How contracts and enforcement explain transaction outcomes

This study considers the influence of contracts on enforcement and the subsequent performance impact of aligned and misaligned enforcement. We define enforcement as a corrective action aimed at remedying problems occurring in the transaction. First we explain the role of contracts and show that at the component level, contracts can both increase and decrease enforcement. Building on an alignment perspective and accounting for the endogeneity of enforcement, we use these contractual components and variables related to enforcement to predict the occurrence of enforcement. We use such predictions to show that aligned enforcement results in higher performance. We also show that the performance impact of misaligned enforcement is relatively greater for transactions where enforcement is not expected. We conduct the study using a unique dataset reporting on 971 business transactions across a wide range of industries.

Benefits of a marketing cooperative in transition agriculture: Mórakert purchasing and service co-operative

The paper analyses the potential benefits of marketing cooperatives in Hungary, employing a transaction cost economics framework. We found that the purchased quantity, the existence of contracts, flexibility and trust are the most important factors farmers consider when selling their products via a cooperative. The most striking result is that diversification has positive influences on the share of cooperatives in farmers’ sale. Furthermore, farmers with larger bargaining power have less willingness to sell their product to the cooperative. Surprisingly, asset specificity has rather negative effects on the share of cooperatives in members’ sales.

Three essays on the economics of defense contracting, output and income inequality

This dissertation analyzes both the economics of the defense contracting process and the impact of total dollar obligations on the economies of U.S. states. Using various econometric techniques, I will estimate relationships across individual contracts, state level output, and income inequality. I will achieve this primarily through the use of a dataset on individual contract obligations. ^ The first essay will catalog the distribution of contracts and isolate aspects of the process that contribute to contract dollar obligations. Accordingly, this study describes several characteristics about individual defense contracts, from 1966-2006: (i) the distribution of contract dollar obligations is extremely rightward skewed, (ii) contracts are unevenly distributed in a geographic sense across the United States, (iii) increased duration of a contract by 10 percent is associated with an increase in costs by 4 percent, (iv) competition does not seem to affect dollar obligations in a substantial way, (v) contract pre-payment financing increases the obligation of contracts from anywhere from 62 to 380 percent over non-financed contracts. ^ The second essay will turn to an aggregate focus, and look the impact of defense spending on state economic output. The analysis in chapter two attempts to estimate the state level fiscal multiplier, deploying Difference-in-Differences estimation as an attempt to filter out potential endogeneity bias. Interstate variation in procurement spending facilitates utilization of a natural experiment scenario, focusing on the spike in relative spending in 1982. The state level relative multiplier estimate here is 1.19, and captures the short run, impact effect of the 1982 spending spike. ^ Finally I will look at the relationship between defense contracting and income inequality. Military spending has typically been observed to have a negative relationship with income inequality. The third chapter examines the existence of this relationship, combining data on defense procurement with data on income inequality at the state level, in a longitudinal analysis across the United States. While the estimates do not suggest a significant relationship exists for the income share of the top ten percent of households, there is a significant positive relationship for the income share of top one percent households for an increase in defense procurement.^

Three Essays on the Economics of Defense Contracting, Output and Income Inequality

This dissertation analyzes both the economics of the defense contracting process and the impact of total dollar obligations on the economies of U.S. states. Using various econometric techniques, I will estimate relationships across individual contracts, state level output, and income inequality. I will achieve this primarily through the use of a dataset on individual contract obligations. The first essay will catalog the distribution of contracts and isolate aspects of the process that contribute to contract dollar obligations. Accordingly, this study describes several characteristics about individual defense contracts, from 1966-2006: (i) the distribution of contract dollar obligations is extremely rightward skewed, (ii) contracts are unevenly distributed in a geographic sense across the United States, (iii) increased duration of a contract by 10 percent is associated with an increase in costs by 4 percent, (iv) competition does not seem to affect dollar obligations in a substantial way, (v) contract pre-payment financing increases the obligation of contracts from anywhere from 62 to 380 percent over non-financed contracts. The second essay will turn to an aggregate focus, and look the impact of defense spending on state economic output. The analysis in chapter two attempts to estimate the state level fiscal multiplier, deploying Difference-in-Differences estimation as an attempt to filter out potential endogeneity bias. Interstate variation in procurement spending facilitates utilization of a natural experiment scenario, focusing on the spike in relative spending in 1982. The state level relative multiplier estimate here is 1.19, and captures the short run, impact effect of the 1982 spending spike. Finally I will look at the relationship between defense contracting and income inequality. Military spending has typically been observed to have a negative relationship with income inequality. The third chapter examines the existence of this relationship, combining data on defense procurement with data on income inequality at the state level, in a longitudinal analysis across the United States. While the estimates do not suggest a significant relationship exists for the income share of the top ten percent of households, there is a significant positive relationship for the income share of top one percent households for an increase in defense procurement.

