909 resultados para Operator decisions
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A new very high-order finite volume method to solve problems with harmonic and biharmonic operators for one- dimensional geometries is proposed. The main ingredient is polynomial reconstruction based on local interpolations of mean values providing accurate approximations of the solution up to the sixth-order accuracy. First developed with the harmonic operator, an extension for the biharmonic operator is obtained, which allows designing a very high-order finite volume scheme where the solution is obtained by solving a matrix-free problem. An application in elasticity coupling the two operators is presented. We consider a beam subject to a combination of tensile and bending loads, where the main goal is the stress critical point determination for an intramedullary nail.
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Architectural (bad) smells are design decisions found in software architectures that degrade the ability of systems to evolve. This paper presents an approach to verify that a software architecture is smellfree using the Archery architectural description language. The language provides a core for modelling software architectures and an extension for specifying constraints. The approach consists in precisely specifying architectural smells as constraints, and then verifying that software architectures do not satisfy any of them. The constraint language is based on a propositional modal logic with recursion that includes: a converse operator for relations among architectural concepts, graded modalities for describing the cardinality in such relations, and nominals referencing architectural elements. Four architectural smells illustrate the approach.
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BACKGROUND To validate a new practical Sepsis Severity Score for patients with complicated intra-abdominal infections (cIAIs) including the clinical conditions at the admission (severe sepsis/septic shock), the origin of the cIAIs, the delay in source control, the setting of acquisition and any risk factors such as age and immunosuppression. METHODS The WISS study (WSES cIAIs Score Study) is a multicenter observational study underwent in 132 medical institutions worldwide during a four-month study period (October 2014-February 2015). Four thousand five hundred thirty-three patients with a mean age of 51.2 years (range 18-99) were enrolled in the WISS study. RESULTS Univariate analysis has shown that all factors that were previously included in the WSES Sepsis Severity Score were highly statistically significant between those who died and those who survived (p < 0.0001). The multivariate logistic regression model was highly significant (p < 0.0001, R2 = 0.54) and showed that all these factors were independent in predicting mortality of sepsis. Receiver Operator Curve has shown that the WSES Severity Sepsis Score had an excellent prediction for mortality. A score above 5.5 was the best predictor of mortality having a sensitivity of 89.2 %, a specificity of 83.5 % and a positive likelihood ratio of 5.4. CONCLUSIONS WSES Sepsis Severity Score for patients with complicated Intra-abdominal infections can be used on global level. It has shown high sensitivity, specificity, and likelihood ratio that may help us in making clinical decisions.
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Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Wirtschaftswiss., Diss., 2011
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We analyse the effects of investment decisions and firms' internal organisation on the efficiency and stability of horizontal mergers. In our framework economies of scale are endogenous and there might be internal conflict within merged firms. We show that often stable mergers do not lead to more efficiency and may even lead to efficiency losses. These mergers lead to lower total welfare, suggesting that a regulator should be careful in assuming that possible efficiency gains of a merger will be effiectively realised. Moreover, the paper offers a possible explanation for merger failures.
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The decisions of many individuals and social groups, taking according to well-defined objectives, are causing serious social and environmental problems, in spite of following the dictates of economic rationality. There are many examples of serious problems for which there are not yet appropriate solutions, such as management of scarce natural resources including aquifer water or the distribution of space among incompatible uses. In order to solve these problems, the paper first characterizes the resources and goods involved from an economic perspective. Then, for each case, the paper notes that there is a serious divergence between individual and collective interests and, where possible, it designs the procedure for solving the conflict of interests. With this procedure, the real opportunities for the application of economic theory are shown, and especially the theory on collective goods and externalities. The limitations of conventional economic analysis are shown and the opportunity to correct the shortfalls is examined. Many environmental problems, such as climate change, have an impact on different generations that do not participate in present decisions. The paper shows that for these cases, the solutions suggested by economic theory are not valid. Furthermore, conventional methods of economic valuation (which usually help decision-makers) are unable to account for the existence of different generations and tend to obviate long-term impacts. The paper analyzes how economic valuation methods could account for the costs and benefits enjoyed by present and future generations. The paper studies an appropriate consideration of preferences for future consumption and the incorporation of sustainability as a requirement in social decisions, which implies not only more efficiency but also a fairer distribution between generations than the one implied by conventional economic analysis.
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"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt."
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In this paper we prove that the solution of a backward stochastic differential equation, which involves a subdifferential operator and associated to a family of reflecting diffusion processes, converges to the solution of a deterministic backward equation and satisfes a large deviation principle.
