Market Transparency, Market Quality and Sunshine Trading

This paper analyzes the implications of pre-trade transpareny on market performance. We find that transparency increases the precision held by agents, however we show that this increase in precision may not be due to prices themselves. In competitive markets, transparency increases market liquidity and reduces price volatility, whereas these results may not hold under imperfect competition. More importantly, market depth and volatility might be positively related with proper priors. Moreover, we study the incentives for liquidity traders to engage in sunshine trading. We obtain that the choice of sunshine/dark trading for a noise trader is independent of his order size, being the traders with higher liquidity needs more interested in sunshine trading, as long as this practice is desirable. Key words: Market Microstructure, Transparency, Prior Information, Market Quality, Sunshine Trading

Survival and Sensemaking: Organizational Resilience in a Wall Street Trading Room After 9/11

How do organizations cope with extreme uncertainty? The existing literature is divided on this issue: some argue that organizations deal best with uncertainty in the environment by reproducing it in the organization, whereas others contend that the orga nization should be protected from the environment. In this paper we study the case of a Wall Street investment bank that lost its entire office and trading technology in the terrorist attack of September 11 th. The traders survived, but were forced to relocate to a makeshift trading room in New Jersey. During the six months the traders spent outside New York City, they had to deal with fears and insecurities inside the company as well as outside it: anxiety about additional attacks, questions of professional identity, doubts about the future of the firm, and ambiguities about the future re-location of the trading room. The firm overcame these uncertainties by protecting the traders' identities and their ability to engage in sensemaking. The organization held together through a leadership style that managed ambiguities and created the conditions for new solutions to emerge.

Speculation, risk premia and expectations in the yield curve

An affine asset pricing model in which traders have rational but heterogeneous expectations aboutfuture asset prices is developed. We use the framework to analyze the term structure of interestrates and to perform a novel three-way decomposition of bond yields into (i) average expectationsabout short rates (ii) common risk premia and (iii) a speculative component due to heterogeneousexpectations about the resale value of a bond. The speculative term is orthogonal to public informationin real time and therefore statistically distinct from common risk premia. Empirically wefind that the speculative component is quantitatively important accounting for up to a percentagepoint of yields, even in the low yield environment of the last decade. Furthermore, allowing for aspeculative component in bond yields results in estimates of historical risk premia that are morevolatile than suggested by standard Affine Gaussian term structure models which our frameworknests.

Insider Trading and Real Investment

In this paper I analyze the effects of insider trading on real investmentand the insurance role of financial markets. There is a single entrepreneurwho, at a first stage, chooses the level of investment in a risky business.At the second stage, an asset with random payoff is issued and then the entrepreneurreceives some privileged information on the likely realization of productionreturn. At the third stage, trading occurs on the asset market, where theentrepreneur faces the aggregate demand coming from a continuum of rationaluniformed traders and some noise traders. I compare the equilibrium withinsider trading (when the entrepreneur trades on her inside information in theasset market) with the equilibrium in the same market without insider trading. Ifind that permitting insider trading tends to decrease the level of realinvestment. Moreover, the asset market is thinner and the entrepreneur's netsupply of the asset and the hedge ratio are lower, although the asset priceis more informative and volatile.

Resolving identities: Successive crises in a trading room after 9/11

How do organizations cope with extreme uncertainty? The existing literatureis divided on this issue: some argue that organizations deal best withuncertainty in the environment by reproducing it in the organization, whereasothers contend that the orga nization should be protected from theenvironment. In this paper we study the case of a Wall Street investment bankthat lost its entire office and trading technology in the terrorist attack ofSeptember 11 th. The traders survived, but were forced to relocate to amakeshift trading room in New Jersey. During the six months the traders spentoutside New York City, they had to deal with fears and insecurities insidethe company as well as outside it: anxiety about additional attacks,questions of professional identity, doubts about the future of the firm, andambiguities about the future re-location of the trading room. The firmovercame these uncertainties by protecting the traders identities and theirability to engage in sensemaking. The organization held together through aleadership style that managed ambiguities and created the conditions for newsolutions to emerge.