Iowa Highway Programs, Finances, and Progress, 1951

(a) Iowa has a total of 101,620 miles of rural roads, both primary and secondary. (b) On January 1, 1951, a total of 68,869 miles of these rural roads were surfaced - mostly with gravel and crushed stone. (c) Additional roads are being surfaced at the rate of 2676 miles per year. (d) Iowa's highway program provides for a surfaced road to every reasonably located rural home and a paved or other type of dustless surface on all primary roads. (e) Iowa's highway funds come 26.0 per cent from property taxes, 63.5 per cent from road use taxes, 10.5 per cent from Federal aid. (f) Annual income under present laws, available for highway construction, is approximately For primary roads ----------------- $24,000,000 For secondary roads---------------- $41,967,000 (g) Iowa's highway improvements are being paid for as built. No new bonds are being issued. (h) Unobligated available farm to market road funds are rapidly being placed under contract. (i) The letting of highway contracts is increasing rapidly. (j)- Iowa's highway program is estimated to cost $945,000,000 and will require twenty years to build. These are the highlights of Iowa's highway program. The details will follow in succeeding paragraphs.

Privity of Contract and Third Party Rights in European Construction Projects

Privity of contract has lately been criticized in several European jurisdictions, particu-larly due to the onerous consequences it gives rise to in arrangements typical for the modern exchange such as chains of contracts. Privity of contract is a classical premise of contract law, which prohibits a third party to acquire or enforce rights under a contract to which he is not a party. Such a premise is usually seen to be manifested in the doctrine of privity of contract developed under common law, however, the jurisdictions of continental Europe do recognize a corresponding starting point in contract law. One of the traditional industry sectors affected by this premise is the construction industry. A typical large construction project includes a contractual chain comprised of an employer, a main contractor and a subcontractor. The employer is usually dependent on the subcontractor's performance, however, no contractual nexus exists between the two. Accordingly, the employer might want to circumvent the privity of contract in order to reach the subcontractor and to mitigate any risks imposed by such a chain of contracts. From this starting point, the study endeavors to examine the concept of privity of con-tract in European jurisdictions and particularly the methods used to circumvent the rule in the construction industry practice. For this purpose, the study employs both a com-parative and a legal dogmatic method. The principal aim is to discover general principles not just from a theoretical perspective, but from a practical angle as well. Consequently, a considerable amount of legal praxis as well as international industry forms have been used as references. The most important include inter alia the model forms produced by FIDIC as well as Olli Norros' doctoral thesis "Vastuu sopimusketjussa". According to the conclusions of this study, the four principal ways to circumvent privity of contract in European construction projects include liability in a chain of contracts, collateral contracts, assignment of rights as well as security instruments. The contempo-rary European jurisdictions recognize these concepts and the references suggest that they are an integral part of the current market practice. Despite the fact that such means of circumventing privity of contract raise a number of legal questions and affect the risk position of particularly a subcontractor considerably, it seems that the impairment of the premise of privity of contract is an increasing trend in the construction industry.

