915 resultados para Labor party
Resumo:
China's market-oriented labor market reform has been in place for about one and a half decades. This study uses individual data for 1981 and 1987 to examine the success of the first half of the reform program. Success is evaluated by examining changes in the wage setting structure in the state-owned sector over the reform period. Have the market reforms stimulated worker incentives by increasing the returns to human capital acquisition? Has the wage structure altered to more closely mimic that of a market economy? In 1987, there is evidence of a structural change in the system of wage determination, with slightly increased rates of return to human capital. However, changes in industrial wage differentials appear to play the dominant role. It is argued that this may be due to labor market reforms, in particular the introduction of the profit related bonus scheme.J. Comp. Econom.,December 1997,25(3), pp. 403–421. Australian National University, Canberra, ACT0200, Australia and University of Tasmania, Hobart, Tasmania, Australia, and University of Aberdeen, Old Aberdeen, Scotland AB24 3QY.
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Related-party (RP) transactions are said to be commonly used opportunistically in business and contribute to corporate failures. While periodic disclosure is widely accepted as an effective means of monitoring such transactions, research is scant, particularly in countries where business dealings may be more susceptible to corruption. This study investigates the nature and extent of corporate RP disclosures across six countries in the Asia-Pacific region. The key finding indicates that companies in countries with stronger regulatory enforcement, shareholders’ protection, and control for corruption, have more transparent RP disclosures. This evidence potentially contributes to reforms aimed at strengthening RP disclosure and compliance.
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This article considers recent cases on guarantees of business loans to identify the lending practices that led the court to set aside the guarantee as against the creditor on the basis that the creditor had engaged in unconscionable conduct. It also explores the role of industry codes of practice in preventing unconscionable conduct, including whether there is a correlation between commitment to an industry code and higher standards of lending practices; whether compliance with an industry code would have produced different outcomes in the cases considered; and whether lenders need to do more than comply with an industry code to ensure their practices are fair and reasonable.
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Growing up, my family worshipped at the altar of unionism. My parents embraced ‘working class’ as an active social position not as a step on the aspirational treadmill. In those days and in the areas where I lived, it was nothing special. It was a given that everyone was in a union and voted Labor, manning factories and building sites and marching or striking when the need arose...
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Poor complaint management may result in organizations losing customers and revenue. Consumers exhibit negative emotional responses when dissatisfied and this may lead to a complaint to a third-party organization. Since little information is available on the role of emotion in the consumer complaint process or how to manage complaints effectively, we offer an emotions perspective by applying Affective Events Theory (AET) to complaint behavior. This study presents the first application of AET in a consumption context and advances a theoretical framework supported by qualitative research for emotional responses to complaints. In contrast to commonly held views on gender and emotion, men as well as women use emotion-focused coping to complain.
Resumo:
Classical results in unconditionally secure multi-party computation (MPC) protocols with a passive adversary indicate that every n-variate function can be computed by n participants, such that no set of size t < n/2 participants learns any additional information other than what they could derive from their private inputs and the output of the protocol. We study unconditionally secure MPC protocols in the presence of a passive adversary in the trusted setup (‘semi-ideal’) model, in which the participants are supplied with some auxiliary information (which is random and independent from the participant inputs) ahead of the protocol execution (such information can be purchased as a “commodity” well before a run of the protocol). We present a new MPC protocol in the trusted setup model, which allows the adversary to corrupt an arbitrary number t < n of participants. Our protocol makes use of a novel subprotocol for converting an additive secret sharing over a field to a multiplicative secret sharing, and can be used to securely evaluate any n-variate polynomial G over a field F, with inputs restricted to non-zero elements of F. The communication complexity of our protocol is O(ℓ · n 2) field elements, where ℓ is the number of non-linear monomials in G. Previous protocols in the trusted setup model require communication proportional to the number of multiplications in an arithmetic circuit for G; thus, our protocol may offer savings over previous protocols for functions with a small number of monomials but a large number of multiplications.
Resumo:
Secure multi-party computation (MPC) protocols enable a set of n mutually distrusting participants P 1, ..., P n , each with their own private input x i , to compute a function Y = F(x 1, ..., x n ), such that at the end of the protocol, all participants learn the correct value of Y, while secrecy of the private inputs is maintained. Classical results in the unconditionally secure MPC indicate that in the presence of an active adversary, every function can be computed if and only if the number of corrupted participants, t a , is smaller than n/3. Relaxing the requirement of perfect secrecy and utilizing broadcast channels, one can improve this bound to t a < n/2. All existing MPC protocols assume that uncorrupted participants are truly honest, i.e., they are not even curious in learning other participant secret inputs. Based on this assumption, some MPC protocols are designed in such a way that after elimination of all misbehaving participants, the remaining ones learn all information in the system. This is not consistent with maintaining privacy of the participant inputs. Furthermore, an improvement of the classical results given by Fitzi, Hirt, and Maurer indicates that in addition to t a actively corrupted participants, the adversary may simultaneously corrupt some participants passively. This is in contrast to the assumption that participants who are not corrupted by an active adversary are truly honest. This paper examines the privacy of MPC protocols, and introduces the notion of an omnipresent adversary, which cannot be eliminated from the protocol. The omnipresent adversary can be either a passive, an active or a mixed one. We assume that up to a minority of participants who are not corrupted by an active adversary can be corrupted passively, with the restriction that at any time, the number of corrupted participants does not exceed a predetermined threshold. We will also show that the existence of a t-resilient protocol for a group of n participants, implies the existence of a t’-private protocol for a group of n′ participants. That is, the elimination of misbehaving participants from a t-resilient protocol leads to the decomposition of the protocol. Our adversary model stipulates that a MPC protocol never operates with a set of truly honest participants (which is a more realistic scenario). Therefore, privacy of all participants who properly follow the protocol will be maintained. We present a novel disqualification protocol to avoid a loss of privacy of participants who properly follow the protocol.