A comparison of stock market mechanisms

This paper studies the relationship between the amount of publicinformation that stock market prices incorporate and the equilibriumbehavior of market participants. The analysis is framed in a static, NREEsetup where traders exchange vectors of assets accessing multidimensionalinformation under two alternative market structures. In the first(the unrestricted system), both informed and uninformed speculators cancondition their demands for each traded asset on all equilibrium prices;in the second (the restricted system), they are restricted to conditiontheir demand on the price of the asset they want to trade. I show thatinformed traders incentives to exploit multidimensional privateinformation depend on the number of prices they can condition upon whensubmitting their demand schedules, and on the specific price formationprocess one considers. Building on this insight, I then give conditionsunder which the restricted system is more efficient than the unrestrictedsystem.

Short-term investment and equilibrium multiplicity

I study the effects of the heterogeneity of traders'horizon in the context of a 2-period NREE model whereall traders are risk averse. Owing to inventory effects,myopic trading behavior generates multiplicity ofequilibria. In particular, two distinct patterns arise.Along the first equilibrium, short term tradersanticipate higher second period price reaction toinformation arrival and, owing to risk aversion,scale back their trading intensity. This, in turn,reduces both risk sharing and information impoundinginto prices enforcing a high returns' volatility-lowprice informativeness equilibrium. In the second one,the opposite happens and a low volatility-high priceinformativeness equilibrium arises.

Specificity revisited: The role of cross-investments

Previous analysis has shown that traders may opt for specific technologies with nojoint productivity advantage as a way to commit themselves to trading jointly, butonly when long-term contracting is infeasible. This paper proves that speciÞcity canalso be optimal (by relaxing the budget-balance constraint) in settings with long-termcontracting. Traders will opt for specificity when one trader makes a cross-investmentand either (1) this cross-investment has a direct externality on the other trader, (2) bothparties invest, or (3) private information is present. The specificity (e.g. from non-salvageable investments, specific assets and technologies, narrow business strategies,and exclusivity restrictions) is equally effective regardless of which trader's alternativetrade payoff is reduced. Specificity supports long-term contracts in a broad rangeof settings - both with and without renegotiation. The theory also offers a novelperspective on franchising and vertical integration.

Speculative dynamics in the term structure of interest rates

When long maturity bonds are traded frequently and traders have non-nestedinformation sets, speculative behavior in the sense of Harrison and Kreps (1978) arises.Using a term structure model displaying such speculative behavior, this paper proposesa conceptually and observationally distinct new mechanism generating time varying predictableexcess returns. It is demonstrated that (i) dispersion of expectations about futureshort rates is sufficient for individual traders to systematically predict excess returns and(ii) the new term structure dynamics driven by speculative trade is orthogonal to publicinformation in real time, but (iii) can nevertheless be quantified using only publicly availableyield data. The model is estimated using monthly data on US short to medium termTreasuries from 1964 to 2007 and it provides a good fit of the data. Speculative dynamicsare found to be quantitatively important, potentially accounting for a substantial fractionof the variation of bond yields and appears to be more important at long maturities.

A Tributação de Prestação de Serviços em Cabo Verde

O presente trabalho investiga a tributação dos serviços em Cabo Verde, trata-se de uma questão importante do ponto de vista financeiro, uma vez que a economia aberta e insular de Cabo Verde é uma grande consumidora de serviços prestados por operadores económicos não residentes. Por outro lado trata de uma questão interessante do ponto de vista jurídico, porque parece actualmente faltar norma de incidência que permite a sujeição destes rendimentos ao Imposto Único sobre os Rendimentos Cabo-verdiano. Em face disto poder-se-ia porventura afirmar que as normas de incidência que servem para fundamentar a tributação dos rendimentos derivados de prestação de serviços a não residentes se encontram nas disposições orçamentais que fixam a própria taxa liberatória de 20% aplicável ao rendimento auferido por não residentes, mesmo que não tenham estabelecimentos estáveis. De resto, não é com base no regulamento do IUR mas com base nas leis do Orçamentos do Estado que a administração fiscal Cabo-verdiana tem vindo a proceder á liquidação deste imposto. As taxas liberatórias previstas nas leis orçamentais não podem nunca aplicar-se a rendimentos que se encontrem fora do âmbito de incidência objectiva, subjectiva ou territorial do IUR. Depois de estudado o tratamento que o direito interno cabo-verdiano faz dos rendimentos derivados de prestação de serviços vale a pena olhar brevemente também ao tratamento que eles merecem no contexto do direito internacional e, muito em particular, da convenção para evitar a Dupla Tributação (CDT) em matéria de imposto sobre o rendimento e prevenir a evasão fiscal, celebrada entre Cabo Verde e Portugal no ano de 1999 e actualmente em vigor.

