H-NAMe: specifying, implementing and testing a hidden-node avoidance mechanism for wireless sensor networks

The hidden-node problem has been shown to be a major source of Quality-of-Service (QoS) degradation in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) due to factors such as the limited communication range of sensor nodes, link asymmetry and the characteristics of the physical environment. In wireless contention-based Medium Access Control protocols, if two nodes that are not visible to each other transmit to a third node that is visible to the formers, there will be a collision – usually called hidden-node or blind collision. This problem greatly affects network throughput, energy-efficiency and message transfer delays, which might be particularly dramatic in large-scale WSNs. This technical report tackles the hidden-node problem in WSNs and proposes HNAMe, a simple yet efficient distributed mechanism to overcome it. H-NAMe relies on a grouping strategy that splits each cluster of a WSN into disjoint groups of non-hidden nodes and then scales to multiple clusters via a cluster grouping strategy that guarantees no transmission interference between overlapping clusters. We also show that the H-NAMe mechanism can be easily applied to the IEEE 802.15.4/ZigBee protocols with only minor add-ons and ensuring backward compatibility with the standard specifications. We demonstrate the feasibility of H-NAMe via an experimental test-bed, showing that it increases network throughput and transmission success probability up to twice the values obtained without H-NAMe. We believe that the results in this technical report will be quite useful in efficiently enabling IEEE 802.15.4/ZigBee as a WSN protocol.

H-NAMe: a hidden-node avoidance mechanism for wireless sensor networks

The hidden-node problem has been shown to be a major source of Quality-of-Service (QoS) degradation in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) due to factors such as the limited communication range of sensor nodes, link asymmetry and the characteristics of the physical environment. In wireless contention-based Medium Access Control protocols, if two nodes that are not visible to each other transmit to a third node that is visible to the formers, there will be a collision – usually called hidden-node or blind collision. This problem greatly affects network throughput, energy-efficiency and message transfer delays, which might be particularly dramatic in large-scale WSNs. This paper tackles the hiddennode problem in WSNs and proposes H-NAMe, a simple yet efficient distributed mechanism to overcome it. H-NAMe relies on a grouping strategy that splits each cluster of a WSN into disjoint groups of non-hidden nodes and then scales to multiple clusters via a cluster grouping strategy that guarantees no transmission interference between overlapping clusters. We also show that the H-NAMe mechanism can be easily applied to the IEEE 802.15.4/ZigBee protocols with only minor add-ons and ensuring backward compatibility with the standard specifications. We demonstrate the feasibility of H-NAMe via an experimental test-bed, showing that it increases network throughput and transmission success probability up to twice the values obtained without H-NAMe. We believe that the results in this paper will be quite useful in efficiently enabling IEEE 802.15.4/ZigBee as a WSN protocol

Privatization and entry of a foreign firm with demand uncertainty

We investigate the effects of trade with a foreign firm and privatization of the domestic pubUc firm on an incentive for the domestic firm to reduce costs by undertaking R&D investment, under demand uncertainty. We suppose that the domestic firm is less efficient than the foreign firm. However, the domestic firm can lower its marginal costs by conducting cost-reducing R&D investment. We examine the impacts of entry of a foreign firm, and the effects of demand uncertainty, on decisions upon cost-reducing R&D investment by the domestic firm and how these affect the domestic welfare.

Cournot competition between a non-profit firm and a for-profit firm with uncertainty

In this paper, we consider a Cournot competition between a nonprofit firm and a for-profit firm in a homogeneous goods market, with uncertain demand. Given an asymmetric tax schedule, we compute explicitly the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we analyze the effects of the tax rate and the degree of altruistic preference on market equilibrium outcomes.

Optimal offering strategies for wind power producers considering uncertainty and risk

This paper provides a two-stage stochastic programming approach for the development of optimal offering strategies for wind power producers. Uncertainty is related to electricity market prices and wind power production. A hybrid intelligent approach, combining wavelet transform, particle swarm optimization and adaptive-network-based fuzzy inference system, is used in this paper to generate plausible scenarios. Also, risk aversion is explicitly modeled using the conditional value-at-risk methodology. Results from a realistic case study, based on a wind farm in Portugal, are provided and analyzed. Finally, conclusions are duly drawn.

Uncertainty in a mixed duopoly with quadratic costs

In this paper, we consider a mixed market with uncertain demand, involving one private firm and one public firm with quadratic costs. The model is a two-stage game in which players choose to make their output decisions either in stage 1 or stage 2. We assume that the demand is unknown until the end of the first stage. We compute the output levels at equilibrium in each possible role. We also determine ex-ante and ex-post firms’ payoff functions.