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In ASIC v Atlantic 3 Financial (Aust) Pty Ltd [2006] QCA 540 the Queensland Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal from the decision of Mullins J at first instance in ASIC v Atlantic 3 Financial (Aust) Pty LTd [2006] QSC 152, the majority concluding that the client agreement in issue was not inconsistent with s48 of the Queensland Law Society Act 1952.
Resumo:
In Kimtran Pty Ltd v Downie [2003] QDC 043 the court allowed in part an appeal from the refusal by the Queensland Building Tribunal to order the respondent liquidators pay the appellants' costs of proceedings in the Tribunal. The decision involved an examination of authorities which have considered the circumstances in which it is in the interests of justice to make an order for costs against a non-party.
Resumo:
The decision in Hook v Boreham & QBE Insurance (Australia) Limited [2006] QDC 304 considered whether the court should go further than order that costs be assessed on the indemnity basis, but should also specify the basis by which those indemnity costs should be determined. The decision makes it clear that under r704(3) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules, questions of that nature are ordinarily preserved to the discretion of the Registrar.
Semiparametric estimates of the supply and demand effects of disability on labor force participation
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This paper modifies and uses the semiparametric methods of Ichimura and Lee (1991) on standard cross-section data to decompose the effect of disability on labor force participation into a demand and a supply effect. It shows that straightforward use of Ichimura and Lee leads to meaningless results while imposing monotonicity on the unknown function leads to substantial results. The paper finds that supply effects dominate the demand effects of disability.
Resumo:
Multi-party key agreement protocols indirectly assume that each principal equally contributes to the final form of the key. In this paper we consider three malleability attacks on multi-party key agreement protocols. The first attack, called strong key control allows a dishonest principal (or a group of principals) to fix the key to a pre-set value. The second attack is weak key control in which the key is still random, but the set from which the key is drawn is much smaller than expected. The third attack is named selective key control in which a dishonest principal (or a group of dishonest principals) is able to remove a contribution of honest principals to the group key. The paper discusses the above three attacks on several key agreement protocols, including DH (Diffie-Hellman), BD (Burmester-Desmedt) and JV (Just-Vaudenay). We show that dishonest principals in all three protocols can weakly control the key, and the only protocol which does not allow for strong key control is the DH protocol. The BD and JV protocols permit to modify the group key by any pair of neighboring principals. This modification remains undetected by honest principals.
Resumo:
We study the natural problem of secure n-party computation (in the passive, computationally unbounded attack model) of the n-product function f G (x 1,...,x n ) = x 1 ·x 2 ⋯ x n in an arbitrary finite group (G,·), where the input of party P i is x i ∈ G for i = 1,...,n. For flexibility, we are interested in protocols for f G which require only black-box access to the group G (i.e. the only computations performed by players in the protocol are a group operation, a group inverse, or sampling a uniformly random group element). Our results are as follows. First, on the negative side, we show that if (G,·) is non-abelian and n ≥ 4, then no ⌈n/2⌉-private protocol for computing f G exists. Second, on the positive side, we initiate an approach for construction of black-box protocols for f G based on k-of-k threshold secret sharing schemes, which are efficiently implementable over any black-box group G. We reduce the problem of constructing such protocols to a combinatorial colouring problem in planar graphs. We then give two constructions for such graph colourings. Our first colouring construction gives a protocol with optimal collusion resistance t < n/2, but has exponential communication complexity O(n*2t+1^2/t) group elements (this construction easily extends to general adversary structures). Our second probabilistic colouring construction gives a protocol with (close to optimal) collusion resistance t < n/μ for a graph-related constant μ ≤ 2.948, and has efficient communication complexity O(n*t^2) group elements. Furthermore, we believe that our results can be improved by further study of the associated combinatorial problems.
Impact of child labor on academic performance : evidence from the program "Edúcame Primero Colombia"
Resumo:
In this study, the effects of different variables of child labor on academic performance are investigated. To this end, 3302 children participating in the child labor eradication program “Edúcame Primero Colombia” were interviewed. The interview format used for the children's enrollment into the program was a template from which socioeconomic conditions, academic performance, and child labor variables were evaluated. The academic performance factor was determined using the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP). The data were analyzed through a logistic regression model that took into account children who engaged in a type of labor (n = 921). The results showed that labor conditions, the number of weekly hours dedicated to work, and the presence of work scheduled in the morning negatively affected the academic performance of child laborers. These results show that the relationship between child labor and academic performance is based on the conflict between these two activities. These results do not indicate a linear and simple relationship associated with the recognition of the presence or absence of child labor. This study has implications for the formulation of policies, programs, and interventions for preventing, eradicating, and attenuating the negative effects of child labor on the social and educational development of children.
Resumo:
The debate about the democratic significance of these trends—a more aggressively inquisitorial media environment, greater public participation in political communication, a more accessible and transparent (at least in appearance) political class—continues, not least in Australia. This essay was written in the first half of 2013, a time of extreme political volatility in Australia, and in the run-up to a general election following three years of minority Labor government. By that stage in the political cycle, Prime Minister Julia Gillard had survived not one but two attempts at leadership “spills”, ministers had resigned or been sacked for disloyalty to the leader, major policy initiatives had been dumped, reversed or quietly dropped, and a Coalition opposition was confidently looking forward to a landslide majority in the election of September that year. Labor’s internal party turmoil, rather than the Coalition’s policy prospectus (which remained sketchy and vague right up to the eve of the election), were widely assumed to be the cause of the former’s poor standing in the opinion polls.