Les codes de l'obligations : méta-analyses pragmatologiques de l'application de méthodes en sciences sociales

Cette thèse rassemble une série de méta-analyses, c'est-à-dire d'analyses ayant pour objet des analyses produites par des sociologues (notamment celles résultant de l'application de méthodes de traitement des entretiens). Il s'agit d'une démarche réflexive visant les pratiques concrètes des sociologues. Celles-ci sont envisagées comme des activités gouvernées par des règles. Une part importante de cette thèse sera donc consacrée au développement d'un outil d'analyse « pragmatologique » (E. Durkheim), c'est-à-dire permettant l'étude des pratiques et des règles en rapport avec elles. Pour aborder les règles, la philosophie analytique d'inspiration wittgensteinienne apporte plusieurs propositions importantes. Les règles sont ainsi considérées comme des concepts d'air de famille : il n'y a pas de définitions communes recouvrant l'ensemble des règles. Pour étudier les règles, il convient alors de faire des distinctions à partir de leurs usages. Une de ces distinctions concerne la différence entre règles constitutives et règles régulatives : une règle constitutive crée une pratique (e.g. le mariage), alors qu'une règle régulative s'applique à des activités qui peuvent exister sans elle (e.g. les règles du savoir-vivre). L'activité méthodologique des sociologues repose et est contrainte par ces types de règles, qui sont pour l'essentiel implicites. Cette thèse vise donc à rendre compte, par la description et la codification des règles, du caractère normatif des méthodes dans les pratiques d'analyse de la sociologie. Elle insiste en particulier sur les limites logiques qu'instituent les règles constitutives, celles-ci rendant impossibles (et non pas interdites) certaines actions des sociologues. This thesis brings together a series of meta-analyzes, that is, analyzes that tackle analyzes produced by sociologists (notably those resulting from the application of methods in treating interviews). The approach is reflexive and aimed at the concrete practices of sociologists, considered as activities governed by rules. An important part of this thesis is therefore devoted to the development of a "pragmatological" analytical tool (Durkheim) to conduct a study of such practices and of the rules that govern them. To approach these rules, Wittgenstein-inspired analytic philosophy offers several important proposals. The rules are, at first, seen as concepts of family resemblance, assuming that there is no common definition accounting for all rules. In order to conduct the study of such rules, it is therefore necessary to discern how they are respectively used. One of these distinctions concerns the difference between constitutive rules and regulative rules: a constitutive rule creates a practice (for example marriage), while a regulative rule applies to activities that can exist outside of the rule (for example, the rules of etiquette). The methodological activity of sociologists relies on, and is constrained by these types of rules, which are essentially implicit. Through the description and codification of rules, this thesis aims to account for the normative character of methods governing analytical practices in sociology. Particular emphasis is on the logical limits established by constitutive rules, limits that render several of the sociologist's actions impossible (rather than forbidden).

Political philosophy, ethnology, and time: a study of the notion of historical handicap

This article starts by identifying the crucial importance of the notion of historical handicap for the present-day social sciences of Latin America. Such notion is not an original invention made by Latinamericanists. On the contrary, I demonstrate that the genealogy of the notion of historical handicap must be sought in the tradition of Western political philosophy. Such genealogy must take into account the way it was integrated into ethnological descriptions. When and how did the Other become the backward, the primitive? While this relation was secondary for ancient Greek thought, theories of historical development became the main source of ethnological categories in the modern era. Interestingly enough, this modern synthesis suited the practical purpose of justifying two successive waves of European imperialistic: the era of discoveries, and 19th century colonialism. The article concludes by raising questions about the present role and application of the social sciences.

