The economics of organized crime and optimal law enforcement

This paper extends the optimal law enforcement literature to organized crime.We model the criminal organization as a vertical structure where the principal extracts some rents from the agents through extortion. Depending on the principal's information set, threats may or may not be credible. As long as threats are credible, the principal is able to fully extract rents.In that case, the results obtained by applying standard theory of optimal law enforcement are robust: we argue for a tougher policy. However, when threats are not credible, the principal is not able to fully extract rents and there is violence. Moreover, we show that it is not necessarily true that a tougher law enforcement policy should be chosen when in presence of organized crime.

Optimal law enforcement and criminal organization

In this paper, we take an organizational view of organized crime. In particular, we study the organizational consequences of product illegality attending at the following characteristics: (i) contracts are not enforceable in court, (ii) all participants are subject to the risk of being punished, (iii) employees present a major threat to the entrepreneur having the most detailed knowledge concerning participation, (iv) separation between ownership and management is difficult because record-keeping and auditing augments criminal evidence.

Dynamic optimal law enforcement with learning

We incorporate the process of enforcement learning by assuming that the agency's current marginal cost is a decreasing function of its past experience of detecting and convicting. The agency accumulates data and information (on criminals, on opportunities of crime) enhancing the ability to apprehend in the future at a lower marginal cost.We focus on the impact of enforcement learning on optimal stationary compliance rules. In particular, we show that the optimal stationary fine could be less-than-maximal and the optimal stationary probability of detection could be higher-than-otherwise.

Optimal law enforcement under asymmetric information

In this paper, we focus on the problem created by asymmetric informationabout the enforcer's (agent's) costs associated to enforcement expenditure. This adverse selection problem affects optimal law enforcement because a low cost enforcer may conceal its information by imitating a high cost enforcer, and must then be given a compensation to be induced to reveal its true costs. The government faces a trade-off between minimizing the enforcer's compensation and maximizing the net surplus of harmful acts. As a consequence, the probability of apprehension and punishment is usually reduced leading to more offenses being committed. We show that asymmetry of information does not affect law enforcement as long as raising public funds is costless. The consideration of costly raising of public funds permits to establish the positive correlation between asymmetry of information between government and enforcers andthe crime rate.

Molecular crime and cellular punishment: active detoxification of misfolded and aggregated proteins in the cell by the chaperone and protease networks.

Labile or mutation-sensitised proteins may spontaneously convert into aggregation-prone conformations that may be toxic and infectious. This hazardous behavior, which can be described as a form of "molecular criminality", can be actively counteracted in the cell by a network of molecular chaperone and proteases. Similar to law enforcement agents, molecular chaperones and proteases can specifically identify, apprehend, unfold and thus neutralize "criminal" protein conformers, allowing them to subsequently refold into harmless functional proteins. Irreversibly damaged polypeptides that have lost the ability to natively refold are preferentially degraded by highly controlled ATP-consuming proteases. Damaged proteins that escape proteasomal degradation can also be "incarcerated" into dense amyloids, "evicted" from the cell, or internally "exiled" to the lysosome to be hydrolysed and recycled. Thus, remarkable parallels exist between molecular and human forms of criminality, as well as in the cellular and social responses to various forms of crime. Yet, differences also exist: whereas programmed death is the preferred solution chosen by aged and aggregation-stressed cells, collective suicide is seldom chosen by lawless societies. Significantly, there is no cellular equivalent for the role of familial care and of education in general, which is so crucial to the proper shaping of functional persons in the society. Unlike in the cell, humanism introduces a bias against radical solutions such as capital punishment, favouring crime prevention, reeducation and social reinsertion of criminals.

On the institution of the moral subject: on the commander and the commanded in Nietzsche's discussion of law