An uncertainty and sensitivity analysis applied to the prioritisation of pharmaceuticals as surface water contaminants from wastewater treatment plant direct emissions

In this study, the concentration probability distributions of 82 pharmaceutical compounds detected in the effluents of 179 European wastewater treatment plants were computed and inserted into a multimedia fate model. The comparative ecotoxicological impact of the direct emission of these compounds from wastewater treatment plants on freshwater ecosystems, based on a potentially affected fraction (PAF) of species approach, was assessed to rank compounds based on priority. As many pharmaceuticals are acids or bases, the multimedia fate model accounts for regressions to estimate pH-dependent fate parameters. An uncertainty analysis was performed by means of Monte Carlo analysis, which included the uncertainty of fate and ecotoxicity model input variables, as well as the spatial variability of landscape characteristics on the European continental scale. Several pharmaceutical compounds were identified as being of greatest concern, including 7 analgesics/anti-inflammatories, 3 β-blockers, 3 psychiatric drugs, and 1 each of 6 other therapeutic classes. The fate and impact modelling relied extensively on estimated data, given that most of these compounds have little or no experimental fate or ecotoxicity data available, as well as a limited reported occurrence in effluents. The contribution of estimated model input variables to the variance of freshwater ecotoxicity impact, as well as the lack of experimental abiotic degradation data for most compounds, helped in establishing priorities for further testing. Generally, the effluent concentration and the ecotoxicity effect factor were the model input variables with the most significant effect on the uncertainty of output results.

Stackelberg leadership with demand uncertainty in a differentiated duopoly

On a symmetric differentiated Stackelberg duopoly model in which there is asymmetric demand information owned by leading and follower firms, we show that the leading firm does not necessarily have advantage over the following one. The reason for this is that the second mover can adjust its output level after observing the realized demand, while the first mover chooses its output level only with the knowledge of demand distribution.

Equilibria of quantity setting differentiated duopoly with uncertainty

In this paper, we consider a Stackelberg duopoly competition with differentiated goods and with unknown costs. The firms' aim is to choose the output levels of their products according to the well-known concept of perfect Bayesian equilibrium. There is a firm ( F1 ) that chooses first the quantity 1 q of its good; the other firm ( F2 ) observes 1 q and then chooses the quantity 2 q of its good. We suppose that each firm has two different technologies, and uses one of them following a probability distribution. The use of either one or the other technology affects the unitary production cost. We show that there is exactly one perfect Bayesian equilibrium for this game. We analyse the advantages, for firms and for consumers, of using the technology with the highest production cost versus the one with the cheapest cost.

Uncertainty based Multi-Robot Cooperative Triangulation

The paper presents a multi-robot cooperative framework to estimate the 3D position of dynamic targets, based on bearing-only vision measurements. The uncertainty of the observation provided by each robot equipped with a bearing-only vision system is effectively addressed for cooperative triangulation purposes by weighing the contribution of each monocular bearing ray in a probabilistic manner. The envisioned framework is evaluated in an outdoor scenario with a team of heterogeneous robots composed of an Unmanned Ground and Aerial Vehicle.

Stackelberg duopoly with demand uncertainty

We consider a symmetric Stackelberg model in which there is asymmetric demand information owned by first and second movers. We analyse the advantages of leadership and flexibility, and prove that when the leading firm faces demand uncertainty, but the follower does not, the first mover does not necessarily have advantage over the second mover. Moreover, we show that the advantage of one firm over the other depends upon the demand fluctuation and also upon the degree of substitutability of the products.

Uncertainty on a Bertrand duopoly with product differentiation

The conclusions of the Bertrand model of competition are substantially altered by the presence of either differentiated goods or asymmetric information about rival’s production costs. In this paper, we consider a Bertrand competition, with differentiated goods. Furthermore, we suppose that each firm has two different technologies, and uses one of them according to a certain probability distribution. The use of either one or the other technology affects the unitary production cost. We show that this game has exactly one Bayesian Nash equilibrium. We do ex-ante and ex-post analyses of firms’ profits and market prices. We prove that the expected profit of each firm increases with the variance of its production costs. We also show that the expected price of each good increases with both expected production costs, being the effect of the expected production costs of the rival dominated by the effect of the own expected production costs.

Asymmetric dynamic price competition with uncertainty

We consider a dynamic setting-price duopoly model in which a dominant (leader) firm moves first and a subordinate (follower) firm moves second. We suppose that each firm has two different technologies, and uses one of them according to a certain probability distribution. The use of either one or the other technology affects the unitary production cost. We analyse the effect of the production costs uncertainty on the profits of the firms, for different values of the intercept demand parameters.

Hydrologic modeling and uncertainty analysis of an ungauged watershed using mapwindow-swat

Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Science in Geospatial Technologies

The effect of demand information sharing in a supply chain under demand uncertainty: a simulation study

Dissertação para obtenção do Grau de Mestre em Engenharia e Gestão Industrial