Medical Assistance in Dying in Canada: An Ethical Analysis of Conscientious and Religious Objections

Article

Medical Assistance in Dying in Canada: An Ethical Analysis of Conscientious and Religious Objections

Article

Explanation, Dialogue and Default Logic

La distinción entre argumentación y explicación es una tarea complicada pero necesaria por diversas razones. Una de ellas es la necesidad de incorporar la explicación en un movimiento del diálogo como resultado de una obligación dialéctica. Se propusieron distintos sistemas de diálogo que exploran la distinción enfatizando aspectos pragmáticos. En el presente trabajo me ocupo de aspectos estructurales de la explicación analizados en el marco de la lógica por defecto que permite caracterizar ciertas objeciones en el diálogo. Asimismo, considero que la versión operacional de la lógica por defecto constituye una aproximaciónadecuada en la construcción de la explicación y en la representación de la instancia de diálogo en el intercambio dialéctico

La objeción de la ignorancia pública

Las teorías deliberativas de la democracia han pasado de cuestionar en su totalidad los sistemas democráticos representativos y sus procedimientos de toma de decisiones a buscar su posibilidad de realización acomodándose a las instituciones liberales. Sin embargo, la deliberación democrática sigue suscitando oposición entre varios autores por varias razones, una de las cuales, especialmente conspicua, es la llamada objeción de la ignorancia pública, que afirma que el público por su ignorancia de los asuntos políticos está incapacitado para cumplir las exigentes requisitos que toda deliberación política presupone y por la que esta, a gran escala, deviene indeseable, cuando no imposible.

La prioridad del Igualitarismo Democrático

Este artículo mostrará que las versiones estrictas del Igualitarismo Democrático y del Igualitarismo de la Suerte son implausibles ya que defienden una visión monista del objeto de la justicia igualitaria. Por el contrario, sus versiones moderadas son aceptables ya que admiten la composición plural del objeto de justicia igualitaria.Esta comprensión plural exige, sin embargo, el establecimiento de prioridades normativas ya que las exigencias de cada valor entran típicamente en conflicto. Aquí, se ofrecerán tres argumentos para defender la prioridad del Igualitarismo Democrático sobre el Igualitarismo de la Suerte: uno instrumental, otro relacionado con el significado expresivo de las políticas públicas estatales y un último que justifica la división del trabajo moral igualitarista.

Rabbits, stoats and the predator problem: Why a strong animal rights position need not call for human intervention to protect prey from predators

Animal rights positions face the ‘predator problem’: the suggestion that if the rights of nonhuman animals are to be protected, then we are obliged to interfere in natural ecosystems to protect prey from predators. Generally, rather than embracing this conclusion, animal ethicists have rejected it, basing this objection on a number of different arguments. This paper considers but challenges three such arguments, before defending a fourth possibility. Rejected are Peter Singer’s suggestion that interference will lead to more harm than good, Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka’s suggestion that respect for nonhuman sovereignty necessitates non-interference in normal circumstances, and Alasdair Cochrane’s solution based on the claim that predators cannot survive without killing prey. The possibility defended builds upon Tom Regan’s suggestion that predators, as moral patients but not moral agents, cannot violate the rights of their prey, and so the rights of the prey, while they do exist, do not call for intervention. This idea is developed by a consideration of how moral agents can be more or less responsible for a given event, and defended against criticisms offered by thinkers including Alasdair Cochrane and Dale Jamieson.

Teolog fundamentalny wobec ataku Przypadku, Nieokreśloności, Prawdopodobieństwa, Dwuznaczności, Wieloznaczności?

Postmodernizm prezentuje postawę akceptacji Nieładu, Chaosu i Przypadku. Czy istnieje moż- liwość dialogu z taką postawą? Postmodernizm powstaje jako bunt na pograniczu filozofii i estetyki. Kontestuje zastany Ład. Sprzeciwia się kartezjańskiemu Cogito ergo sum oraz podziałowi na res cogitans i res extensa. Jest to ruch kulturowy, który nie ma jeszcze swojego ostatecznego wyrazu. Jest on ciągle postrzegany jako proces przechodzenia od starego do nowego Ładu. Taki brak dookreślenia budzi niepokój i sprzeciw. Teologia fundamentalna jest badaniem granic i dialogu. Stoi na progu, więc ma obowiązek rozeznać ludzki niepokój w akceptacji otaczającego świata. Musimy zapytać, dlaczego człowiek akceptuje ten Nieład?

Closing Pandora's box: a defence of Alvin Plantinga's epistemology of religious belief

I argue (1) that Alvin Plantinga’s theory of warrant is plausible and (2) that, contrary to the Pandora’s Box objection, there are certain serious world religions that cannot successfully use Plantinga’s epistemology to demonstrate that their beliefs could be warranted in the same way that Christian belief can be warranted. In arguing for (1), I deploy Ernest Sosa’s Swampman case to show that Plantinga’s proper function condition is a necessary condition for warrant. I then engage three objections to Plantinga’s theory of warrant, each of which attempts to demonstrate that his conditions for warrant are neither necessary nor sufficient. Having defended the plausibility of Plantinga’s theory of warrant, I present and expand his key arguments to the effect that naturalism cannot make use of it. These arguments provide the conceptual tools that are needed to argue for (2): that there are certain world religions that cannot legitimately use Plantinga’s theory of warrant to demonstrate that their beliefs could be warranted in the same way that Christian belief can be warranted.

Objeção da consciência e aborto previsto em lei : vivências em um serviço público de saúde

Tese (doutorado)—Universidade de Brasília, Faculdade de Ciências da Saúde, Departamento de Enfermagem, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Enfermagem, 2015.

