972 resultados para Capital Costs
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Este estudo investiga as diferenças na maneira como gestores administram o capital de giro nas micro e pequenas empresas. As contribuições derivadas deste estudo ampliam a literatura financeira de curto prazo em MPEs no sentido de se compreender como os itens relacionados ao construto de capital de giro se comportam numa economia emergente, com fricções de mercado severas e mutáveis e com nível de desenvolvimento financeiro distinto. Os diferentes estilos de gestão podem ocorrer em razão do impacto do desenvolvimento e profundidade do mercado financeiro e do acesso e da oferta de trade credit. Os fatores determinantes desses estilos de condução da gestão do capital de giro em micro e pequenas empresas (MPEs) são identificados e, explicados, à luz dos fundamentos das teorias de crescimento das firmas por estágios, da visão baseada em recursos, de crédito comercial, de agência e de custos de transação. Esta é uma pesquisa mista com investigação cross-section, em três etapas. Ela foi composta por um survey e por entrevistas. Os dados obtidos por meio de um survey com dirigentes de 447 MPEs dos estados de Minas Gerais e São Paulo foram analisados por técnicas multivariadas, tendo sido identificados quatro “estilos” de gestão de capital de giro, que podem ser explicados por variáveis como idade, tamanho e lucratividade da firma e as entrevistas pela análise de conteúdo. A base de dados foi tratada com técnicas multivariadas e modelagem com equações estruturais. Os resultados sugerem que dirigentes brasileiros são mais propensos a adotar controle financeiro que os dirigentes britânicos e que gestão de crédito afeta positivamente a gestão de estoque quando mediada por fundos internos. Os resultados foram comparados aos obtidos por pesquisa similar realizada com empresas do Reino Unido (Howorth e Westhead, 2003), e a evidência mostra diferenças importantes: 1) as empresas brasileiras revisam a maioria das rotinas de capital de giro com maior frequência que as britânicas; 2) as MPEs brasileiras ofertam e demandam menos crédito comercial que as britânicas. Essas diferenças podem ser explicadas, pelo menos em parte, pelo maior custo do financiamento bancário das firmas brasileiras em comparação às britânicas.
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Motivated by a novel stylized fact { countries with isolated capital cities display worse quality of governance { we provide a framework of endogenous institutional choice based on the idea that elites are constrained by the threat of rebellion, and that this threat is rendered less e ective by distance from the seat of political power. In established democracies, the threat of insurgencies is not a binding constraint, and the model predicts no correlation between isolated capitals and misgovernance. In contrast, a correlation emerges in equilibrium in the case of autocracies. Causality runs both ways: broader power sharing (associated with better governance) means that any rents have to be shared more broadly, hence the elite has less of an incentive to protect its position by isolating the capital city; conversely, a more isolated capital city allows the elite to appropriate a larger share of output, so the costs of better governance for the elite, in terms of rents that would have to be shared, are larger. We show evidence that this pattern holds true robustly in the data. We also show that isolated capitals are associated with less power sharing, a larger income premium enjoyed by capital city inhabitants, and lower levels of military spending by ruling elites, as predicted by the theory.
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Os controles de capitais estão novamente em voga em razão dos países emergentes reintroduzirem essas medidas nos últimos anos face a abundante entrada de capital internacional. As autoridades argumentam que tais medidas protegem as economias no caso de uma “parada abrupta” desses fluxos. Será demonstrado que os controles de capitais parecem fazer com que as economias emergentes (EMEs) fiquem mais resistentes diante de uma crise financeira (por exemplo, uma queda na atividade econômica seguida de uma crise é menor quando o controle é maior). No entanto, os controles de capitais parecem deixar as economias emergentes (EMEs) também mais propícias a uma crise. Deste modo, as autoridades devem ser cautelosas na avaliação quanto aos riscos e benefícios relativos a aplicação das medidas dos controles de capitais.
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Capital controls are again in vogue as a number of emerging markets have reintroduced these measures in recent years in response to a “flood” of international capital. Policymakers use these tools to buttress their economies against the “sudden stop” risk that accompanies international capital flows. Using a panel VAR model, we show that capital controls appear to make emerging market economies (EMEs) more resistant to financial crises by showing that lower post-crisis output loss is correlated with stronger capital controls. However, EMEs that employ capital controls seem to be more crisis-prone. Thus, policymakers should carefully evaluate whether the benefits of capital controls outweigh their costs.
