Enforcing international financial standards in Brazil: limits and possibilities for adoption of IOSCO principles

Foreign capital and institutional investors play a key role in the Brazilian capital and financial markets. Internationally promoted regulatory patterns, especially IOSCO principles, have been increasingly influencing administrative rule making by the Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission (CVM) as well as the adoption of transnational rules in Brazil by means of self-regulatory activity. Even though there is a certain level of convergence of market regulatory standards at the transnational level, implementation and enforcement of rules remains essentially domestic. We analyze two case studies regarding the transposition of international standards into the Brazilian legal system, which illustrate this tension between the transnational and domestic dimensions of financial markets regulation. The first case concerns a CVM rule on disclosure of executive compensation and the its interpretation by local courts. The second case refers to the adoption of suitability rules.

Knowledge disclosure as a weapon in technological change battles: straight shot or backfire?

This work aims at evaluating how effective is knowledge disclosure in attenuating institutional negative reactions caused by uncertainties brought by firms’ new strategies that respond to novel technologies. The empirical setting is from an era of technological ferment, the period of the introduction of the voice over internet protocol (VoIP) in the USA in the early 2000’s. This technology led to the convergence of the wireline telecommu- nications and cable television industries. The Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (also known as the I/B/E/S system) was used to capture reactions of securities analysts, a revealed important source of institutional pressure on firms’ strategies. For assessing knowledge disclosure, a coding technique and a established content analysis framework were used to quantitatively measure the non-numerical and unstructured data of transcripts of business events occurred at that time. Eventually, several binary response models were tested in order to assess the effect of knowledge disclosure on the probability of institutional positive reactions. The findings are that the odds of favorable institutional reactions increase when a specific kind of knowledge is disclosed. It can be concluded that knowledge disclosure can be considered as a weapon in technological changes situations, attenuating adverse institutional reactions to the companies’ strategies in environments of technological changes.

An essay on impression management: three randomized experiments with financial analysts

This thesis aims to explore the concept of impression management from the financial analysts’ point of view. Impression management is the definition of the act of an agent manipulating an impression that another person have of this agent, in the context of this thesis it happens when a company make graphics to disclosure financial-accounting information in order to manipulate the market’s perception of their performance. Three types of impression management were analyzed: presentation enhancement (color manipulation), measurement distortion (scale manipulation) and selectivity (the disclosure of positive information only). While presentation enhancement improved only the most impulsive financial analysts’ perception of firm’s performance, the measurement distortion improved the perception of performance for both groups of financial analysts (impulsive and reflective). Finally, selectivity improved the financial analysts’ perception of firm’s performance for both groups (impulsive and reflective), although impulsive financial analysts assigned lower ratings when compared to their reflective peers, on average, to a hypothetical company.

Compliance com os requisitos de divulgação do IFRS - International Financial Reporting Standards e sua relação com o erro de previsão dos analistas de mercado

O objetivo deste estudo é fazer uma análise da relação entre o erro de previsão dos analistas de mercado quanto à rentabilidade das empresas listadas na BM&FBOVESPA S.A. (Bovespa) e os requerimentos de divulgação do International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Isto foi feito através da regressão do erro de previsão dos analistas, utilizando a metodologia de dados em painel no ano de implantação do IFRS no Brasil, 2010, e, complementarmente em 2012, para referenciamento desses dados. Partindo desse pressuposto, foi determinado o erro de previsão das empresas listadas na Bovespa através de dados de rentabilidade (índice de lucro por ação/earnings per share) previstos e realizados, disponíveis nas bases de dados I/B/E/S Earnings Consensus Information, providos pela plataforma Thomson ONE Investment Banking e Economática Pro®, respectivamente. Os resultados obtidos indicam uma relação negativa entre o erro de previsão e o cumprimento dos requisitos de divulgação do IFRS, ou seja, quanto maior a qualidade nas informações divulgadas, menor o erro de previsão dos analistas. Portanto, esses resultados sustentam a perspectiva de que o grau de cumprimento das normas contábeis é tão ou mais importante do que as próprias normas. Adicionalmente, foi verificado que quando a empresa listada na BM&FBOVESPA é vinculada a Agência Reguladora, seu erro de previsão não é alterado. Por fim, esses resultados sugerem que é importante que haja o aprimoramento dos mecanismos de auditoria das firmas quanto ao cumprimento dos requerimentos normativos de divulgação, tais como: penalidades pela não observância da norma (enforcement), estruturas de governança corporativa e auditorias interna e externa.

Discretionary-based disclosure: evidence from the Brazilian market

The primary objective of this paper is to identify the factors that explain Brazilian companies level of voluntary disclosure. Underpinning this work is the Discretionary-based Disclosure theory. The sample is composed of the top 100 largest non-financial companies listed in the Bolsa de Valores de São Paulo (Brazilian Securities, Commodities, and Futures exchange - BOVESPA). Information was gathered from Financial Statements for the years ending in 2006, 2007, and 2008, with the use of content analysis. A disclosure framework based on 27 studies from these years was created, with a total of 92 voluntary items divided into two dimensions: economic (43) and socio-environmental (49). Based on the existing literature, a total of 12 hypotheses were elaborated and tested using a panel data approach. Results evidence that: (a) Sector and Origin of Control are statistically significant in all three models tested: economic, socio-environmental, and total; (b) Profitability is relevant in the economic model and in the total model; (c) Tobin s Q is relevant in the socio-environmental model and in the total disclosure model; (d) Leverage and Auditing Firm are only relevant in the economic disclosure model; (e) Size, Governance, Stock Issuing, Growth Opportunities and Concentration of Control are not statistically significant in any of the three models.

