L’Office des Nations Unies contre la drogue et le crime et la lutte internationale contre la corruption : perceptions des professionnels

Travail dirigé présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures et postdoctorales en vue de l’obtention du grade de Maître ès sciences (M.Sc) en Criminologie – Option sécurité intérieure

Les paradoxes de la lutte contre la corruption en Afrique : cas du Bénin et du Rwanda

Le régime politique démocratique est souvent plébiscité dans le discours général reproduit par les institutions internationales et assumé par les principaux acteurs politiques dans le monde, comme étant l’arme par excellence pour l’éradication de la corruption et une bonne gouvernance. L’analyse de deux pays africains le Bénin et le Rwanda, semble toutefois indiquer que c’est le pays avec le système le moins démocratique, à savoir le Rwanda qui réussit le mieux le pari de la lutte contre la corruption. Contre toute attente en effet, le Rwanda malgré l’autoritarisme souvent décrié de son gouvernement surclasse le Bénin, souvent applaudi pour la réussite de sa transition démocratique, en matière de lutte contre la corruption. Cette tendance est confirmée par la plupart des indicateurs de la corruption. Ce constat vient remettre en question les postulats de départ, et nous oblige alors à nous interroger sur les sources de la performance du Rwanda. Le présent mémoire vient justement démontrer que la relation entre la nature du régime politique et l’efficacité de la lutte contre la corruption est loin d’être automatique. Les règles du jeu politique à l’intérieur du régime ainsi que la qualité des institutions de lutte contre la corruption mises en place peuvent avoir une influence majeure sur le succès ou l’échec des mesures de lutte contre la corruption.

Securitización en el desierto: Una respuesta al terrorismo en Malí y en Níger, 2009 - 2013.

Este es un estudio sobre las dinámicas de seguridad en Malí durante el periodo de 2009 a 2013. La investigación busca explicar de qué manera se ha dado un proceso de securitización de los grupos insurgentes frente a la amenaza generada por la proliferación de grupos armados no estatales en el territorio comprendido entre Malí y Níger. Se toma a Níger con el ánimo de ver la existencia de un subcomplejo regional de seguridad entre este país y Malí. De esta manera se afirma que el aumento de las actividades insurgentes y terroristas en la zona compuesta por Malí y Níger se da por la proliferación de actores armados no estatales, entre los cuales se encuentran los grupos seculares e insurgentes Tuareg, las agrupaciones islamistas fundamentalistas y los grupos que se componen entre rebeldes Tuareg, criminales e islamistas, éstos actores han afectado la percepción que tiene Malí sobre su seguridad.

Mapping evidence gaps in anti-corruption: assessing the state of the operationally relevant evidence on donors' actions and approaches to reducing corruption

This paper charts the current evidence on effectiveness of different anti-corruption reforms, and identifies significant evidence gaps. Despite a substantial amount of literature on corruption, this review found very few studies focusing on anti-corruption reforms, and even fewer that credibly assess issues of effectiveness and impact. The evidence was strong for only two types of interventions: public financial management (PFM) reforms and supreme audit institutions (SAIs). For PFM, the evidence in general showed positive results, whereas the effectiveness was mixed for SAIs. No strong evidence indicates that any of the interventions pursued have been ineffective, but there is fair evidence that anti-corruption authorities, civil service reforms and the use of corruption conditionality in aid allocation decisions in general have not been effective. The paper advocates more operationally-relevant research and rigorous evaluations to build up the missing evidence base, particularly in conflict-afflicted states, in regards to the private sector, and on the interactions and interdependencies between different anti-corruption interventions.

Corruption and state-building

The chapter examines the compex roles of corruption in state-buioding environments. The first section briefly outlines how statebuilding is conceptualized in this discussion. The second section examines the concept of corruption,and argues that the organization, rather than the scale of corruption, offers a better lens through which its impact can be analyzed. The third section examines the complex relationship between corruption and statebuilding through the lenses of two key aspects of statebuilding – elite settlements, and the provision of public services – and briefly discusses both the complex relationship between corruption and security, and the impact of aid on corruption in statebuilding environments. The fourth section concludes the chapter with a reflection on the implications of the analysis for understanding contemporary statebuilding efforts and policy.

Greasing the wheels? The impact of regulations and corruption on firm entry

This paper investigates the question of whether corruption might ‘grease the wheels’ of an economy. We investigate whether and to what extent the impact of regulations on entrepreneurship is dependent on corruption. We first test whether regulations robustly deter firm entry into markets. Our results show that the existence of a larger number of procedures required to start a business, as well as larger minimum capital requirements are detrimental to entrepreneurship. Second, we test whether corruption reduces the negative impact of regulations on entrepreneurship in highly regulated economies. Our empirical analysis, covering a maximum of 43 countries over the 2003–2005 period, shows that corruption facilitates firm entry in highly regulated economies. For example, the ‘greasing’ effect of corruption kicks in at around 50 days required to start a new business. Our results thus provide support for the ‘grease the wheels’ hypothesis.

Physiological and behavioral patterns of corruption

We study the behavior and emotional arousal of the participants in an experimental auction, leading to an asymmetric social dilemma involving an auctioneer and two bidders. An antisocial transfer (bribe) which is beneficial for the auctioneer (official) is paid, if promised, by the winner of the auction. Some pro-social behavior on both the auctioneers' and the bidders' sides is observed even in the absence of any punishment mechanism (Baseline, Treatment 0). However, pro-social behavior is adopted by the vast majority of subjects when the loser of the auction can inspect the transaction between the winner and the auctioneer (Inspection, Treatment 1). The inspection and punishment mechanism is such that, if a bribe is (not) revealed, both corrupt agents (the denouncing bidder) lose(s) this period's payoffs. This renders the inspection option unprofitable for the loser and is rarely used, especially towards the end of the session, when pro-social behavior becomes pervasive. Subjects' emotional arousal was obtained through skin conductance responses. Generally speaking, our findings suggest that stronger emotions are associated with decisions deviating from pure monetary reward maximization, rather than with (un)ethical behavior per se. In fact, using response times as a measure of the subject's reflection during the decision-making process, we can associate emotional arousal with the conflict between primary or instinctive and secondary or contemplative motivations and, more specifically, with deviations from the subject's pure monetary interest.