Multicriteria decision analysis applied to cover crop species andcultivars selection

Cover crop selection should be oriented to the achievement of specific agrosystem benefits. The covercrop, catch crop, green manure and fodder uses were identified as possible targets for selection. Theobjective was to apply multi-criteria decision analysis to evaluate different species (Hordeum vulgareL., Secale cereale L., ×Triticosecale Whim, Sinapis alba L., Vicia sativa L.) and cultivars according to theirsuitability to be used as cover crops in each of the uses. A field trial with 20 cultivars of the five specieswas conducted in Central Spain during two seasons (October?April). Measurements of ground cover, cropbiomass, N uptake, N derived from the atmosphere, C/N, dietary fiber content and residue quality werecollected. Aggregation of these variables through utility functions allowed ranking species and cultivarsfor each usage. Grasses were the most suitable for the cover crop, catch crop and fodder uses, while thevetches were the best as green manures. The mustard attained high ranks as cover and catch crop the firstseason, but the second decayed due to low performance in cold winters. Mustard and vetches obtainedworse rankings than grasses as fodder. Hispanic was the most suitable barley cultivar as cover and catchcrop, and Albacete as fodder. The triticale Titania attained the highest rank as cover and catch crop andfodder. Vetches Aitana and BGE014897 showed good aptitudes as green manures and catch crops. Thisanalysis allowed comparison among species and cultivars and might provide relevant information forcover crops selection and management.

Nas–Walras equilibria of a large economy

Individuals exchange contracts for the delivery of commodities in competitive markets and, simultaneously, act strategically; actions affect utilities across individuals directly or through the payoffs of contracts. This encompasses economies with asymmetric information. Nash–Walras equilibria exist for large economies, even if utility functions are not quasi-concave and choice sets are not convex, which is the case in standard settings; the separation of the purchase from the sale of contracts and the pooling of the deliveries on contracts guarantee that the markets for commodities clear.

The Debreu Gap Lemma and some generalizations

In this paper we study the Debreu Gap Lemma and its generalizations to totally ordered sets more general than (R, less than or equal to). We explain why it is important in economics to study utility functions which may not be real-valued and we build the foundations of a theory of continuity of such generalized utility functions. (C) 2004 Published by Elsevier B.V.

Analysis of computer communication systems by use of digital signal processing methods

Queueing theory is an effective tool in the analysis of canputer camrunication systems. Many results in queueing analysis have teen derived in the form of Laplace and z-transform expressions. Accurate inversion of these transforms is very important in the study of computer systems, but the inversion is very often difficult. In this thesis, methods for solving some of these queueing problems, by use of digital signal processing techniques, are presented. The z-transform of the queue length distribution for the Mj GY jl system is derived. Two numerical methods for the inversion of the transfom, together with the standard numerical technique for solving transforms with multiple queue-state dependence, are presented. Bilinear and Poisson transform sequences are presented as useful ways of representing continuous-time functions in numerical computations.

A two-stage win–win multiattribute negotiation model:optimization and then concession

Many automated negotiation models have been developed to solve the conflict in many distributed computational systems. However, the problem of finding win-win outcome in multiattribute negotiation has not been tackled well. To address this issue, based on an evolutionary method of multiobjective optimization, this paper presents a negotiation model that can find win-win solutions of multiple attributes, but needs not to reveal negotiating agents' private utility functions to their opponents or a third-party mediator. Moreover, we also equip our agents with a general type of utility functions of interdependent multiattributes, which captures human intuitions well. In addition, we also develop a novel time-dependent concession strategy model, which can help both sides find a final agreement among a set of win-win ones. Finally, lots of experiments confirm that our negotiation model outperforms the existing models developed recently. And the experiments also show our model is stable and efficient in finding fair win-win outcomes, which is seldom solved in the existing models. © 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

A származtatott termékek árazása és annak problémái az egyensúlyelmélet szempontjából (Pricing of derived products and problems with it in terms of equilibrium theory)

