896 resultados para False consciousness
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In this paper we present an improved model for line and edge detection in cortical area V1. This model is based on responses of simple and complex cells, and it is multi-scale with no free parameters. We illustrate the use of the multi-scale line/edge representation in different processes: visual reconstruction or brightness perception, automatic scale selection and object segregation. A two-level object categorization scenario is tested in which pre-categorization is based on coarse scales only and final categorization on coarse plus fine scales. We also present a multi-scale object and face recognition model. Processing schemes are discussed in the framework of a complete cortical architecture. The fact that brightness perception and object recognition may be based on the same symbolic image representation is an indication that the entire (visual) cortex is involved in consciousness.
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Epistemology in philosophy of mind is a difficult endeavor. Those who believe that our phenomenal life is different from other domains suggest that self-knowledge about phenomenal properties is certain and therefore privileged. Usually, this so called privileged access is explained by the idea that we have direct access to our phenomenal life. This means, in contrast to perceptual knowledge, self-knowledge is non-inferential. It is widely believed that, this kind of directness involves two different senses: an epistemic sense and a metaphysical sense. Proponents of this view often claim that this is due to the fact that we are acquainted with our current experiences. The acquaintance thesis, therefore, is the backbone in justifying privileged access. Unfortunately the whole approach has a profound flaw. For the thesis to work, acquaintance has to be a genuine explanation. Since it is usually assumed that any knowledge relation between judgments and the corresponding objects are merely causal and contingent (e.g. in perception), the proponent of the privileged access view needs to show that acquaintance can do the job. In this thesis, however, I claim that the latter cannot be done. Based on considerations introduced by Levine, I conclude that this approach involves either the introduction of ontologically independent properties or a rather obscure knowledge relation. A proper explanation, however, cannot employ either of the two options. The acquaintance thesis is, therefore, bound to fail. Since the privileged access intuition seems to be vital to epistemology within the philosophy of mind, I will explore alternative justifications. After discussing a number of options, I will focus on the so called revelation thesis. This approach states that by simply having an experience with phenomenal properties, one is in the position to know the essence of those phenomenal properties. I will argue that, after finding a solution for the controversial essence claim, this thesis is a successful replacement explanation which maintains all the virtues of the acquaintance account without necessarily introducing ontologically independent properties or an obscure knowledge relation. The overall solution consists in qualifying the essence claim in the relevant sense, leaving us with an appropriate ontology for phenomenal properties. On the one hand, this avoids employing mysterious independent properties, since this ontological view is physicalist in nature. On the other hand, this approach has the right kind of structure to explain privileged self-knowledge of our phenomenal life. My final conclusion consists in the claim that the privileged access intuition is in fact veridical. It cannot, however, be justified by the popular acquaintance approach, but rather, is explainable by the controversial revelation thesis.
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The unresolved issue of false-positive D-dimer results in the diagnostic workup of pulmonary embolism Pulmonary embolism (PE) remains a difficult diagnosis as it lacks specific symptoms and clinical signs. After the determination of the pretest PE probability by a validated clinical score, D-dimers (DD) is the initial blood test in the majority of patients whose probability is low or intermediate. The low specificity of DD results in a high number of false-positives that then require thoracic angio-CT. A new clinical decision rule, called the Pulmonary Embolism Rule-out criteria (PERC), identifies patients at such low risk that PE can be safely ruled-out without a DD test. Its safety has been confirmed in US emergency departments, but retrospective European studies showed that it would lead to 5-7% of undiagnosed PE. Alternative strategies are needed to reduce the proportion of false-positive DD results.