Are Videogames Art?

My dissertation defends a positive answer to the question: “Can a videogame be a work of art? ” To achieve this goal I develop definitions of several concepts, primarily ‘art’, ‘games’, and ‘videogames’, and offer arguments about the compatibility of these notions. In Part One, I defend a definition of art from amongst several contemporary and historical accounts. This definition, the Intentional-Historical account, requires, among other things, that an artwork have the right kind of creative intentions behind it, in short that the work be intended to be regarded in a particular manner. This is a leading account that has faced several recent objections that I address, particular the buck-passing theory, the objection against non-failure theories of art, and the simultaneous creation response to the ur-art problem, while arguing that it is superior to other theories in its ability to answer the question of videogames’ art status. Part Two examines whether games can exhibit the art-making kind of creative intention. Recent literature has suggested that they can. To verify this a definition of games is needed. I review and develop the most promising account of games in the literature, the over-looked account from Bernard Suits. I propose and defend a modified version of this definition against other accounts. Interestingly, this account entails that games cannot be successfully intended to be works of art because games are goal-directed activities that require a voluntary selection of inefficient means and that is incompatible with the proper manner of regarding that is necessary for something to be an artwork. While the conclusions of Part One and Part Two may appear to suggest that videogames cannot be works of art, Part Three proposes and defends a new account of videogames that, contrary to first appearances, implies that not all videogames are games. This Intentional-Historical Formalist account allows for non-game videogames to be created with an art-making intention, though not every non-ludic videogame will have an art-making intention behind it. I then discuss examples of videogames that are good candidates for being works of art. I conclude that a videogame can be a work of art, but that not all videogames are works of art. The thesis is significant in several respects. It is a continuation of academic work that has focused on the definition and art status of videogames. It clarifies the current debate and provides a positive account of the central issues that has so far been lacking. It also defines videogames in a way that corresponds better with the actual practice of videogame making and playing than other definitions in the literature. It offers further evidence in defense of certain theories of art over others, providing a close examination of videogames as a new case study for potential art objects and for aesthetic and artistic theory in general. Finally, it provides a compelling answer to the question of whether videogames can be art. This project also provides the groundwork for new evaluative, critical, and appreciative tools for engagement with videogames as they develop as a medium. As videogames mature, more people, both inside and outside academia, have increasing interest in what they are and how to understand them. One place many have looked is to the practice of art appreciation. My project helps make sense of which appreciative and art-critical tools and methods are applicable to videogames.

New worlds and new churches: The Orthodox Church(es) and the European Union

The Orthodox church(es) share a common commitment to the unity of dogma and spirituality. There is, however, no doctrinal formulation that comes close to a form of political theology at a pan-Orthodox level. This means that the Orthodox churches’ attitude towards the European Union (EU) is driven by their ecclesial diversity and by complex inter-ecclesial relations. More fundamentally they share a fragmented and plural, theological objection to the very ideas of Europe and the West. This has been further complicated by the emergence of a substantial Orthodox diaspora from Eastern Europe, Russia, and the Middle East living across the breadth of the European continent. Consequently the ecclesial identity and self-perception of the autocephalous Orthodox churches is changing. These churches are becoming increasingly transnational and extra-territorial. With this, their perception of Europe and the West, as seen through the eyes of their diaspora communities, is altering from “threat” to “home” (Makrides and Uffelmann, 2003). The growing diaspora will not only impact the Christian demographics of Europe but will also transform the Eastern Churches’ view of Europe and the EU (Leustean, 2009; 2011; 2013; 2014a; 2014b).

Explanation, Dialogue and Default Logic

La distinción entre argumentación y explicación es una tarea complicada pero necesaria por diversas razones. Una de ellas es la necesidad de incorporar la explicación en un movimiento del diálogo como resultado de una obligación dialéctica. Se propusieron distintos sistemas de diálogo que exploran la distinción enfatizando aspectos pragmáticos. En el presente trabajo me ocupo de aspectos estructurales de la explicación analizados en el marco de la lógica por defecto que permite caracterizar ciertas objeciones en el diálogo. Asimismo, considero que la versión operacional de la lógica por defecto constituye una aproximaciónadecuada en la construcción de la explicación y en la representación de la instancia de diálogo en el intercambio dialéctico

Explanation, Dialogue and Default Logic

La distinción entre argumentación y explicación es una tarea complicada pero necesaria por diversas razones. Una de ellas es la necesidad de incorporar la explicación en un movimiento del diálogo como resultado de una obligación dialéctica. Se propusieron distintos sistemas de diálogo que exploran la distinción enfatizando aspectos pragmáticos. En el presente trabajo me ocupo de aspectos estructurales de la explicación analizados en el marco de la lógica por defecto que permite caracterizar ciertas objeciones en el diálogo. Asimismo, considero que la versión operacional de la lógica por defecto constituye una aproximaciónadecuada en la construcción de la explicación y en la representación de la instancia de diálogo en el intercambio dialéctico

El argumento de la indispensabilidad y el ficcionalismo de Balaguer

My main purpose in this article consist in analyzing two objections, thrown by Balaguer against Quine`s and Putnam`s indispensability argument. First I present the argument, under Quine`s philosophical framework, and classify objections against it in three main categories, one of them leading to fictionalism. The next section contains a revision about the particular form this philosophical current acquires in Balaguer`s works, to conclude by mentioning the relevant issues left unsolved, concerning the applicability of mathematics. Also mentioned is how this objection could be solved, adopting some of his adversaries premises. At the end I considerer a further objection presented by Balaguer to the indispensability argument, noting, to conclude, that although serious, nonetheless it is not conclusive.