The article discusses how Nietzsche understands the institution of law and morals in distinction to Kant and the Christian tradition. It argues that Nietzsche to a large extent is inspired by the paradigm-shift toward a evolutionary biological thinking introduced by several of his peers in the late 19th century, among else F. A. Lange, who sees this shift as a sobering scientific-materialistic alternative to Kant. In Nietzsche, the Kantian moral imperative is replaced with a notion of a morality emerging thanks to historical, or pre-historical, civilizational processes, imposed on a feebleminded human without any inherent rational dispositions to obey Law. It is also a process, which rather than universalizing the human, splits it in a duality where one part obeys old immediate self-interests and another part obeys new 'commands,' having been shouted 'into the ear' by a so-called 'commander.' The compliance with law takes two radically different forms in Nietzsche: servile and mediocre individuals need to be exposed to discipline and punishment in order to adopt Law; while so-called 'sovereign' individuals are able to impose law upon themselves. The figure of the 'sovereign' has consequently been an issue for vigorous debate in especially the Anglo-Saxon tradition of Nietzsche research, since his apparent 'respect for law' and 'sense of duty' reiterate typical Kantian qualities. Relating to these discussions, I suggest that Nietzsche's 'sovereign' (in one context) is identical his 'commander' (in other contexts). When the 'sovereign' as such imposes law upon himself and others, his act is conventional and arbitrary (like language in Saussure), and is rather irrational than rational as in Kant. His will is not a good will, nor a rational will with a vision of human autonomy. His command of himself and others is a performative, thus without truth-value (like illocutionary speech-acts in Austin and Searle).

Corporal punishment : understanding the debate in Canada

There has been considerable debate over whether corporal punishment against children should be prohibited in Canada. Various organizations, most notably the Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law, have argued that the Canadian Government should ban the use of corporal punishment by repealing the specific section of the Canadian Criminal Code that provides parents with a legal defence to use corporal punishment against their children; this provision is outlined in Section 43 of the Criminal Code. Recently, the Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law challenged the constitutionality of Section 43 before the Supreme Court of Canada. The organization claimed Section 43 is unconstitutional. It violates children's Charter rights, such as the right to security of a person (Section 7), the right to be protected from cruel and unusual treatment (Section 12), and denies children the same protection adults receive under the law. Both the Canadian government and the Supreme Court of Canada reject the Foundation's arguments. Examining the federal government and the judicial system's rationale for refusing to remove Section 43 of the Canadian Criminal Code discloses how the parent-child relationship is perceived. This thesis examines how the parent-child relationship is perceived by the Canadian government and the issues that arise from such a view. This examination is essential for the comprehension of why Canada's corporal punishment law was enacted and remains in effect today.

On cultural property and its protection: a law-and-economics comment

The term cultural property seems to have come into vogue after the Second World War as part of efforts to prevent the recurrence of the massive war-time destruction of objects of cultural significance to various groups and, in some cases, to all of humanity. The 1954 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict symbolises those efforts. Destruction is not the only doomsday scenario for cultural property. Removal of objects from their owners or region of origin is another concern. This, too, had occurred during the Second World War with the nazis’ looting treasures of all kinds from occupied territories, not to mention the massive confiscation of the property of their Jewish victims everywhere. But the concern was older, as Merryman for one shows in the story of the Elgin marbles, brought from Greece to England during the 19th century. This concern has found expression in a 1970 UNESCO treaty and in a 1995 Unidroit Convention seeking to halt international traffic in cultural property.

How much debtors' punishment?

This paper investigates how the bankruptcy exemptions applied by the Personal Bankruptcy Law in each American state a§ect the aggregated level of individuals and small businessesí loans. Higher levels of bankruptcy exemptions imply in a lenient rule, motivating debtors to Öle for bankruptcy, what makes lenders worsen the terms of credit. On the other hand, lower levels of exemptions imply in a harsh punishment to debtors, inhibiting their demand for credit fearing a possible bankruptcy by bad luck. ConÖrming the theoretical claims, empirical tests show the existence of a non-monotonic shape in the relationship between the bankruptcy exemptions and the amount of credit to individuals and small businesses, where the optimal level of exemptions should be neither too high nor too low. Since the majority of the states in U.S. do not apply the optimal level, an intervention that brings the exemption level closer to the optimal one can be credit and welfare enhancing.

Punitive damages in Brazilian law and the boundaries between criminal and civil liabilities

This article demonstrates the existence of civil responsibility with punitive purposes in Brazilian Law, explaining how it was introduced by jurisdictional activity in cases involving moral damages. Next, it points out main problems this situation represents to Brazilian Law from the standpoint of our juridical dogmatics and public policies. Additionally, it proposes the execution of an empirical research for comprehension of the structure and fundamentals of jurisprudence on the punitive character of civil responsibility for moral damages and establishes criteria for use in this research based on theories of punishment. Finally, it positions the problem of punitive function of civil responsibility in the broader ambit of relationships and boundaries between civil and criminal responsibility.

