Influence of habitat on the reproductive ecology of the Amazonian palm, Mauritia flexuosa, in Roraima, Brazil

Although Mauritia flexuosa (Arecaceae) plays a pivotal role in the ecology and economy of the Amazon, and occurs in a variety of habitats, little is known about the influence of habitat on the reproductive biology of this palm. My dissertation focuses on the reproductive biology of M. flexuosa in three habitats in Roraima, Brazil: undisturbed forest, undisturbed forest-savanna ecotone, and savanna disturbed by plantations of the exotic tree, Acacia mangium. First, I calculated sex ratios and linked precipitation patterns with phenology. Sex ratios were female-biased. Precipitation was negatively associated with flowering, and positively associated with fruiting. Habitat appears to have no significant influence on phenology of M. flexuosa, although short-term climate variation may affect phenology of this species. Second, I examined floral biology, observed floral visitors, and performed exclusion experiments to determine the pollination system of M. flexuosa. Fruit set did not differ significantly between the visitor exclusion treatment and the control, but was significantly lowest in the wind + visitor exclusion treatment, suggesting that this dioecious palm is anemophilous, independent of habitat. Third, I identified the abiotic and biotic factors explaining variation in fruit mass, seed mass, seed number per fruit, and total fruit yield among habitats. Soil moisture and flooding during the wet season were the best predictors of fruit and seed output. The number of leaves, diameter at breast height, and height were all accurate predictors of reproductive output, but crown volume did not accurately predict fruit yields. Results re-evaluate traditional assumptions about wind-pollination in the tropics, and highlight abiotic and biotic factors responsible for variation in reproductive output of M. flexuosa, with implications for effective management of this palm. Finally, I interviewed harvesters and vendors to document the traditional knowledge and market dynamics of the fruit of M. flexuosa, buriti. Traditional knowledge corroborated results from scientific studies. Vendors argued that the price of buriti must increase, and must fluctuate with varying supply. With appropriate economic incentives to vendors/harvesters, Roraima may expand its market infrastructure for buriti, effectively stimulating the regional economy and practicing sustainable harvesting.

James Fitzpiers Fitzgerald, Captain Thomas Lee, and the problem of ‘secret traitors’: conflicted loyalties during the Nine Years’ War, 1594-1603

Existing evidence pertaining to Ireland’s Nine Years’ War (1594–1603) strongly lends itself to the impression that the majority of Old English Palesmen, at least those of higher social status, chose to support the English crown during this conflict rather than their co-religionist Gaelic Irish countrymen. Loyalties, however, were anything but straightforward and could depend on any number of cultural values, social concerns, and economic incentives. Nevertheless, James Fitzpiers Fitzgerald, a ‘Bastard Geraldine’ who served as sheriff of Kildare, seemed to have been driven by a genuine sense of duty to the English crown and establishment. With the outbreak of hostilities in the 1590s, Fitzpiers proved to be a devout crown servitor, risking life and limb to confront the English queen’s Irish enemies. But, in late 1598 he suddenly, and somewhat inexplicably, threw his lot in with the Irish confederacy, defying the government he had once championed. During the ensuing investigation, the Dublin administration accumulated much damning evidence against Fitzpiers, including a patriotic plea from rebel leader Hugh O’Neill which urged Fitzpiers to defend his Irish homeland from the oppressions of English Protestant rule. Yet, at the very same time, a counter case was made by Fitzpiers’s controversial English friend, Captain Thomas Lee, which argued that Fitzpiers’s actions were more loyal than anyone could have imagined. Through an examination of Fitzpiers’s perplexing case, this paper will explore the complicated nature of allegiances in 1590s Ireland and how loyalties were not always what they seemed.