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This study applies a Marxist theoretical paradigm to examine the working conditions of greenhouse workers in the Niagara Region, and the range of factors that bear upon the formation of their class-consciousness. The Niagara greenhouse industry represents one of the most developed horticultural regions in Canada and plays a prominent role in the local economy. The industry generates substantial revenues and employs a significant number of people, yet the greenhouse workers are paid one of the lowest rates in the region. Being classified as agricultural workers, the greenhouse employees are exempted from many provisions of federal and provincial labour regulations. Under the current provincial statutes, agricultural workers in Ontario are denied the right to organize and bargain collectively. Except for a few technical and managerial positions, the greenhouse industry employs mostly low-skilled workers who are subjected to poor working conditions that stem from the employer's attempts to adapt to larger structural imperatives of the capitalist economy. While subjected to these poor working conditions, the greenhouse workers are also affected by objectively alienated social relations and by ruling class ideological domination and hegemony. These two sets of factors arise from the inherent conflict of interests between wage-labour and capital but also militate against the development of class-consciousness. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 12 greenhouse workers to examine the role played by their material circumstances in the formulation of their social and political views as well as the extent to which they are aware of their class location and class interests. The hegemonic notions of 'common sense' acted as impediments to formation of classconsciousness. The greenhouse workers have virtually no opportunities to access alternative perspectives that would address the issues associated with exploitation in production and offer solutions leading to 'social justice'. Fonnidable challenges confront any organized political body seeking to improve the conditions of the working people.
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It is our intention in the course of the development of this thesis to give an account of how intersubjectivity is "eidetically" constituted by means of the application of the phenomenological reduction to our experience in the context of the thought of Edmund Husserl; contrasted with various representative thinkers in what H. Spiegelberg refers to as "the wider scene" of phenomenology. That is to say, we intend to show those structures of both consciousness and the relation which man has to the world which present themselves as the generic conditions for the possibility of overcoming our "radical sol itude" in order that we may gain access to the mental 1 ife of an Other as other human subject. It is clear that in order for us to give expression to these accounts in a coherent manner, along with their relative merits, it will be necessary to develop the common features of any phenomenological theory of consdousness whatever. Therefore, our preliminary inquiry, subordinate to the larger theme, shall be into some of the epistemological results of the application of the phenomenological method used to develop a transcendental theory of consciousness. Inherent in this will be the deliniation of the exigency for making this an lIintentional ll theory. We will then be able to see how itis possible to overcome transcendentally the Other as an object merely given among other merely given objects, and further, how this other is constituted specifically as other ego. The problem of transcendental intersubjectivity and its constitution in experience can be viewed as one of the most compelling, if not the most polemical of issues in phenomenology. To be sure, right from the beginning we are forced to ask a number of questions regarding Husserl's responses to the problem within the context of the methodological genesis of the Cartesian Meditations, and The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. This we do in order to set the stage for amplification. First, we ask, has Husserl lived up to his goal, in this connexion, of an apodictic result? We recall that in his Logos article of 1911 he adminished that previous philosophy does not have at its disposal a merely incomplete and, in particular instances, imperfect doctrinal system; it simply has none whatever. Each and every question is herein controverted, each position is a matter of individual conviction, of the interpretation given byaschool, of a "point of view". 1. Moreover in the same article he writes that his goal is a philosophical system of doctrine that, after the gigantic preparatory work. of generations, really be- . gins from the ground up with a foundation free from doubt and rises up like any skilful construction, wherein stone is set upon store, each as solid as the other, in accord with directive insights. 2. Reflecting upon the fact that he foresaw "preparatory work of generations", we perhaps should not expect that he would claim that his was the last word on the matter of intersubjectivity. Indeed, with 2. 'Edmund Husserl, lIPhilosophy as a Rigorous Science" in Phenomenology and theCrisis6fPhilosophy, trans". with an introduction by Quentin Lauer (New York.: Harper & Row, 1965) pp. 74 .. 5. 2Ibid . pp. 75 .. 6. 