Essays on behavioral aspects of the design and disclosure of compensation contracts

This thesis consists of four essays on the design and disclosure of compensation contracts. Essays 1, 2 and 3 focus on behavioral aspects of mandatory compensation disclosure rules and of contract negotiations in agency relationships. The three experimental studies develop psychology- based theory and present results that deviate from standard economic predictions. Furthermore, the results of Essay 1 and 2 also have implications for firms’ discretion in how to communicate their top management’s incentives to the capital market. Essay 4 analyzes the role of fairness perceptions for the evaluation of executive compensation. For this purpose, two surveys targeting representative eligible voters as well as investment professionals were conducted. Essay 1 investigates the role of the detailed ‘Compensation Discussion and Analysis’, which is part of the Security and Exchange Commission’s 2006 regulation, on investors’ evaluations of executive performance. Compensation disclosure complying with this regulation clarifies the relationship between realized reported compensation and the underlying performance measures and their target achievement levels. The experimental findings suggest that the salient presentation of executives’ incentives inherent in the ‘Compensation Discussion and Analysis’ makes investors’ performance evaluations less outcome dependent. Therefore, investors’ judgment and investment decisions might be less affected by noisy environmental factors that drive financial performance. The results also suggest that fairness perceptions of compensation contracts are essential for investors’ performance evaluations in that more transparent disclosure increases the perceived fairness of compensation and the performance evaluation of managers who are not responsible for a bad financial performance. These results have important practical implications as firms might choose to communicate their top management’s incentive compensation more transparently in order to benefit from less volatile expectations about their future performance. Similar to the first experiment, the experiment described in Essay 2 addresses the question of more transparent compensation disclosure. However, other than the first experiment, the second experiment does not analyze the effect of a more salient presentation of contract information but the informational effect of contract information itself. For this purpose, the experiment tests two conditions in which the assessment of the compensation contracts’ incentive compatibility, which determines executive effort, is either possible or not. On the one hand, the results suggest that the quality of investors’ expectations about executive effort is improved, but on the other hand investors might over-adjust their prior expectations about executive effort if being confronted with an unexpected financial performance and under-adjust if the financial performance confirms their prior expectations. Therefore, in the experiment, more transparent compensation disclosure does not lead to more correct overall judgments of executive effort and to even lower processing quality of outcome information. These results add to the literature on disclosure which predominantly advocates more transparency. The findings of the experiment however, identify decreased information processing quality as a relevant disclosure cost category. Firms might therefore carefully evaluate the additional costs and benefits of more transparent compensation disclosure. Together with the results from the experiment in Essay 1, the two experiments on compensation disclosure imply that firms should rather focus on their discretion how to present their compensation disclosure to benefit from investors’ improved fairness perceptions and their spill-over on performance evaluation. Essay 3 studies the behavioral effects of contextual factors in recruitment processes that do not affect the employer’s or the applicant’s bargaining power from a standard economic perspective. In particular, the experiment studies two common characteristics of recruitment processes: Pre-contractual competition among job applicants and job applicants’ non-binding effort announcements as they might be made during job interviews. Despite the standard economic irrelevance of these factors, the experiment develops theory regarding the behavioral effects on employees’ subsequent effort provision and the employers’ contract design choices. The experimental findings largely support the predictions. More specifically, the results suggest that firms can benefit from increased effort and, therefore, may generate higher profits. Further, firms may seize a larger share of the employment relationship’s profit by highlighting the competitive aspects of the recruitment process and by requiring applicants to make announcements about their future effort. Finally, Essay 4 studies the role of fairness perceptions for the public evaluation of executive compensation. Although economic criteria for the design of incentive compensation generally do not make restrictive recommendations with regard to the amount of compensation, fairness perceptions might be relevant from the perspective of firms and standard setters. This is because behavioral theory has identified fairness as an important determinant of individuals’ judgment and decisions. However, although fairness concerns about executive compensation are often stated in the popular media and even in the literature, evidence on the meaning of fairness in the context of executive compensation is scarce and ambiguous. In order to inform practitioners and standard setters whether fairness concerns are exclusive to non-professionals or relevant for investment professionals as well, the two surveys presented in Essay 4 aim to find commonalities in the opinions of representative eligible voters and investments professionals. The results suggest that fairness is an important criterion for both groups. Especially, exposure to risk in the form of the variable compensation share is an important criterion shared by both groups. The higher the assumed variable share, the higher is the compensation amount to be perceived as fair. However, to a large extent, opinions on executive compensation depend on personality characteristics, and to some extent, investment professionals’ perceptions deviate systematically from those of non-professionals. The findings imply that firms might benefit from emphasizing the riskiness of their managers’ variable pay components and, therefore, the findings are also in line with those of Essay 1.

CPA audit quality : status of actions taken to improve auditing and financial reporting of public companies : report to the chairman, Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of Representatives /

"B-233641"-- P. [1].

Strengthening the supervision and regulation of the depository institutions : hearings before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, United States Senate, One Hundred Second Congress, first session, on reform federal deposit insurance, protect the deposit insurance funds, and improve supervision and regulation of and disclosure relating to federally insured depository institutions ....

"February 26, 1991 ... April 23, 1991"--Vol. 1. "April 25, 1991 ... November 25, 1991"--Vol. 2.

Is the risk of product market predation a cost of disclosure?

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Washington, 2016-06