THE SKEPTICAL CARTESIAN BACKGROUND OF HUME'S "OF THE ACADEMICAL OR SCEPTICAL PHILOSOPHY" (FIRST INQUIRY, SECTION 12)

ABSTRACT In section XII of the First Inquiry, Hume refers to the two Hellenistic schools of skepticism (Academic and Pyrrhonian) to present his own view of skepticism, which, however, depends on the ancient skeptics mainly indirectly. Hume's view of skepticism depends crucially on Descartes and post-Cartesian philosophers such as Pascal, Huet, Foucher and Bayle, who reacted skeptically to major Cartesian doctrines but followed one version or other of Descartes's methodical doubt. Although all these post-Cartesian philosophers are relevant in section XII, I focus on the topics in which Descartes himself-besides his skeptical followers-seems directly relevant. After an introductory section (I) on Julia Annas' and Richard Popkin's views of Hume's relation to, respectively, ancient and modern skepticism, I turn to section XII and examine what Hume calls (II) "consequent skepticism about the senses," (III) "antecedent skepticism," and (IV) "Academic skepticism."

PASSIONS AND EVIL IN KANT'S PHILOSOPHY

In this paper, I aim at relating passions to evil in Kant's philosophy. I begin by explaining the difference between affects and passions in the textAnthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. Kant claims that both affects and passions are illnesses of the mind, because both affect and passion hinder the sovereignty of reason. I show that passions are worse than affects for the purpose of pure reason. Second, I relate affects and passions to the degrees of the propensity to evil in theReligion. I analyze the idea of an ethical community as a way to overcome the evil, which goes beyond political and anthropological solutions suggested by Kant.

The demonism of creation in Goethe's philosophy

Goethe's philosophy of creativity revolves around what he called das Dämonische. This essay is not meant as a definition or an explanation of demonic creation, but instead presents a demonic work par excellence, as the term "demonic" is defined by Goethe in the Elegy from Marienbad. The process of the creation of this work, as it is described by Goethe, also represents a strange exorcism, as the entire daemonic creative force of the author is transposed in this lyrical masterpiece of German and universal literature. After writing the Elegy Goethe, it is no longer demonic.

Animal Experience in Kant’s Philosophy

The role of animals in the philosophy of mind is primarily to help understand the human mind by serving as practical examples of cognition that differs from ours either in kind or in degree. Kant regarded animals as beings that only have the faculty of sensibility. By examining what Kant writes about animal experience we gain knowledge concerning the role of sensibility in experience, free from the influence of understanding and reason. I look at Kant’s view of animals in the historical context of alternative views presented by Descartes’ and Hume’s views. Kant’s view can be seen as a counterargument against Descartes’ doctrine of animal machines according to which animals do not have minds and they do not think. I suggest that while it can be argued that some kind of elementary experience could be possible in the physiological level, this only makes sense when it is possible to become conscious of the unconscious sensation, and this requires a mind. A further option is to claim that there is only a difference in degree between human and animal cognitive capacities. This is Hume’s view. I argue that even though Kant’s and Hume’s view on the cognitive capacities of animals seems to depart from each other to a considerable extent, the differences between them diminish when the focus is on the experience these capacities enable. I also briefly discuss the relation of the metaphysics of animal minds to animal ethics.

The Literary relations between La Fontaine and the "Astrée" of Honoré d'Urfé : a dissertation presented to the faculty of the department of philosophy of the university of Pennsylvania in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of doctor of philosophy / by Walther P. Fischer

Collection : Publications of the University of Pennsylvania ; n° 6

Memory mixed with desire : a preliminary study of philosophy and literature in the works of Friedrich Nietzsche and Milan Kundera

Memory Mixed with Desire: A preliminary study of Philosophy and Literature in the works of Friedrich Nietzsche and Milan Kundera Robert Spinelli Brock University, Department of Philosophy This thesis studies intertextuality in the works of Friedrich Nietzsche and Milan Kundera through the primary themes of memory and forgetting. The thesis starts with two introductory chapters that delineate memory according to Nietzsche and Kundera respectively. From here, I move into a discussion of Nietzsche's Ubermensch as an example of the type of forgetting that Nietzsche sees as a cure for the overabundance of memory that has led to Christian morality. Next, I explore the Kunderan concept of kitsch as the polar opposite of what Nietzsche has sought in his philosophy, finishing the chapter by tying the two thinkers together in a Kunderan critique of Nietzsche. The thesis ends with a chapter devoted to the Eternal Return beginning with an exegesis of Nietzsche's idea and ending with a similar exegesis of Kundera's treatment of this thought. What I suggest in this chapter is that the Eternal Return might itself be a form of kitsch even in its attempt to revalue existence.