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OBJECTIVE: Incomplete compliance is one of several possible causes of uncontrolled hypertension. Yet, non-compliance remains largely unrecognized and is falsely interpreted as treatment resistance, because it is difficult to confirm or exclude objectively. The goal of this study was to evaluate the potential benefits of electronic monitoring of drug compliance in the management of patients with resistant hypertension. METHODS: Forty-one hypertensive patients resistant to a three-drug regimen (average blood pressure 156/ 106 +/- 23/11 mmHg, mean +/- SD) were studied prospectively. They were informed that for the next 2 months, their presently prescribed drugs would be provided in electronic monitors, without any change in treatment, so as to provide the treating physician with a measure of their compliance. Thereafter, patients were offered the possibility of prolonging the monitoring of compliance for another 2 month period, during which treatment was adapted if necessary. RESULTS: Monitoring of compliance alone was associated with a significant improvement of blood pressure at 2 months (145/97 +/- 20/15 mmHg, P < 0.01). During monitoring, blood pressure was normalized (systolic < 140 mmHg or diastolic < 90 mmHg) in one-third of the patients and insufficient compliance was unmasked in another 20%. When analysed according to tertiles of compliance, patients with the lowest compliance exhibited significantly higher achieved diastolic blood pressures (P = 0.04). In 30 patients, compliance was monitored up to 4 months and drug therapy was adapted whenever necessary. In these patients, a further significant decrease in blood pressure was obtained (from 150/100 +/- 18/15 to 143/94 +/- 22/11 mmHg, P = 0.04/0.02). CONCLUSIONS: These results suggest that objective monitoring of compliance using electronic devices may be a useful step in the management of patients with refractory hypertension, as it enables physicians to take rational decisions based on reliable and objective data of drug compliance and hence to improve blood pressure control.
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The paper studies the interaction between cyclical uncertainty and investment in a stochastic real option framework where demand shifts stochastically between three different states, each with different rates of drift and volatility. In our setting the shifts are governed by a three-state Markov switching model with constant transition probabilities. The magnitude of the link between cyclical uncertainty and investment is quantified using simulations of the model. The chief implication of the model is that recessions and financial turmoil are important catalysts for waiting. In other words, our model shows that macroeconomic risk acts as an important deterrent to investments.
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We construct a model in which oligopolistic firms decide between locating in a country where employment protection implies costly output adjustments and in one without employment protection. Using a two-period three-stage game with uncertainty, we demonstrate that location is influenced by both flexibility and strategic concerns. The strategic effects under Cournot work towards domestic anchorage in the country with employment protection while those under Bertrand do not. Strategic agglomeration can occur in the inflexible country under Cournot and even under Bertrand, provided uncertainty and foreign direct investment costs are low.
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This paper studies dichotomous majority voting in common interest committees where each member receives not only a private signal but also a public signal observed by all of them. The public signal represents, e.g. expert information presented to an entire committee and its quality is higher than that of each individual private signal. We identify two informative symmetric strategy equilibria, namely i) the mixed strategy equilibrium where each member randomizes between following the private and public signals should they disagree; and ii) the pure strategy equilibrium where they follow the public signal for certain. The former outperforms the latter. The presence of the public signal precludes the equilibrium where every member follows their own signal, which is an equilibrium in the absence of the public signal. The mixed strategy equilibrium in the presence of the public signal outperforms the sincere voting equilibrium without the public signal, but the latter may be more efficient than the pure strategy equilibrium in the presence of the public signal. We suggest that whether expert information improves committee decision making depends on equilibrium selection.
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A number of different models with behavioral economics have a reduced form representation where potentially boundedly rational decision-makers do not necessarily internalize all the consequences of their actions on payoff relevant features (which we label as psychological states) of the choice environment. This paper studies the restrictions that such behavioral models impose on choice data and the implications they have for welfare analysis. First, we propose a welfare benchmark that is justified using standard axioms of rational choice and can be applied to a number of existing seminal behavioral economics models. Second, we show that Sen's axioms and fully characterize choice data consistent with behavioral decision-makers. Third, we show how choice data to infer information about the normative signi.cance of psychological states and establish the possibility of identifying welfare dominated choices.
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In this paper we assume that for some commodities individuals may wish to adjust their levels of consumption from their normal Marshallian levels so as to match the consumption levels of a group of other individuals, in order to signal that they conform to the consumption norms of that group. Unlike Veblen’s concept of conspicuous consumption this can mean that some individuals may reduce their consumption of the relevant commodities. We model this as a three-stage game in which individuals first decide whether or not they wish to adhere to a norm, then decide which norm they wish to adhere to, and finally decide their actual consumption. We present a number of examples of the resulting equilibria, and then discuss the potential policy implications of this model.