3. the relatively small amount of published material by Husserl on the subject we can assume that he himself was not entirely satisfied with his solution. The second question we have is that if the transcendental reduction is to yield the generic and apodictic structures of the relationship of consciousness to its various possible objects, how far can we extend this particular constitutive synthetic function to intersubjectivity where the objects must of necessity always remain delitescent? To be sure, the type of 'object' here to be considered is unlike any other which might appear in the perceptual field. What kind of indubitable evidence will convince us that the characteristic which we label "alter-ego" and which we attribute to an object which appears to resemble another body which we have never, and can never see the whole of (namely, our own bodies), is nothing more than a cleverly contrived automaton? What;s the nature of this peculiar intentional function which enables us to say "you think just as I do"? If phenomenology is to take such great pains to reduce the takenfor- granted, lived, everyday world to an immanent world of pure presentation, we must ask the mode of presentation for transcendent sub .. jectivities. And in the end, we must ask if Husserl's argument is not reducible to a case (however special) of reasoning by analogy, and if so, tf this type of reasoning is not so removed from that from whtch the analogy is made that it would render all transcendental intersubjective understandtng impos'sible? 2. HistoticalandEidetic Priority: The Necessity of Abstraction 4. The problem is not a simple one. What is being sought are the conditions for the poss ibili:ty of experi encing other subjects. More precisely, the question of the possibility of intersubjectivity is the question of the essence of intersubjectivity. What we are seeking is the absolute route from one solitude to another. Inherent in this programme is the ultimate discovery of the meaning of community. That this route needs be lIabstract" requires some explanation. It requires little explanation that we agree with Husserl in the aim of fixing the goal of philosophy on apodictic, unquestionable results. This means that we seek a philosophical approach which is, though, not necessarily free from assumptions, one which examines and makes explicit all assumptions in a thorough manner. It would be helpful at this point to distinguish between lIeidetic ll priority, and JlhistoricallJpriority in order to shed some light on the value, in this context, of an abstraction.3 It is true that intersubjectivity is mundanely an accomplished fact, there havi.ng been so many mi.llions of years for humans to beIt eve in the exi s tence of one another I s abili ty to think as they do. But what we seek is not to study how this proceeded historically, but 3Cf• Maurice Natanson;·TheJburne in 'Self, a Stud in Philoso h and Social Role (Santa Cruz, U. of California Press, 1970 . rather the logical, nay, "psychological" conditions under which this is possible at all. It is therefore irrelevant to the exigesis of this monograph whether or not anyone should shrug his shoulders and mumble IIwhy worry about it, it is always already engaged". By way of an explanation of the value of logical priority, we can find an analogy in the case of language. Certainly the language 5. in a spoken or written form predates the formulation of the appropriate grammar. However, this grammar has a logical priority insofar as it lays out the conditions from which that language exhibits coherence. The act of formulating the grammar is a case of abstraction. The abstraction towards the discovery of the conditions for the poss; bi 1 ity of any experiencing whatever, for which intersubjective experience is a definite case, manifests itself as a sort of "grammar". This "grammar" is like the basic grammar of a language in the sense that these "rulesil are the ~ priori conditions for the possibility of that experience. There is, we shall say, an "eidetic priority", or a generic condition which is the logical antecedent to the taken-forgranted object of experience. In the case of intersubjectivity we readily grant that one may mundanely be aware of fellow-men as fellowmen, but in order to discover how that awareness is possible it is necessary to abstract from the mundane, believed-in experience. This process of abstraction is the paramount issue; the first step, in the search for an apodictic basis for social relations. How then is this abstraction to be accomplished? What is the nature of an abstraction which would permit us an Archimedean point, absolutely grounded, from which we may proceed? The answer can be discovered in an examination of Descartes in the light of Husserl's criticism. 3. The Impulse for Scientific Philosophy. The Method to which it Gives Rise. 6. Foremost in our inquiry is the discovery of a method appropriate to the discovery of our grounding point. For the purposes of our investigations, i.e., that of attempting to give a phenomenological view of the problem of intersubjectivity, it would appear to be of cardinal importance to trace the attempt of philosophy predating Husserl, particularly in the philosophy of Descartes, at founding a truly IIscientific ll philosophy. Paramount in this connexion would be the impulse in the Modern period, as the result of more or less recent discoveries in the natural sciences, to found philosophy upon scientific and mathematical principles. This impulse was intended to culminate in an all-encompassing knowledge which might extend to every realm of possible thought, viz., the universal science ot IIMathexis Universalis ll •4 This was a central issue for Descartes, whose conception of a universal science would include all the possible sciences of man. This inclination towards a science upon which all other sciences might be based waS not to be belittled by Husserl, who would appropriate 4This term, according to Jacab Klein, was first used by Barocius, the translator of Proclus into Latin, to designate the highest mathematical discipline. . 