Overconfidence and market efficiency with heterogeneous agents

We study financial markets in which both rational and overconfident agents coexist and make endogenous information acquisition decisions. We demonstrate the following irrelevance result: when a positive fraction of rational agents (endogeneously) decides to become informed in equilibrium, prices are set as if all investors were rational, and as a consequence the overconfidence bias does not aect informational efficiency, price volatility, rational traders expected profits or their welfare. Intuitively, as overconfidence goes up, so does price infornativeness, which makes rational agents cut their information acquisition activities, effectively undoing the standard effect of more aggressive trading by the overconfident.

Giffen goods and market making

This paper shows that information effects per se are not responsible forthe Giffen goods anomaly affecting competitive traders demands in multi-asset, noisy rational expectations equilibrium models. The role thatinformation plays in traders strategies also matters. In a market withrisk averse, uninformed traders, informed agents havea dual motive for trading: speculation and market making. Whilespeculation entails using prices to assess the effect of private signalerror terms, market making requires employing them to disentangle noisetraders effects in traders aggregate orders. In a correlated environment,this complicates a trader s signal-extraction problem and maygenerate upward-sloping demand curves. Assuming either (i) that competitive,risk neutral market makers price the assets, or that (ii) the risktolerance coefficient of uninformed traders grows without bound, removesthe market making component from informed traders demands, rendering themwell behaved in prices.

Dynamic higher order expectations

In models where privately informed agents interact, agents may need to formhigher order expectations, i.e. expectations of other agents' expectations. This paper develops a tractable framework for solving and analyzing linear dynamic rational expectationsmodels in which privately informed agents form higher order expectations. The frameworkis used to demonstrate that the well-known problem of the infinite regress of expectationsidentified by Townsend (1983) can be approximated to an arbitrary accuracy with a finitedimensional representation under quite general conditions. The paper is constructive andpresents a fixed point algorithm for finding an accurate solution and provides weak conditions that ensure that a fixed point exists. To help intuition, Singleton's (1987) asset pricingmodel with disparately informed traders is used as a vehicle for the paper.

A note on the convergence to competitive equilibria in economies with moral hazard

We examine the conditions under which competitive equilibria can beobtained as the limit, when the number of strategic traders getslarge, of Nash equilibria in economies with asymmetric informationon agents' effort and possibly imperfect observability of agents'trades. Convergence always occur when either effort is publiclyobserved (no matter what is the information available tointermediaries on agents' trades); or effort is private informationbut agents' trades are perfectly observed; or no information at allis available on agents' trades. On the other hand, when eachintermediary can observe its trades with an agent, but not theagent's trades with other intermediaries, the (Nash) equilibriawith strategic intermediaries do not converge to any of thecompetitive equilibria, for an open set of economies. The source ofthe difficulties for convergence is the combination of asymmetricinformation and the restrictions on the observability of tradeswhich prevent the formation of exclusive contractual relationshipsand generate barriers to entry in the markets for contracts.

Why did modern trade fairs appear?

According to our interpretation, modern trade fairs started in Europe during the FirstWorld War and in its immediate aftermath. With the closing of trade movements duringthe war, many cities had to resort to the old medieval tradition of providing especialpermits to traders to guarantee them personal protection during their trade meetings.During the tough post war crisis many more cities typically industrial districts-discovered in the creation of trade fairs a powerful competitive tool to attract markettransactions. We compare these developments with the remote origins of fairs, as, inboth cases, trade fair development is a reaction to the closing of free markets under thepressure of political violence.