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O trabalho analisa o tema do capital social no direito societário brasileiro. Seu objetivo é demonstrar, do ponto de vista jurídico, os malefícios e benefícios que o instituto promove. Apesar de ser tido como um conceito clássico e essencial para as sociedades com limitação de responsabilidade no Brasil, esse instituto vem sendo cada vez mais criticado no sentido de que não desempenha suas funções clássicas (organização, produção, e proteção de credores) de maneira efetiva nos dias atuais. Nesse contexto, direito societário moderno vem passando por uma evolução no sentido de questionar a efetividade de seus institutos. A análise aqui proposta do capital social segue esse raciocínio. Para auxiliar na interpretação do instituto no Brasil, serão utilizadas serão estudadas as lições e legislações dos ordenamentos europeu e norte-americano, onde o tema já foi amplamente debatido. O tratamento dado pelo Revised Model Business Corporation Act, legislação modelo norte americana, e da Segunda Diretiva do Capital da União Europeia aos instituto serão comparados com o tratamento da Lei das S.A. para o capital social. Por fim, são identificadas algumas particularidades do instituto do capital social em relação aos ordenamentos estrangeiros, que demonstram que uma eventual supressão do conceito de capital social no Brasil possuiria características próprias que não estão presentes na Europa e nos Estados Unidos. Nesse contexto, serão identificados os custos legislativos que uma eventual mudança do regime de capital social teria no sistema legislativo brasileiro.
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Includes bibliography
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Includes bibliography
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Includes bibliography
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Incluye Bibliografía
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Includes bibliography
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The external environment has deteriorated sharply as a result of the spiraling financial turmoil, and has led to a weakening in commodity prices and fears of a worldwide recession. Latin America and the Caribbean's fastest expansion in 40 years may be threatened as the global credit crunch makes financing scarce and squeezes demand for the region's commodities. This time around the region is better positioned to weather the crisis than in the past, given improvements in macroeconomic and financial policies as well as a reduced net dependency on external capital inflows. However, Latin American markets are feeling the effects of the crisis through a slowdown in capital inflows, large declines in stock price indexes, significant currency adjustments and an increase in debt spreads. Volatility has soared, with the closely watched Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index moving to an all-time high of 70.33 on October 17, indicating that fear (rather than greed) has been ruling the markets.After reaching record lows in May 2007, emerging markets bond spreads are now above pre-Asian crisis levels. The JPMorgan EMBI+ Latin American composite widened by 146 basis points in the third quarter, with spreads reaching 448 basis points at the end of September. Spreads have widened sharply in recent weeks as foreign investors cut back regional exposure for the safety of U.S. Treasuries. The ongoing lack of liquidity and subsequent liquidation of assets is leading to a collapse in asset prices and a sharp widening in spreads. Daily spreads in October have risen to levels not seen since December 2002, making it much more difficult for governments that need financing to get it. Risk premiums for Latin corporates and sovereigns have risen substantially, but have remained well below U.S. junk (high-yield) bonds. Latin corporates are facing a steep rise in foreign exchange borrowing costs (although less than firms in other emerging markets), which raises concerns that refinancing risks will climb.So far, emerging markets vulnerabilities have been more focused on corporates, as sovereigns have improved public debt dynamics and countries' financing needs are under control. Market performance has been driven by the rapid deterioration of emerging markets bank and corporate market, as well as ongoing losses in emerging markets equities. From January to September 2008, the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) Latin American Index lost almost 28%, while the Emerging Markets Index lost 37% and the G-7 Index lost 24%. While in 2007 the Latin America component gained 47%, almost nine times as much as the MSCI-G7 index for developed markets, since mid-September 2008 stocks in Latin America have been doing worse than stocks in developed countries, as concerns about access to credit and the adverse impact of sharp falls in commodity prices and in local currencies contribute to increased risk aversion and to outflows of capital. Many governments in the region have used revenue from the commodity boom to pay down debt and build reserves. Now, facing a global financial crisis and the threat of recession in developed countries, the biggest question for Latin America is how long and deep this cyclical downturn will be, and how much it is going to reduce commodity prices. Prices for commodities such as soy, gold, copper and oil, which helped fund the region's boom, have fallen 28% since their July 2 high, according to the RJ/CRB Commodity Price Index. According to Morgan Stanley (in a September 29 report), should prices return to their 10-year average, Latin America's balanced budgets would quickly revert to a deficit of 4.1% of GDP. As risk