The “social” aspect of social-ecological systems: a critique of analytical frameworks and findings from a multisite study of coastal sustainability

We evaluate whether society can adequately be conceptualized as a component of social-ecological systems, given social theory and the current outputs of systems-based research. A mounting critique from the social sciences posits that resilience theory has undertheorized social entities with the concept of social-ecological systems. We trace the way that use of the term has evolved, relating to social science theory. Scientometic and network analysis provide a wide range of empirical data about the origin, growth, and use of this term in academic literature. A content analysis of papers in Ecology and Society demonstrates a marked emphasis in research on institutions, economic incentives, land use, population, social networks, and social learning. These findings are supported by a review of systems science in 18 coastal assessments. This reveals that a systems-based conceptualization tends to limit the kinds of social science research favoring quantitative couplings of social and ecological components and downplaying interpretive traditions of social research. However, the concept of social-ecological systems remains relevant because of the central insights concerning the dynamic coupling between humans and the environment, and its salient critique about the need for multidisciplinary approaches to solve real world problems, drawing on heuristic devices. The findings of this study should lead to more circumspection about whether a systems approach warrants such claims to comprehensiveness. Further methodological advances are required for interdisciplinarity. Yet there is evidence that systems approaches remain highly productive and useful for considering certain social components such as land use and hybrid ecological networks. We clarify advantages and restrictions of utilizing such a concept, and propose a reformulation that supports engagement with wider traditions of research in the social sciences.

Of sets of offsets: Cumulative impacts and strategies for compensatory restoration

Biodiversity offsets are increasingly advocated as a flexible approach to managing the ecological costs of economic development. Arguably, however, this remains an area where policy-making has run ahead of science. A growing number of studies identify limitations of offsets in achieving ecologically sustainable outcomes, pointing to ethical and implementation issues that may undermine their effectiveness. We develop a novel system dynamic modelling framework to analyze the no net loss objective of development and biodiversity offsets. The modelling framework considers a marine-based example, where resource abundance depends on a habitat that is affected by a sequence of development projects, and biodiversity offsets are understood as habitat restoration actions. The model is used to explore the implications of four alternative offset management strategies for a regulator, which differ in how net loss is measured, and whether and how the cumulative impacts of development are considered. Our results confirm that, when it comes to offsets as a conservation tool, the devil lies in the details. Approaches to determining the magnitude of offsets required, as well as their timing and allocation among multiple developers, can result in potentially complex and undesired sets of economic incentives, with direct impacts on the ability to meet the overall objective of ecologically sustainable development. The approach and insights are of direct interest to conservation policy design in a broad range of marine and coastal contexts.

LA OCUPACIÓN DE DOCENTE UNIVERSITARIO Y LA REMUNERACIÓN SALARIAL: caso de los profesores de la Escuela de Bibliotecología, Documentación e Información la Universidad Nacional de Costa Rica

Este artículo muestra los principales resultados de una amplia investigación sobre los salarios de los profesionales en bibliotecología, motivo de preocupación de las autoridades de la Escuela de Bibliotecología, Documentación e Información de la Universidad Nacional desde el proceso de autoevaluación, realizado previo a la acreditación de la carrera de Bibliotecología y Documentación por parte del Sistema Nacional de Acreditación de la Educación Superior (SINAES).En esta investigación se ha demostrado la inequidad salarial que afecta al docente de la Universidad Nacional, con respecto a los salarios de los profesores de otras escuelas de bibliotecología y, también, al personal que ocupa puestos administrativos tanto en la misma Universidad Nacional como en el sector público. Los bajos salarios de los profesores y la falta de incentivos económicos en una función fundamental para una institución de enseñanza superior, no solo es motivo de disconformidad por el personal, máximo la elevada carga laboral a que es sometido en una escuela acreditada, sino que impide la contratación de profesores altamente calificados.

Influence of Habitat on the Reproductive Ecology of the Amazonian Palm, Mauritia flexuosa, in Roraima, Brazil

Although Mauritia flexuosa (Arecaceae) plays a pivotal role in the ecology and economy of the Amazon, and occurs in a variety of habitats, little is known about the influence of habitat on the reproductive biology of this palm. My dissertation focuses on the reproductive biology of M. flexuosa in three habitats in Roraima, Brazil: undisturbed forest, undisturbed forest-savanna ecotone, and savanna disturbed by plantations of the exotic tree, Acacia mangium. First, I calculated sex ratios and linked precipitation patterns with phenology. Sex ratios were female-biased. Precipitation was negatively associated with flowering, and positively associated with fruiting. Habitat appears to have no significant influence on phenology of M. flexuosa, although short-term climate variation may affect phenology of this species. Second, I examined floral biology, observed floral visitors, and performed exclusion experiments to determine the pollination system of M. flexuosa. Fruit set did not differ significantly between the visitor exclusion treatment and the control, but was significantly lowest in the wind + visitor exclusion treatment, suggesting that this dioecious palm is anemophilous, independent of habitat. Third, I identified the abiotic and biotic factors explaining variation in fruit mass, seed mass, seed number per fruit, and total fruit yield among habitats. Soil moisture and flooding during the wet season were the best predictors of fruit and seed output. The number of leaves, diameter at breast height, and height were all accurate predictors of reproductive output, but crown volume did not accurately predict fruit yields. Results re-evaluate traditional assumptions about wind-pollination in the tropics, and highlight abiotic and biotic factors responsible for variation in reproductive output of M. flexuosa, with implications for effective management of this palm. Finally, I interviewed harvesters and vendors to document the traditional knowledge and market dynamics of the fruit of M. flexuosa, buriti. Traditional knowledge corroborated results from scientific studies. Vendors argued that the price of buriti must increase, and must fluctuate with varying supply. With appropriate economic incentives to vendors/harvesters, Roraima may expand its market infrastructure for buriti, effectively stimulating the regional economy and practicing sustainable harvesting.