Transformando burocracias para financiar os mais pobres: a evolu????o do Pronaf Cr??dito Grupo B

Institui????es banc??rias tradicionalmente n??o oferecem servi??os financeiros, principalmente cr??dito produtivo, aos grupos de mais baixa renda. Considerando-se a rigidez do sistema financeiro em trabalhar com os mais pobres, o presente artigo descreve o processo de cria????o e aperfei??oamento de uma pol??tica p??blica de microcr??dito rural dentro do Programa Nacional de Fortalecimento da Agricultura Familiar (Pronaf). S??o apresentadas as motiva????es para altera????es no desenho da linha de cr??dito, assim como as mudan??as normativas, de fontes e de agentes operadores, efetuadas em cada ano-safra para tornar poss??vel superar os desafios apresentados pela burocracia do Sistema Nacional de Cr??dito Rural ??? SNCR. O texto apresenta ainda o impacto no n??mero de contrata????es resultante das diversas medidas tomadas. Finalmente, ?? feito um balan??o das principais li????es aprendidas assim como dos desafios atuais de maior qualifica????o do microcr??dito e integra????o com outras pol??ticas p??blicas.

Transações com partes relacionadas : determinantes e impactos no desempenho das empresas

A literatura internacional que analisa os fatores impactantes das transações com partes relacionadas concentra-se no Reino Unido, nos EUA e no continente asiático, sendo o Brasil um ambiente pouco investigado. Esta pesquisa tem por objetivo investigar tanto os fatores impactantes dos contratos com partes relacionadas, quanto o impacto dessas transações no desempenho das empresas brasileiras. Estudos recentes que investigaram as determinantes das transações com partes relacionadas (TPRs), assim como seus impactos no desempenho das empresas, levaram em consideração as vertentes apresentadas por Gordon, Henry e Palia (2004): (a) de conflitos de interesses, as quais apoiam a visão de que as TPRs são danosas para os acionistas minoritários, implicando expropriação da riqueza deles, por parte dos controladores (acionistas majoritários); e (b) transações eficientes que podem ser benéficas às empresas, atendendo, desse modo, aos objetivos econômicos subjacentes delas. Esta pesquisa apoia-se na vertente de conflito de interesses, com base na teoria da agência e no fato de que o cenário brasileiro apresenta ter como característica uma estrutura de propriedade concentrada e ser um país emergente com ambiente legal caracterizado pela baixa proteção aos acionistas minoritários. Para operacionalizar a pesquisa, utilizou-se uma amostra inicial composta de 70 empresas com ações listadas na BM&FBovespa, observando o período de 2010 a 2012. Os contratos relacionados foram identificados e quantificados de duas formas, de acordo com a metodologia aplicada por Kohlbeck e Mayhew (2004; 2010) e Silveira, Prado e Sasso (2009). Como principais determinantes foram investigadas proxies para captar os efeitos dos mecanismos de governança corporativa e ambiente legal, do desempenho das empresas, dos desvios entre direitos sobre controle e direitos sobre fluxo de caixa e do excesso de remuneração executiva. Também foram adicionadas variáveis de controle para isolar as características intrínsecas das firmas. Nas análises econométricas foram estimados os modelos pelos métodos de Poisson, corte transversal agrupado (Pooled-OLS) e logit. A estimação foi feita pelo método dos mínimos quadrados ordinários (MQO), e para aumentar a robustez das estimativas econométricas, foram utilizadas variáveis instrumentais estimadas pelo método dos momentos generalizados (MMG). As evidências indicam que os fatores investigados impactam diferentemente as diversas medidas de TPRs das empresas analisadas. Verificou-se que os contratos relacionados, em geral, são danosos às empresas, impactando negativamente o desempenho delas, desempenho este que é aumentado pela presença de mecanismos eficazes de governança corporativa. Os resultados do impacto das medidas de governança corporativa e das características intrínsecas das firmas no desempenho das empresas são robustos à presença de endogeneidade com base nas regressões com variáveis instrumentais.

