Summons and recognizance for Hugh Woodcock, 1730

An early colonial summons and recognizance for Hugh Woodcock, who was charged with adultery. John Shoreland was surety for Woodcock's appearance in court. Woodcock failed to appear, and Shoreland failed to produce him, so the Court declared a default and ordered Shoreland's arrest and detention.

Eurasian integration. Russia's attempt at the economic unification of the post-Soviet area. OSW Study 44/2013

In 2009, Vladimir Putin, the then Russian prime minister, gave impetus to the establishment of closer relations within what was then a still narrow group of three countries: Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus. Russia was determined in embarking on the implementation of the principles of the Customs Union among these three states and, since 2012, within the Common Economic Space as well. This process of integration is intended to bring about the introduction of ‘four freedoms’ in this area: the free movement of goods, services, capital and labour. From Moscow’s point of view, building up such integration structures is especially necessary in order to counteract the economic expansion of the European Union and China. It also feels it is important to take measures against the loosening of the bonds between the CIS countries and Russia. At the same time, close co-operation is expected to guarantee for Russia that the strong politico-economic influences in this area will be maintained. Despite the numerous limitations of the integration process, such as the small number of the participating states or limited progress in implementing the CES, this is still the most advanced integration programme in the region seen since the collapse of the USSR. Progress in putting the rules of the Customs Union into practice can be seen as a success for Moscow. In turn, the formation of the CES is still at an early stage, and it is difficult to determine at this point to what extent the three countries will harmonise their markets.

Dialogue with the Eurasian Union on Ukraine – an opportunity or a trap? OSW COMMENTARY No. 154, 2014-12-01

The Eurasian Union (or, to give it its full name, the Eurasian Economic Union, EEU) is Russia's flagship project, by use of which it aims to institutionally subordinate the post-Soviet states to itself using political ties and the projected common economic space. The Kremlin has so far managed to persuade Belarus and Kazakhstan, and tentatively also Armenia, to join this integration project, which on the surface looks like a multilateral initiative but in reality conceals a network of bilateral relations centred on Russia. However, in order for Russia to reconstruct its influence in its neighbourhood permanently and without change, it is of key importance that Ukraine is incorporated into the EEU. That still seemed feasible even in 2013, but the Maidan and the Russian-Ukrainian war have undone this possibility. However, they also opened up an alternative scenario for Russia, one in which the Western states recognise the Eurasian Union as a legitimate partner in discussions about a new order in Europe with a view to restoring peace in Ukraine. It is worth taking into account the strategic consequences of that scenario. We need to consider if the idea which Moscow has been lobbying for – and which has found some supporters in Brussels and Berlin – threatens to take us back to the Cold War system of geopolitical blocs and implies recognition of Russia's dominance over Ukraine and the other Eastern Partnership countries?

The Eurasian Economic Union – more political, less economic. OSW Commentary Number 157/20.01.2015

The Eurasian Economic Union is undoubtedly the most comprehensive form of economic integration of the post-Soviet countries since the break-up of the Soviet Union. However, the way in which the integration process has been unfolding, as well as Russia’s aggressive policy over the last year, are indications that the EEU has become primarily a political project, and the importance of its economic aspects has eroded. This has triggered a change in the way Kazakhstan and Belarus treat the EEU. Initially, the two countries viewed integration as an opportunity for the development of genuine economic co-operation. However, Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the conflict in Ukraine have revealed the real significance of the EEU project – as a tool to reinforce Russian influence in the post-Soviet area and isolate the post-Soviet countries from the West and China. While the Kremlin presents the EEU as the Eurasian equivalent of the European Union, the project is in reality an imitation of integration. The reasons for this include the nature of the political systems in the participating countries, which are authoritarian, prone to instrumentalise law, and affected by systemic corruption; the aggressive policy that Russia has been pursuing over the last year; and Russia’s dominant role in defining the shape of the EEU. The EEU appears to be based on forceful integration, and is becoming less and less economically attractive for its member countries other than Russia. Moreover, it is clearly assuming a political dimension that those other member countries perceive as dangerous. For these reasons, its functioning will depend on the power and position of Russia. In the longer term it is likely that the other member states will try to ‘sham’ and delay closer integration within the EEU. This means that if Russia becomes politically and economically weaker, the EEU may evolve into an increasingly dysfunctional organisation – a development that will be reinforced by the low standards of legal culture in its member states and their reluctance to integrate. Should Russia’s power increase, the EEU will become an effective instrument of Russian dominance in the area of the former USSR.

