier for children to refer to those specific things when learning words (Spelke, 1990; Pylyshyn, 2003). It would be easier still, if linguistic input was segmented in predictable ways (Gentner, 1982; Gleitman, et al., 2004) Unfortunately the frequency of patterns in lexical or grammatical input cannot explain the cross-cultural and cross-linguistic tendency to favor nouns over verbs and predicates. There are three examples of this failure: 1) a wide variety of nouns are uttered less frequently than a smaller number of verbs and yet are learnt far more easily (Gentner, 1982); 2) word order and morphological transparency offer no insight when you contrast the sentence structures and word inflections of different languages (Slobin, 1973) and 3) particular language teaching behaviors (e.g. pointing at objects and repeating names for them) have little impact on children's tendency to prefer concrete nouns in their first fifty words (Newport, et al., 1977). Although the linguistic solution appears problematic, there has been increasing evidence that the early visual system does indeed segment perceptual information in specific ways before the conscious mind begins to intervene (Pylyshyn, 2003). I argue that nouns are easier to learn because their referents directly connect with innate features of the perceptual faculty. This hypothesis stems from work done on visual indexes by Zenon Pylyshyn (2001, 2003). Pylyshyn argues that the early visual system (the architecture of the "vision module") segments perceptual data into pre-conceptual proto-objects called FINSTs. FINSTs typically correspond to physical things such as Spelke objects (Spelke, 1990). Hence, before conceptualization, visual objects are picked out by the perceptual system demonstratively, like a finger pointing indicating ‘this’ or ‘that’. I suggest that this primitive system of demonstration elaborates on Gareth Evan's (1982) theory of nonconceptual content. Nouns are learnt first because their referents attract demonstrative visual indexes. This theory also explains why infants less often name stationary objects such as plate or table, but do name things that attract the focal attention of the early visual system, i.e., small objects that move, such as ‘dog’ or ‘ball’. This view leaves open the question how blind children learn words for visible objects and why children learn category nouns (e.g. 'dog'), rather than proper nouns (e.g. 'Fido') or higher taxonomic distinctions (e.g. 'animal').

Identifying parents' perceptions about physical activity : a qualitative exploration of salient behavioural, normative and control beliefs among mothers and fathers of young children

Drawing on the belief-based framework of the Theory of Planned Behaviour, this study employs qualitative methodology involving individual and group interviews to examine the beliefs associated with regular physical activity performance among parents of young children (N = 40). The data were analysed using thematic content analysis. A range of advantages (e.g. improves parenting practices), disadvantages (e.g. interferes with commitments), barriers (e.g. time), and facilitators (e.g. social support) to performing physical activity are identified. Normative pressures are also identified as affecting parents’ activity behaviour. These identified beliefs can be used to inform interventions to challenge inactivity among this at-risk group.

Forecasting negative effects of monotony and sensation seeking on performance during a vigilance task

The driving task requires sustained attention during prolonged periods, and can be performed in highly predictable or repetitive environments. Such conditions could create hypovigilance and impair performance towards critical events. Identifying such impairment in monotonous conditions has been a major subject of research, but no research to date has attempted to predict it in real-time. This pilot study aims to show that performance decrements due to monotonous tasks can be predicted through mathematical modelling taking into account sensation seeking levels. A short vigilance task sensitive to short periods of lapses of vigilance called Sustained Attention to Response Task is used to assess participants‟ performance. The framework for prediction developed on this task could be extended to a monotonous driving task. A Hidden Markov Model (HMM) is proposed to predict participants‟ lapses in alertness. Driver‟s vigilance evolution is modelled as a hidden state and is correlated to a surrogate measure: the participant‟s reactions time. This experiment shows that the monotony of the task can lead to an important decline in performance in less than five minutes. This impairment can be predicted four minutes in advance with an 86% accuracy using HMMs. This experiment showed that mathematical models such as HMM can efficiently predict hypovigilance through surrogate measures. The presented model could result in the development of an in-vehicle device that detects driver hypovigilance in advance and warn the driver accordingly, thus offering the potential to enhance road safety and prevent road crashes.