Lições de Direito dos Contratos

1 – Importância e actualidade do instituto. 2 – Noção de contrato. Sua disciplina no Código Civil. 3 – Relações contratuais de facto. 4 – Princípios fundamentais do regime dos contratos. 5 – Princípio da liberdade contratual. 6 – Princípio do consensualismo. 7 – Princípio da boa fé. A responsabilidade pré-contratual. 8 – Princípio da força vinculativa. 9 – Contratos unilaterais ou não sinalagmáticos e bilaterais ou sinalagmáticos. Contratos gratuitos e onerosos. Contratos cumulativos e aleatórios. 10 – Contratos mistos. União de contratos ou coligação de contratos. 11 – Contrato-promessa. 12 – Pacto de preferência. 13 - Alguns problemas e “contratos em especial”, a título enunciativo, relacionados com as actividades de Gestão, Banca e Seguros: “aspectos contratuais” de direito civil e de direito comercial. § 1 - Importance and actuality of the institute. 2 - Contract notion. Its disciplines in the portuguese Civil Code. 3 – Contractual relations of fact. 4 - Basic principles of the regimen of contracts. 5 - Principle of the contractual freedom. 6 - Principle of “consensualism”. 7 - Principle of the "good faith". The pre-contractual liability. 8 - Principle of the obligatory force (binding). 9 - Unilateral or not bilateral contracts. Free and onerous contracts. Cumulative and random contracts.

Contratos bilaterais em mercados multi-agente de energia eléctrica: protocolo de ofertas alternadas

A liberalização do sector eléctrico, e a consequente criação de mercados de energia eléctrica regulados e liberalizados, mudou a forma de comercialização da electricidade. Em particular, permitiu a entrada de empresas nas actividades de produção e comercialização, aumentando a competitividade e assegurando a liberdade de escolha dos consumidores, para decidir o fornecedor de electricidade que pretenderem. A competitividade no sector eléctrico aumentou a necessidade das empresas que o integram a proporem preços mais aliciantes (do que os preços propostos pelos concorrentes), e contribuiu para o desenvolvimento de estratégias de mercado que atraiam mais clientes e aumentem a eficiência energética e económica. A comercialização de electricidade pode ser realizada em mercados organizados ou através de contratação directa entre comercializadores e consumidores, utilizando os contratos bilaterais físicos. Estes contratos permitem a negociação dos preços de electricidade entre os comercializadores e os consumidores. Actualmente, existem várias ferramentas computacionais para fazer a simulação de mercados de energia eléctrica. Os simuladores existentes permitem simulações de transacções em bolsas de energia, negociação de preços através de contratos bilaterais, e análises técnicas a redes de energia. No entanto, devido à complexidade dos sistemas eléctricos, esses simuladores apresentam algumas limitações. Esta dissertação apresenta um simulador de contratos bilaterais em mercados de energia eléctrica, sendo dando ênfase a um protocolo de ofertas alternadas, desenvolvido através da tecnologia multi-agente. Em termos sucintos, um protocolo de ofertas alternadas é um protocolo de interacção que define as regras da negociação entre um agente vendedor (por exemplo um retalhista) e um agente comprador (por exemplo um consumidor final). Aplicou-se o simulador na resolução de um caso prático, baseado em dados reais. Os resultados obtidos permitem concluir que o simulador, apesar de simplificado, pode ser uma ferramenta importante na ajuda à tomada de decisões inerentes à negociação de contratos bilaterais em mercados de electricidade.

A decision-support system based on particle swarm optimization for multiperiod hedging in electricity markets

This paper proposes a particle swarm optimization (PSO) approach to support electricity producers for multiperiod optimal contract allocation. The producer risk preference is stated by a utility function (U) expressing the tradeoff between the expectation and variance of the return. Variance estimation and expected return are based on a forecasted scenario interval determined by a price range forecasting model developed by the authors. A certain confidence level is associated to each forecasted scenario interval. The proposed model makes use of contracts with physical (spot and forward) and financial (options) settlement. PSO performance was evaluated by comparing it with a genetic algorithm-based approach. This model can be used by producers in deregulated electricity markets but can easily be adapted to load serving entities and retailers. Moreover, it can easily be adapted to the use of other type of contracts.