Trade and geopolitics: should the EU engage with the Eurasian Economic Union? EPC Policy Brief, 2 April 2015

In an effort to find a solution to the deteriorating relationship between the EU and Russia, various commentators, policy-makers and experts have suggested that the EU should seriously consider engaging with the Eurasian Economic Union, as part of a new ‘grand bargain’ between Russia and the EU. If Ukraine will no longer be forced to choose between two integrating regimes, so the argument goes, Russian sensibilities can be pacified, which will in turn, hopefully, lead to peace in eastern Ukraine. However, according to Rilka Dragneva and Kataryna Wolczuk, these arguments are based on a number of problematic assumptions about integration dynamics in the eastern neighbourhood. In this Policy Brief, they recommend the EU better think twice before further engaging with the EEU.

Paper Tiger or Game-Changer? Challenges of and Opportunities for EU Engagement with the Eurasian Economic Union. Bruges Regional Integration & Global Governance Papers (BRIGG) 1/2015.

The Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) started work on 1 January 2015. Considered as Russia’s response to the EU’s Eastern Partnership (EaP), it has been almost ignored in Brussels. However, with the Ukraine crisis and the deteriorating relations with Moscow, some European leaders have begun to reconsider Putin’s proposal for a region-to-region engagement. This paper tries to analyse under which conditions this could represent a long-term solution for a new European order. First, it is argued that the EEU is still far from being a credible international interlocutor. Second, Russia’s commitment to international trade rules and liberalization is questioned, whereas its geopolitical objectives seem predominant. EU engagement with the EEU in Ukraine would mean, in the short term, legitimizing Russia’s vision of a ‘bipolar Europe’ divided in spheres of influence. In the long run, prospects for inter-regional cooperation remain open, but the way to go is long and full of obstacles.

The Eurasian Economic Union: a time of crisis. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 195/27.01.2016

The Eurasian Economic Union (EaEU), a project forced through by Russia which links it to Kazakhstan, Belarus, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan, is currently struggling with serious problems. The economic crisis in Russia – mainly caused by the fall in the price of oil on world markets and exacerbated by sanctions imposed by Western countries in connection with the Ukraine conflict – is affecting these uncompetitive post-Soviet economies which are dependent on Russia. This has resulted in increased economic and political tension among the members of the EaEU. From Russia’s point of view, however, the EaEU project remains useful, because it is not economic integration that is Moscow’s priority. The Union remains its most important instrument for implementing the Kremlin’s geo-political objectives, in particular maintaining its sphere of influence and preventing post-Soviet countries from integrating with the West, as well as restricting their rapprochement with China. Moscow is pushing for the EaEU to include new countries, strengthening its tools for political dominance within the Union, and promoting its project on the international stage. However, the future of this project will depend on both the continued determination of the Kremlin, and whether the other countries can change the rules for integration by taking advantage of the current crisis.

Distribution of clay minerals in surface sediments of the Eurasian Arctic Ocean

Clay-mineral distributions in the Arctic Ocean and the adjacent Eurasian shelf areas are discussed to identify source areas and transport pathways of terrigenous material in the Arctic Ocean. The main clay minerals in Eurasian Arctic Ocean sediments are illite and chlorite. Smectite and kaolinite occur in minor amounts in these sediments, but show strong variations in the shelf areas. These two minerals are therefore reliable in reconstructions of source areas of sediments from the Eurasian Arctic. The Kara Sea and the western part of the Laptev Sea are enriched in smectite, with highest values of up to 70% in the deltas of the Ob and Yenisey rivers. Illite is the dominant clay mineral in all the investigated sediments except for parts of the Kara Sea. The highest concentrations with more than 70% illite occur in the East Siberian Sea and around Svalbard. Chlorite represents the clay mineral with lowest concentration changes in the Eastern Arctic, ranging between 10 and 25%. The main source areas for kaolinite in the Eurasian Arctic are Mesozoic sedimentary rocks on Franz-Josef Land islands. Based on clay-mineral data, transport of the clay fraction via sea ice is of minor importance for the modern sedimentary budget in the Arctic basins.

Marine ice-rafted debris records and age determinations along the northern Eurasian margin