Evaluation of financial incentives as a quality improvement strategy in the public hospital context : clinician attitudes, design variables, and economic costs

In 2008, a three-year pilot ‘pay for performance’ (P4P) program, known as ‘Clinical Practice Improvement Payment’ (CPIP) was introduced into Queensland Health (QHealth). QHealth is a large public health sector provider of acute, community, and public health services in Queensland, Australia. The organisation has recently embarked on a significant reform agenda including a review of existing funding arrangements (Duckett et al., 2008). Partly in response to this reform agenda, a casemix funding model has been implemented to reconnect health care funding with outcomes. CPIP was conceptualised as a performance-based scheme that rewarded quality with financial incentives. This is the first time such a scheme has been implemented into the public health sector in Australia with a focus on rewarding quality, and it is unique in that it has a large state-wide focus and includes 15 Districts. CPIP initially targeted five acute and community clinical areas including Mental Health, Discharge Medication, Emergency Department, Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease, and Stroke. The CPIP scheme was designed around key concepts including the identification of clinical indicators that met the set criteria of: high disease burden, a well defined single diagnostic group or intervention, significant variations in clinical outcomes and/or practices, a good evidence, and clinician control and support (Ward, Daniels, Walker & Duckett, 2007). This evaluative research targeted Phase One of implementation of the CPIP scheme from January 2008 to March 2009. A formative evaluation utilising a mixed methodology and complementarity analysis was undertaken. The research involved three research questions and aimed to determine the knowledge, understanding, and attitudes of clinicians; identify improvements to the design, administration, and monitoring of CPIP; and determine the financial and economic costs of the scheme. Three key studies were undertaken to ascertain responses to the key research questions. Firstly, a survey of clinicians was undertaken to examine levels of knowledge and understanding and their attitudes to the scheme. Secondly, the study sought to apply Statistical Process Control (SPC) to the process indicators to assess if this enhanced the scheme and a third study examined a simple economic cost analysis. The CPIP Survey of clinicians elicited 192 clinician respondents. Over 70% of these respondents were supportive of the continuation of the CPIP scheme. This finding was also supported by the results of a quantitative altitude survey that identified positive attitudes in 6 of the 7 domains-including impact, awareness and understanding and clinical relevance, all being scored positive across the combined respondent group. SPC as a trending tool may play an important role in the early identification of indicator weakness for the CPIP scheme. This evaluative research study supports a previously identified need in the literature for a phased introduction of Pay for Performance (P4P) type programs. It further highlights the value of undertaking a formal risk assessment of clinician, management, and systemic levels of literacy and competency with measurement and monitoring of quality prior to a phased implementation. This phasing can then be guided by a P4P Design Variable Matrix which provides a selection of program design options such as indicator target and payment mechanisms. It became evident that a clear process is required to standardise how clinical indicators evolve over time and direct movement towards more rigorous ‘pay for performance’ targets and the development of an optimal funding model. Use of this matrix will enable the scheme to mature and build the literacy and competency of clinicians and the organisation as implementation progresses. Furthermore, the research identified that CPIP created a spotlight on clinical indicators and incentive payments of over five million from a potential ten million was secured across the five clinical areas in the first 15 months of the scheme. This indicates that quality was rewarded in the new QHealth funding model, and despite issues being identified with the payment mechanism, funding was distributed. The economic model used identified a relative low cost of reporting (under $8,000) as opposed to funds secured of over $300,000 for mental health as an example. Movement to a full cost effectiveness study of CPIP is supported. Overall the introduction of the CPIP scheme into QHealth has been a positive and effective strategy for engaging clinicians in quality and has been the catalyst for the identification and monitoring of valuable clinical process indicators. This research has highlighted that clinicians are supportive of the scheme in general; however, there are some significant risks that include the functioning of the CPIP payment mechanism. Given clinician support for the use of a pay–for-performance methodology in QHealth, the CPIP scheme has the potential to be a powerful addition to a multi-faceted suite of quality improvement initiatives within QHealth.