7. it himself in hopes of establishing, for the very first time, philosophy as a "rigorous science". It bears emphasizing that this in fact was the drive for the hardening of the foundations of philosophy, the link between the philosophical projects of Husserl and those of the philosophers of the modern period. Indeed, Husserl owes Descartes quite a debt for indicating the starting place from which to attempt a radical, presupositionless, and therefore scientific philosophy, in order not to begin philosophy anew, but rather for the first time.5 The aim of philosophy for Husserl is the search for apodictic, radical certitude. However while he attempted to locate in experience the type of necessity which is found in mathematics, he wished this necessity to be a function of our life in the world, as opposed to the definition and postulation of an axiomatic method as might be found in the unexpurgated attempts to found philosophy in Descartes. Beyond the necessity which is involved in experiencing the world, Husserl was searching for the certainty of roots, of the conditi'ons which underl ie experience and render it pOssible. Descartes believed that hi~ MeditatiOns had uncovered an absolute ground for knowledge, one founded upon the ineluctable givenness of thinking which is present even when one doubts thinking. Husserl, in acknowledging this procedure is certainly Cartesian, but moves, despite this debt to Descartes, far beyond Cartesian philosophy i.n his phenomenology (and in many respects, closer to home). 5Cf. Husserl, Philosophy as a Rigorous Science, pp. 74ff. 8 But wherein lies this Cartesian jumping off point by which we may vivify our theme? Descartes, through inner reflection, saw that all of his convictions and beliefs about the world were coloured in one way or another by prejudice: ... at the end I feel constrained to reply that there is nothing in a all that I formerly believed to be true, of which I cannot in some measure doubt, and that not merely through want of thought or through levity, but for reasons which are very powerful and maturely considered; so that henceforth I ought not the less carefully to refrain from giving credence to these opinions than to that which is manifestly false, if I desire to arrive at any certainty (in the sciences). 6 Doubts arise regardless of the nature of belief - one can never completely believe what one believes. Therefore, in order to establish absolutely grounded knowledge, which may serve as the basis fora "universal Science", one must use a method by which one may purge oneself of all doubts and thereby gain some radically indubitable insight into knowledge. Such a method, gescartes found, was that, as indicated above by hi,s own words, of II radical doubt" which "forbids in advance any judgemental use of (previous convictions and) which forbids taking any position with regard to their val idi'ty. ,,7 This is the method of the "sceptical epoche ll , the method of doubting all which had heretofor 6Descartes,Meditations on First Philosophy, first Med., (Libera 1 Arts Press, New York, 1954) trans. by L. LaFl eur. pp. 10. 7Husserl ,CrisiS of Eliroeari SCiences and Trariscendental Phenomenology, (Northwestern U. Press, Evanston, 1 7 ,p. 76. 9. been considered as belonging to the world, including the world itself. What then is left over? Via the process of a thorough and all-inclusive doubting, Descartes discovers that the ego which performs the epoche, or "reduction", is excluded from these things which can be doubted, and, in principle provides something which is beyond doubt. Consequently this ego provides an absolute and apodictic starting point for founding scientific philosophy. By way of this abstention. of bel ief, Desca'rtes managed to reduce the worl d of everyday 1 ife as bel ieved in, to mere 'phenomena', components of the rescogitans:. Thus:, having discovered his Archimedean point, the existence of the ego without question, he proceeds to deduce the 'rest' of the world with the aid of innate ideas and the veracity of God. In both Husserl and Descartes the compelling problem is that of establ ishing a scientific, apodictic phi'losophy based upon presuppos itionless groundwork .. Husserl, in thi.s regard, levels the charge at Descartes that the engagement of his method was not complete, such that hi.S: starting place was not indeed presupositionless, and that the validity of both causality and deductive methods were not called into question i.'n the performance of theepoche. In this way it is easy for an absolute evidence to make sure of the ego as: a first, "absolute, indubitablyexisting tag~end of the worldll , and it is then only a matter of inferring the absolute subs.tance and the other substances which belon.g to the world, along with my own mental substance, using a logically val i d deductive procedure. 8 8Husserl, E.;' Cartesian 'Meditation;, trans. Dorion Cairns (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1970), p. 24 ff.
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The purpose of this study was to investigate the effect a human link through the One World Youth Project has on a global education program, if a human connection through the program enhances a student's ability to develop a critical consciousness of global issues, and the etTectiveness of thc constructivist-based Driver Model of Curriculum Development, which served as the curriculum model in this study. An action based research cycle was chosen as this study's research methodology and incorporated 5 qualitative data collection instruments: a) interviews and questionnaires, b) artifacts, c) teacher journal, d) critical friend's observation forms, and e) my critical friend's postobservation interviews. The data were conected from 4 student participants and my critical friend during all stages of the action research cycle. The results of this study provide educators with data on the impact of human connections in a global education program, the effects these connections have on students, and the effectiveness of the Driver Model of Curriculum Development. This study also provides practical activities and strategies that could be used by educators to develop their own global education programs. The United Nations drafted the Millennium Development Goals in an effort to improve the lives of billions of people across the globe. The eight goals were developed with the support of all member nations since all human beings are global citizens who have a responsibility to make the world a better place. Students need to develop a critical consciousness of global issues so that they can work with others to eliminate them. Students who are taught to restate the opinions of others win not be prepared to inherit a world full of challenges that will require new innovative ideas to foster positive change.