Ice-rafted debris (IRD) (>2 mm), input in eight sediment cores along the Eurasian continental margin (Arctic Ocean), have been studied over the last two glacial/interglacial cycles. Together with the revised chronologies and new micropaleontological data of two cores from the northern Barents Sea (PS2138) and northeastern Kara Sea (PS2741) spanning Marine Isotope Stages (MIS) 6 to 1, the IRD data give new insights into the glacial history of northern Eurasian ice-sheets over the last 150 ka. The chronologies of the cores are based on stable isotope records, AMS 14C datings, paleomagnetic and biostratigraphic data. Extensive episodes of northern Barents Sea ice-sheet growth, probably to the shelf edge, occurred during the late Weichselian (MIS 2) and the Saalian (MIS 6). Major IRD discharge at the MIS 4/3-transition hints to another severe glaciation, probably onto the outer shelf, during MIS 4. IRD-based instabilities of the marine-based ice margin along the northern Barents Sea between MIS 4 and 2 are similar in timing with North Atlantic Heinrich events and Nordic Seas IRD events, suggesting similar atmospheric cooling over a broad region or linkage of ice-sheet fluctuations through small sea-level events. In the relatively low-precipitation areas of eastern Eurasia, IRD peak values during Termination II and MIS 4/3-transition suggest a Kara Sea ice-sheet advance onto the outer shelf, probably to the shelf edge, during glacial MIS 6 and 4. This suggests that during the initial cooling following the interglacials MIS 5, and possibly MIS 7, the combined effect of sustained inflow of Atlantic water into the Arctic Ocean and penetration of moisture-bearing cyclones into easterly direction supported major ice build-up during Saalian (MIS 6) and Mid-Weichselian (MIS 4) glaciation. IRD peak values in MIS 5 indicate at least two advances of the Severnaya Semlya ice-sheet to the coast line during the Early Weichselian. In contrast, a distinct Kara Sea ice advance during the Late Weichselian (MIS 2) is not documented by the IRD records along the northeastern Kara Sea margin.

Accumulation of particulate organic carbon at the Eurasian continental margin during late Quaternary times

Data on the amount and composition of organic carbon were determined in sediment cores from the Kara and Laptev Sea continental margin, representing oxygen isotope stages 1-6. The characterization of organic matter is based on hydrogen index (HI) values, n-alkanes and maceral composition, indicating the predominance of terrigenous organic matter through space and time. The variations in the amount and composition of organic carbon are mainly influenced by changes in fluvial sediment supply, Atlantic water inflow, and continental ice sheets. During oxygen isotope stage (OIS) 6, high organic carbon contents in sediments from the Laptev Sea and western East Siberian Sea continental margin were probably caused by the increased glacial erosion and further transport in the eastward-flowing boundary current along the continental margin. During OIS 5 and early OIS 3, some increased amounts of marine organic matter were preserved in sediments east of the Lomonosov Ridge, suggesting an influence of nutrient-rich Pacific waters. During OIS 2, terrigenous organic carbon supply was increased along the Barents and western Kara Sea continental margin caused by extended continental ice sheets in the Barents Sea (Svalbard to Franz Josef Land) area and increased glacial erosion. Along the Laptev Sea continental margin, on the other hand, the supply of terrigenous (organic) matter was significantly reduced due to the lack of major ice sheets and reduced river discharge. Towards the Holocene, the amount of total organic carbon (TOC) increased along the Kara and Laptev Sea continental margin, reaching average values of up to 0.5 g C/cm**2/ky. Between about 8 and 10 ka (9 and 11 Cal ka), i.e., during times when the inner shallow Kara and Laptev seas became largely flooded for the first time after the Last Glacial Maximum, maximum supply of terrigenous organic carbon occurred, which is related to an increase in coastal erosion and Siberian river discharge. During the last 8000 years, the increased amount of marine organic carbon preserved in the sediments from the Kara and Laptev Sea continental margin is interpreted as a result of the intensification of Atlantic water inflow along the Eurasian continental margin.

Woodcock management research.

Final report, Pittman-Robertson Project 53-R.

Food habits of a group of shorebirds: woodcock, snipe knot, and dowitcher,

At head of title: United States Dept. of the Interior, Harold L. Ickes, secretary. Bureau of Biological Survey, Ira N. Gabrielson, chief ...

The Allelic Abundance of Afghanistan, a Pool for West and South Eurasian Genes and a Blockade against Eastern Admixture

In this study, I divided samples from individuals within Afghanistan based upon geography (i.e., north versus south). I determined allelic frequencies and other statistical parameters for 15 STR loci (i.e., D8S1179, D21S11, D7S820, CSF1PO, D3S1358, TH01, Dl3S317, D16S539, D2S1338, D19S433, vWA, TPOX, D18S51, D5S818, and FGA). I conducted pairwise comparisons with 19 neighboring Eurasian populations to assign Gstatistics and p-values. Categorizing the populations into five groups (i.e., Central Asia, East Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, and the Caucasus/Anatolia), I derived values for intra-population, inter-population, and total variance. Admixture analyses determined the highest allelic contributions to be from the Caucasus/ Anatolia, while negligible contributions were made by Central Asia and East Asia. A Correspondence Analysis revealed clustering of both northern and southern Afghanistan with Georgia, Turkey, northern Iran, and southern Iran of the Caucasus/ Anatolia and the Middle East. A Neighbor-Joining phylogenetic tree was constructed to generate bootstrap values over 1, 000 reiterations.

Households without Houses : Mobility and Moorings on the Eurasian Steppe

Peer reviewed