A szerző röviden összefoglalja a származtatott termékek árazásával kapcsolatos legfontosabb ismereteket és problémákat. A derivatív árazás elmélete a piacon levő termékek közötti redundanciát kihasználva próbálja meghatározni az egyes termékek relatív árát. Ezt azonban csak teljes piacon lehet megtenni, és így csak teljes piac esetén lehetséges a hasznossági függvények fogalmát az elméletből és a ráépülő gyakorlatból elhagyni, ezért a kockázatsemleges árazás elve félrevezető. Másképpen fogalmazva: a származtatott termékek elmélete csak azon az áron képes a hasznossági függvény fogalmától megszabadulni, ha a piac szerkezetére a valóságban nem teljesülő megkötéseket tesz. Ennek hangsúlyozása mind a piaci gyakorlatban, mind az oktatásban elengedhetetlen. / === / The author sums up briefly the main aspects and problems to do with the pricing of derived products. The theory of derivative pricing uses the redundancy among products on the market to arrive at relative product prices. But this can be done only on a complete market, so that only with a complete market does it become possible to omit from the theory and the practice built upon it the concept of utility functions, and for that reason the principle of risk-neutral pricing is misleading. To put it another way, the theory of derived products is capable of freeing itself from the concept of utility functions only at a price where in practice it places impossible restrictions on the market structure. This it is essential to emphasize in market practice and in teaching.

A bizonytalanságnak és a vevőkör nagyságának együttes hatása az árakra (Investigating how the number of policies effect the optimum insurance premium)

Ebben a cikkben azzal foglalkozom, hogy a kockázat és a vevőkör nagysága együttesen hogyan hat a termék árára. Kétféle piacot hasonlítok össze: egy biztosítási piacot, és egy termékpiacot. A kétféle piac között az a legfontosabb különbség, hogy termékpiac esetében az eladó számára csak ott jelentkezik kockázat, hogy el tudja-e adni a terméket, míg biztosítási piac esetében az eladó a termék értékesítése után is szembesül kockázattal. A cikk során megmutatom, hogy a vevőkör növekedésének ellentétes hatása lehet a termék árára termék- illetve biztosítási piacok esetében. / === / An economic approach for modeling the insurance markets. The study focuses on the monopolistic market, where one insurance company sells a product with predetermined benefits for the customers. An outline of the company and the insureds' behavior with utility functions is given. The study investigates the problem of policy pricing in relation to the number of clients the company acquires. Analytic tools will be used to further clarify the points.

Non -traded goods, product differentiation and integration of factor markets

This research sought to determine the implications of a non-traded differentiated commodity produced with increasing returns to scale, for the welfare of countries that allowed free international migration. We developed two- and three-country Ricardian models in which labor was the only factor of production. The countries traded freely in homogeneous goods produced with constant returns to scale. Each also had a non-traded differentiated good sector where production took place using increasing returns to scale technology. Then we allowed for free international migration between two of the countries and observed what happened to welfare in both countries as indicated by their per capita utilities in the new equilibrium relative to their pre-migration utilities. ^ Preferences of consumers were represented by a two-tier utility function [Dixit and Stiglitz 1977]. As migration took place it impacted utility in two ways. The expanding country enjoyed the positive effect of increased product diversity in the non-traded good sector. However, it also suffered adverse terms-of-trade as its production cost declined. The converse was true for the contracting country. To determine the net impact on welfare we derived indirect per capita utility functions of the countries algebraically and graphically. Then we juxtaposed the graphs of the utility functions to obtain possible general equilibria. These we used to observe the welfare outcomes. ^ We found that the most likely outcomes were either that both countries gained, or one country lost while the other gained. We were, however, able to generate cases where both countries lost as a result of allowing free inter-country migration. This was most likely to happen when the shares of income spent on each country's export good differed significantly. In the three country world when we allowed two of the countries to engage in preferential trading arrangements while imposing a prohibitive tariff on imports from the third country welfare of the partner countries declined. When inter-union migration was permitted welfare declined even further. This we showed was due to the presence of the non-traded good sector. ^

Computational Analysis of Intelligent Agents: Social and Strategic Settings

The central motif of this work is prediction and optimization in presence of multiple interacting intelligent agents. We use the phrase `intelligent agents' to imply in some sense, a `bounded rationality', the exact meaning of which varies depending on the setting. Our agents may not be `rational' in the classical game theoretic sense, in that they don't always optimize a global objective. Rather, they rely on heuristics, as is natural for human agents or even software agents operating in the real-world. Within this broad framework we study the problem of influence maximization in social networks where behavior of agents is myopic, but complication stems from the structure of interaction networks. In this setting, we generalize two well-known models and give new algorithms and hardness results for our models. Then we move on to models where the agents reason strategically but are faced with considerable uncertainty. For such games, we give a new solution concept and analyze a real-world game using out techniques. Finally, the richest model we consider is that of Network Cournot Competition which deals with strategic resource allocation in hypergraphs, where agents reason strategically and their interaction is specified indirectly via player's utility functions. For this model, we give the first equilibrium computability results. In all of the above problems, we assume that payoffs for the agents are known. However, for real-world games, getting the payoffs can be quite challenging. To this end, we also study the inverse problem of inferring payoffs, given game history. We propose and evaluate a data analytic framework and we show that it is fast and performant.