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Cette thèse s’intéresse aux effets de la conscience historique sur les négociations de l’ethnicité et la structuration des frontières intergroupes chez les enseignants d’histoire nationale au Québec. L’ambiguïté de dominance ethnique entre Francophones et Anglophones contextualise la façon dont les enseignants de ces groupes historicisent les significations du passé pour se connaître et s’orienter « ethniquement. » Selon leurs constructions des réalités intergroupes, ils peuvent promouvoir la compréhension intergroupe ou préserver une coexistence rigide. Le premier article théorise comment les capacités à historiciser le passé, ou à générer des formes de vie morales pour une orientation temporelle, soutiennent la construction de l’ethnicité. En développant un répertoire des tendances de conscience historique parallèles et égales afin de comprendre les fluctuations dans le maintien des frontières ethniques, l’article souligne l’importance de la volonté à reconnaître l’agentivité morale et historique des humains à rendre les frontières plus perméables. Le deuxième article discute d’une étude sur les attitudes intergroupes et les traitements mutuels entre des enseignants d’histoire Francophones et Anglophones. Alors que la plupart des répondants francophones sont indifférents aux réalités sociales et expériences historiques des Anglo-québécois, tous les répondants anglophones en sont conscients et enseignent celles des Franco-québécois. Cette divergence implique une dissemblance dans la manière dont les relations intergroupes passées sont historicisées. La non-reconnaissance de l’agentivité morale et historique des Anglo-québécois peut expliquer l’indifférence des répondants francophones. Le dernier article présente une étude sur la conscience historique des enseignants d’histoire francophone à l’égard des Anglo-québécois. En mettant le répertoire de conscience historique développé à l’épreuve, l’étude se concentre sur la manière dont les répondants historicisent le changement temporel dans leurs négociations de l’ethnicité et leurs structurations des frontières. Tandis que leurs opinions sur l’« histoire » et leurs historicisations des contextes différents les amènent à renforcer des différences ethnoculturelles et à ne pas reconnaître l’agentivité morale et historique de l’Autre, presque la moitié des répondants démontre une ouverture à apprendre et transmettre les réalités et expériences anglo-québécoises. La dépendance sur les visions historiques préétablies pour construire les réalités intergroupes souligne néanmoins l’exclusion de ce dernier groupe dans le développement d’une identité nationale.
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Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal.
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HINDI
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HINDI
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HINDI
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This study examines the effects in university students of a psycho-educational program in full awareness (mindfulness) on certain personality variables. A quasi-experimental (group comparison) design with pretest and postest measurements was employed in an experimental (n = 26) and a control group (n = 27). Barratt impulsiveness Scale (BiS- 11), Acceptance and Action Questionnaire (AAQ), Social Avoidance and Distress Scale (SAD), and the Profile of Mood States (POMS) were applied to experimental and control groups. The results show statistically significant changes in impulsivity variables, experiential avoidance, social avoidance, social anxiety, tension and fatigue when comparing the posttest mean scores of the groups.
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El artículo busca demostrar las inconsistencias del pensamiento estratégico de Porter desde el punto de vista metodológico y epistemológico. De igual manera, muestra que las propuestas praxológicas de Porter son imposibles de operacionalizar y normativizar. Además, la teoría carece de factores fundamentales que permitan a las organizaciones perdurar y ser exitosas en el tiempo teniendo ventaja defendible y difícilmente imitable.
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Proporciona una introducción sobre como los niños adquieren y utilizan el lenguaje. Hace hincapié en la explicación psicológica del desarrollo del lenguaje, pero, sin olvidar, los aspectos cognitivo, biológico y social en el desarrollo de éste, y también, considera la influencia de la escolaridad y la experiencia social.