A long-term swarm intelligence hedging tool applied to electricity markets

This paper proposes a swarm intelligence long-term hedging tool to support electricity producers in competitive electricity markets. This tool investigates the long-term hedging opportunities available to electric power producers through the use of contracts with physical (spot and forward) and financial (options) settlement. To find the optimal portfolio the producer risk preference is stated by a utility function (U) expressing the trade-off between the expectation and the variance of the return. Variance estimation and the expected return are based on a forecasted scenario interval determined by a long-term price range forecast model, developed by the authors, whose explanation is outside the scope of this paper. The proposed tool makes use of Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO) and its performance has been evaluated by comparing it with a Genetic Algorithm (GA) based approach. To validate the risk management tool a case study, using real price historical data for mainland Spanish market, is presented to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed methodology.

A long-term risk management tool for electricity markets using swarm intelligence

This paper addresses the optimal involvement in derivatives electricity markets of a power producer to hedge against the pool price volatility. To achieve this aim, a swarm intelligence meta-heuristic optimization technique for long-term risk management tool is proposed. This tool investigates the long-term opportunities for risk hedging available for electric power producers through the use of contracts with physical (spot and forward contracts) and financial (options contracts) settlement. The producer risk preference is formulated as a utility function (U) expressing the trade-off between the expectation and the variance of the return. Variance of return and the expectation are based on a forecasted scenario interval determined by a long-term price range forecasting model. This model also makes use of particle swarm optimization (PSO) to find the best parameters allow to achieve better forecasting results. On the other hand, the price estimation depends on load forecasting. This work also presents a regressive long-term load forecast model that make use of PSO to find the best parameters as well as in price estimation. The PSO technique performance has been evaluated by comparison with a Genetic Algorithm (GA) based approach. A case study is presented and the results are discussed taking into account the real price and load historical data from mainland Spanish electricity market demonstrating the effectiveness of the methodology handling this type of problems. Finally, conclusions are dully drawn.

Sistema de fundações para postes de catenária com betão com pré-colocação de agregados (PAC)

Trabalho de Projecto de natureza científica para obtenção do grau de Mestre em Engenharia Civil

Política de humanização em serviços de saúde – contributos para a definição de indicadores

A reforma dos cuidados de saúde primários (CSP), iniciada em 2005, visa melhorar o desempenho dos centros de saúde através da reorganização dos serviços em várias unidades funcionais, no sentido de resolver os problemas tendo em conta as necessidades a satisfazer, complementando-se entre si e assumindo compromissos de acessibilidade e qualidade nos cuidados de saúde prestados. Ao mesmo tempo, são criados órgãos de gestão e governação clínica que nunca antes existiram nos CSP, envolvendo a participação da comunidade. A optimização da gestão e da governação clínica permitiu organizar os serviços de saúde em Agrupamentos de Centros de Saúde (AGES), dando-lhes poderes e responsabilidades para solucionarem problemas e tomarem as decisões acertadas e céleres, já que conhecem melhor as necessidades de saúde das populações. As relações burocráticas são substituídas por relações de contratualidade, orientadas para obter melhores resultados em saúde. Partindo destes pressupostos, o estudo realizado pretende analisar a percepção de profissionais de saúde quanto à política de humanização dos CSP, bem como, identificar/construir indicadores que avaliem essa política, sendo um estudo de carácter exploratório e descritivo, à luz de uma abordagem qualitativa. Participaram neste estudo cinco profissionais de saúde da Administração Regional de Saúde (ARS) do Norte, lP, do Departamento de Contratualização, Departamento de Estudos e Planeamento da ARS Norte e do AGES Tâmega 11 - Vale Sousa Sul, seleccionados por conveniência e inquiridos por entrevista semi-estruturada. Os dados foram tratados através da análise de conteúdo com o apoio informático NVivo9. Os resultados apresentados, com base nas entrevistas realizadas aos participantes no estudo, sustentam que os actuais indicadores quantitativos contratualizados com as unidades funcionais, expressam a política de humanização num serviço de saúde, não coincidindo totalmente com as definições internacionais expressas neste estudo.