On the size of the fibers of spectral maps induced by semialgebraic embeddings

Let S(M) be the ring of (continuous) semialgebraic functions on a semialgebraic set M and S*(M) its subring of bounded semialgebraic functions. In this work we compute the size of the fibers of the spectral maps Spec(j)1:Spec(S(N))→Spec(S(M)) and Spec(j)2:Spec(S*(N))→Spec(S*(M)) induced by the inclusion j:N M of a semialgebraic subset N of M. The ring S(M) can be understood as the localization of S*(M) at the multiplicative subset WM of those bounded semialgebraic functions on M with empty zero set. This provides a natural inclusion iM:Spec(S(M)) Spec(S*(M)) that reduces both problems above to an analysis of the fibers of the spectral map Spec(j)2:Spec(S*(N))→Spec(S*(M)). If we denote Z:=ClSpec(S*(M))(M N), it holds that the restriction map Spec(j)2|:Spec(S*(N)) Spec(j)2-1(Z)→Spec(S*(M)) Z is a homeomorphism. Our problem concentrates on the computation of the size of the fibers of Spec(j)2 at the points of Z. The size of the fibers of prime ideals "close" to the complement Y:=M N provides valuable information concerning how N is immersed inside M. If N is dense in M, the map Spec(j)2 is surjective and the generic fiber of a prime ideal p∈Z contains infinitely many elements. However, finite fibers may also appear and we provide a criterium to decide when the fiber Spec(j)2-1(p) is a finite set for p∈Z. If such is the case, our procedure allows us to compute the size s of Spec(j)2-1(p). If in addition N is locally compact and M is pure dimensional, s coincides with the number of minimal prime ideals contained in p. © 2016 WILEY-VCH Verlag GmbH & Co. KGaA, Weinheim.

A holistic attempt to predicating excess aftermarket returns of IPOs over a 90-day period post IPO

Double Degree

An Afriat theorem for the collective model of household consumption

We provide a nonparametric 'revealed preference’ characterization of rational household behavior in terms of the collective consumption model, while accounting for general (possibly non-convex) individual preferences. We establish a Collective Axiom of Revealed Preference (CARP), which provides a necessary and sufficient condition for data consistency with collective rationality. Our main result takes the form of a ‘collective’ version of the Afriat Theorem for rational behavior in terms of the unitary model. This theorem has some interesting implications. With only a finite set of observations, the nature of consumption externalities (positive or negative) in the intra-household allocation process is non-testable. The same non-testability conclusion holds for privateness (with or without externalities) or publicness of consumption. By contrast, concavity of individual utility functions (representing convex preferences) turns out to be testable. In addition, monotonicity is testable for the model that assumes all household consumption is public.

On Convergence of Differential Evolution Over a Class of Continuous Functions With Unique Global Optimum

Differential evolution (DE) is arguably one of the most powerful stochastic real-parameter optimization algorithms of current interest. Since its inception in the mid 1990s, DE has been finding many successful applications in real-world optimization problems from diverse domains of science and engineering. This paper takes a first significant step toward the convergence analysis of a canonical DE (DE/rand/1/bin) algorithm. It first deduces a time-recursive relationship for the probability density function (PDF) of the trial solutions, taking into consideration the DE-type mutation, crossover, and selection mechanisms. Then, by applying the concepts of Lyapunov stability theorems, it shows that as time approaches infinity, the PDF of the trial solutions concentrates narrowly around the global optimum of the objective function, assuming the shape of a Dirac delta distribution. Asymptotic convergence behavior of the population PDF is established by constructing a Lyapunov functional based on the PDF and showing that it monotonically decreases with time. The analysis is applicable to a class of continuous and real-valued objective functions that possesses a unique global optimum (but may have multiple local optima). Theoretical results have been substantiated with relevant computer simulations.