Compliance to law and effectiveness of the rule of law in Brazil

The goal of this paper is to debate the degree of effectiveness of the rule of law in Brazil, through a survey measuring perceptions, attitudes and habits of Brazilians in regard to compliance to law. The survey conducted in Brazil is based on the study conducted by Tom R. Tyler in the United States, entitled Why People Obey the Law? (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990). The main argument of Tyler´s study is that people obey the law when they believe it’s legitimate, and not because they fear punishment. We test the same argument in Brazil, relying on five indicators: (i) behavior, which depicts the frequency with which respondents declared to have engaged in conducts in disobedience to the law; (ii) instrumentality, measuring perception of losses associated with the violation of the law, specially fear of punishment; (iii) morality, measuring perception of how much is right or wrong to engage in certain conducts in violation of the law; (iv) social control, which measures perception of social disapproval of certain types of behavior in violation of the law, and (v) legitimacy, which measures the perception of respect to the law and to some authorities. Results indicate that fear of sanctions is not the strongest drive in compliance to law, but more than legitimacy, indicators of morality and social control are the strongest in explaining why people obey the law in Brazil.

How much debtors' punishment?

This paper investigates how the bankruptcy exemptions applied by the Personal Bankruptcy Law in each American state affect the aggregated leveI of individuaIs and small businesses' loans. Higher leveIs of bankruptcy exemptions imply in a lenient rule, motivating debtors to file for bankruptcy, what makes lenders worsen the terms of credito On the other hand, lower leveIs of exemptions imply in a harsh punishment to debtors, inhibiting their demand for credit fearing a possible bankruptcy by bad luck. Confirming the theoretical daims, empirical tests show the existence of a non-monotonic shape in the relationship between the bankruptcy exemptions and the amount of credit to individuaIs and small businesses, where the optimal leveI of exemptions should be neither too high nor too low. Since the majority of the states in V.S. do not apply the optimallevel, an intervention that brings the exemption leveI doser to the optimal one can be credit and welfare enhancing.

Law, Informal Institutions and Trust: an Experimental Perspective

This dissertation has studied how legal and non-legal mechanisms affect the levels of trust and trustworthiness in an economy, and whether and when subtle psychological factors are crucial for establishing trust and even for recovering trust from a breach of contract. The first Chapter has addressed the question of whether formal legal enforcement crowds out or crowds in the amount of trust in a society. We find that formal legal mechanisms, especially formal contracts backed by a powerful authority, normally undermine trust except when they are perceived as legitimate, or when there are no strong social norms of fairness (i.e. the population in a society is considerably heterogeneous), or when the environment in which repeated commercial relationships take place becomes highly uncertain. The second Chapter has examined whether the endogenous adoption of a collective punishment institution can help a society coordinate on an efficient outcome, characterized by high levels of trust and trustworthiness. The experimental results show that the endogenous introduction of collective punishment by means of a majority-voting rule does not significantly improve coordination on the efficient equilibrium. Not all subjects seem to be able to anticipate the change in behavior induced by the introduction of the mechanism, and a majority of them vote against it. The third Chapter has explored whether high-trustors adapt their behavior in response to others’ trustworthiness or untrustworthiness more quickly, which in turn supports them to maintain higher default expectations of others’ trustworthiness relative to low-trustors. Our experimental results reveal that high-trustors are better than low-trustors at predicting others’ trustworthiness because they are less susceptible to the anticipated aversive emotions aroused by the potential betrayal and thereby have a higher willingness to acquire the valuable information about their partner’s actions.

Review of Complete Crime and Punishment Series

Some examples of topics covered include undocumented immigrants, guns, and terrorism within Crime and Criminal Behavior, vigilantes, Miranda warnings, and zero-tolerance policing within Police and Law Enforcement; insanity laws, DNA evidence, and victims' rights within Courts, Law, and Justice; gangs and prison violence, capital punishment, and prison privatization within Corrections; and school violence, violent juvenile offenders, and age of responsibility within Juvenile Crime and Justice. Note that Sage offers numerous reference works that provide focused analysis of key topics in the field of criminal justice, such as the Encyclopedia of Crime and Punishment (2002), the Encyclopedia of Race and Crime (2009), the Encyclopedia of Victimology and Crime Prevention (2010), the Encyclopedia of White Collar & Corporate Crime (2004), and the Encyclopedia of Interpersonal Violence (2008), available in print or as e-books via Sage Reference online.