Perfectionism, Economic (dis)Incentives, and Political Coercion

May a government attempt to improve the lives of its citizens by promoting the activities it deems valuable and discouraging those it disvalues? May it engage in such a practice even when doing so is not a requirement of justice in some strict sense, and even when the judgments of value and disvalue in question are likely to be subject to controversy among its citizens? These questions have long stood at the center of debates between political perfectionists and political neutralists. In what follows I address a prominent cluster of arguments against political perfectionism—namely, arguments that focus on the coercive dimensions of state action. My main claim is simple: whatever concerns we might have about coercion, arguments from coercion fall short of supporting a thoroughgoing rejection of perfectionism, for the reason that perfectionist policies need not be coercive. Thlist challenges to this last claim.

Are local economic development incentives promoting job growth? An empirical case study

At a time when cities are competing with one another to attract or retain jobs within a globalizing economy, city governments are providing an array of financial incentives to stimulate job growth and retain existing jobs, particularly in high cost locations. This paper provides the first systematic and comprehensive analysis of datasets on economic development incentives in New York City over the last fifteen years. The evidence on job retention and creation is mixed. Although many companies do not meet their agreed-upon job targets in absolute terms, the evidence suggests that companies receiving subsidies outperform their respective industries in terms of employment growth, that is, the grow more, or decline less. We emphasize that this finding is difficult to interpret, since firms receiving incentives may not be representative of the industry as a whole. In other words, their above-average performance may simply reflect the fact that the Economic Development Corporation (EDC) selects economically promising companies within manufacturing (or other industries) when granting incentives. At the same time, it is also possible that receiving incentives helps these companies to become stronger.

Compensation, Incentives and Risk: Economic Theory and Russian Practise

Mr. Pechersky set out to examine a specific feature of the employer-employee relationship in Russian business organisations. He wanted to study to what extent the so-called "moral hazard" is being solved (if it is being solved at all), whether there is a relationship between pay and performance, and whether there is a correlation between economic theory and Russian reality. Finally, he set out to construct a model of the Russian economy that better reflects the way it actually functions than do certain other well-known models (for example models of incentive compensation, the Shapiro-Stiglitz model etc.). His report was presented to the RSS in the form of a series of manuscripts in English and Russian, and on disc, with many tables and graphs. He begins by pointing out the different examples of randomness that exist in the relationship between employee and employer. Firstly, results are frequently affected by circumstances outside the employee's control that have nothing to do with how intelligently, honestly, and diligently the employee has worked. When rewards are based on results, uncontrollable randomness in the employee's output induces randomness in their incomes. A second source of randomness involves the outside events that are beyond the control of the employee that may affect his or her ability to perform as contracted. A third source of randomness arises when the performance itself (rather than the result) is measured, and the performance evaluation procedures include random or subjective elements. Mr. Pechersky's study shows that in Russia the third source of randomness plays an important role. Moreover, he points out that employer-employee relationships in Russia are sometimes opposite to those in the West. Drawing on game theory, he characterises the Western system as follows. The two players are the principal and the agent, who are usually representative individuals. The principal hires an agent to perform a task, and the agent acquires an information advantage concerning his actions or the outside world at some point in the game, i.e. it is assumed that the employee is better informed. In Russia, on the other hand, incentive contracts are typically negotiated in situations in which the employer has the information advantage concerning outcome. Mr. Pechersky schematises it thus. Compensation (the wage) is W and consists of a base amount, plus a portion that varies with the outcome, x. So W = a + bx, where b is used to measure the intensity of the incentives provided to the employee. This means that one contract will be said to provide stronger incentives than another if it specifies a higher value for b. This is the incentive contract as it operates in the West. The key feature distinguishing the Russian example is that x is observed by the employer but is not observed by the employee. So the employer promises to pay in accordance with an incentive scheme, but since the outcome is not observable by the employee the contract cannot be enforced, and the question arises: is there any incentive for the employer to fulfil his or her promises? Mr. Pechersky considers two simple models of employer-employee relationships displaying the above type of information symmetry. In a static framework the obtained result is somewhat surprising: at the Nash equilibrium the employer pays nothing, even though his objective function contains a quadratic term reflecting negative consequences for the employer if the actual level of compensation deviates from the expectations of the employee. This can lead, for example, to labour turnover, or the expenses resulting from a bad reputation. In a dynamic framework, the conclusion can be formulated as follows: the higher the discount factor, the higher the incentive for the employer to be honest in his/her relationships with the employee. If the discount factor is taken to be a parameter reflecting the degree of (un)certainty (the higher the degree of uncertainty is, the lower is the discount factor), we can conclude that the answer to the formulated question depends on the stability of the political, social and economic situation in a country. Mr. Pechersky believes that the strength of a market system with private property lies not just in its providing the information needed to compute an efficient allocation of resources in an efficient manner. At least equally important is the manner in which it accepts individually self-interested behaviour, but then channels this behaviour in desired directions. People do not have to be cajoled, artificially induced, or forced to do their parts in a well-functioning market system. Instead, they are simply left to pursue their own objectives as they see fit. Under the right circumstances, people are led by Adam Smith's "invisible hand" of impersonal market forces to take the actions needed to achieve an efficient, co-ordinated pattern of choices. The problem is that, as Mr. Pechersky sees it, there is no reason to believe that the circumstances in Russia are right, and the invisible hand is doing its work properly. Political instability, social tension and other circumstances prevent it from doing so. Mr. Pechersky believes that the discount factor plays a crucial role in employer-employee relationships. Such relationships can be considered satisfactory from a normative point of view, only in those cases where the discount factor is sufficiently large. Unfortunately, in modern Russia the evidence points to the typical discount factor being relatively small. This fact can be explained as a manifestation of aversion to risk of economic agents. Mr. Pechersky hopes that when political stabilisation occurs, the discount factors of economic agents will increase, and the agent's behaviour will be explicable in terms of more traditional models.

Interconnector Investment for a Well-Functioning Internal Market: What EU regime of regulatory incentives? Bruges European Economic Research (BEER) Papers 18/October 2010

Sufficient cross‐border electricity transmission infrastructure is a pre‐requisite for a functioning European internal market for electricity. Also, the achievement of the EU’s energy policy objectives – sustainability, competitiveness and security of supply – critically depends on adequate investment in physical interconnections between the member states. Mainly focusing on the “regulatory path”, this paper assesses different ways to achieve a sufficient level of interconnector investment. In a first step, economic analysis identifies numerous impediments to interconnector investment adding up to an “interconnector investment failure”. Reflecting on the proper regulatory design of an EU framework able to overcome the interconnector investment failure, a number of recommendations are put forward:  All congestion rents should be channeled into interconnector building. Unused rents should be transferred to a European interconnector fund supervised by an EU agency.  Even though inherently sub‐optimal, merchant transmission investment can be used as a means to put pressure on regulated transmission system operators (TSO) that do not deliver. An EU agency should have exclusive competence on merchant interconnector exemptions.  A European TSO organization should be entrusted with supra‐national network planning, supervised by an EU agency.  The agency should decide on investment cost reallocation for interconnector projects that yield strong externalities. Payments could be settled via a European interconnector fund.  In case of non‐compliance with the supra‐national network plan, the EU agency should have the right to organize a tender – financed by the European interconnector fund – in order to get the “missing link” built. Assessing the existing EU regulatory framework, the efforts of the 2009 “third energy package” to fill the “regulatory gap” with new EU bodies – ACER and ENTSO‐E – are acknowledged. However, striking holes in regulatory framework are spotted, notably with regard to the use of congestion rents, interconnector cost allocation, and the distribution of decision making powers on new infrastructure exemptions A discussion of the TEN‐E interconnector funding scheme shows that massive funding can be an interim solution to the problem of insufficient interconnection capacities while overcoming the political deadlock on sensible regulatory topics such as interconnector cost allocation. The paper ends with policy recommendations.