aversion increases, investors are rapidly pulling out massive amounts of money, creating problems for local markets and banks. There is an ongoing shortage of dollars (as investors liquidate assets in Latin American markets), and as currencies depreciate, inflation concerns increase despite the global slowdown. In Brazil and Mexico, central banks deployed billions of dollars of reserves to stem steep currency declines, as companies in these countries, believing their local currencies would continue to strengthen against the U.S. dollar, took debts in dollars. Some companies also made bets using currency derivatives that have led to losses in the billions of dollars. Dramatic currency swings have caused heavy losses for many companies, from Mexico's cement giant Cemex SAB to the Brazilian conglomerate Grupo Votorantim. Mexico's third-largest retailer, Controladora Comercial Mexicana, declared bankruptcy recently after reporting huge losses related to exchange rate bets. As concerns about corporate exposure to dollar-denominated derivatives increases, yields on bonds issued by many of Brazil's and Mexico's leading companies have started to rise, sharply raising the cost of issuing new debt. Latin American external debt issuance came to a halt in the third quarter of 2008, totaling only US$ 690 million. The cost of obtaining loans for capital expenditures, M&A and debt refinancing is also rising substantially for Latin American corporates amid contagion from the U.S. financial crisis. According to bankers, a protracted trend of shortening tenors and widening spreads has intensified in the past few weeks, indicating that bank lending is quickly following the way of bonds and equity. Finally, money transfers from Latin American migrants are expected to decline for the first time this decade, as a result of economic downturns in the U.S. and Spain, inflation and a weaker dollar. The Mexican Central Bank announced that money transfers from Mexicans living in the U.S. dropped a record 12.2% in August. In 2008, migrants from the region will send some 1.7% less in remittances year-on-year when adjusted for inflation, according to the IADB, compounding the adverse effects of the deepening financial turmoil.
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For six years, the global economy has been driven by the U.S. Federal Reserve’s policies of easy money. Liquidity has flowed from developed to developing economies, financing infrastructure and corporate investment and allowing consumers to indulge in credit-fuelled retail spending. Thus the effective ending of the Fed’s third round of asset purchases (QE3) at the end of October represents both a watershed and the beginning of a new stage in the world economy. The end of asset-purchases comes at a challenging time for emerging markets, with China’s economy slowing, the Euro zone struggling to avoid a recession and the Japanese economy already in recession. The unwinding of the U.S. monetary stimulus, while the European Central Bank and the Bank of Japan step up their monetary stimulus, has underpinned an appreciation by the U.S. dollar, in which most commodities are priced. An appreciated dollar makes dollar-denominated commodities more expensive to buyers, thereby creating pressure for sellers to lower their prices. Latin American markets ended the third quarter of 2014 under pressure from a stronger U.S. dollar. In this changing external context, there are many signs that a slowdown in Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) financial markets, particularly debt markets, which have been breaking issuance records for the past six years, may slowdown from now on. Commodity prices – including those of oil, base metals and some goods – are in a prolonged slump. The Bloomberg commodity price index, a benchmark of commodity investments, has fallen to a five-year low as China’s economy slows down, and with it the demand for commodities. Investment into the LAC region has decelerated, in large part because of a deceleration of mining investments. Latin American currencies have suffered depreciations, as current account deficits have widening for a number of countries. And LAC companies, having issued record amounts of foreign currency bonds may now struggle to service their debt. In October, credit-rating agency Moody’s downgraded the bonds of Brazil’s Petrobras to tow notches above speculative grade because of the impact of falling oil prices and the weaker real on its debt. Growth prospects look brighter in 2015 relative to 2014, but a strengthening U.S. dollar, uneven global growth and weakness in commodity prices are skewing the risk toward the downside for the 2015 forecasts across the region. The Institute of International Finance expects the strengthening of the dollar to have a divergent impact across the region, however, depending on trade and financial linkages. The Institute of International Finance, Capital Flows to Emerging Markets, October 2, 2014. A stronger dollar lifts U.S. purchasing power, supporting exports, growth and capital inflows in countries with close trade links to the U.S. economy. However, rising dollar financing costs will increase pressure on countries with weak external positions. Given the effects of falling oil prices and a stronger dollar, some companies in the region, having issued record amounts of foreign currency bonds, may now struggle to service their debts. Prospects of Fed rate hikes resulting in tighter global liquidity amid the rapid rise in the corporate external bond stock has indeed raised concerns over some companies. However, there is still a shortage of bonds at a global level and the region still enjoys good economic policy management for the most part, so LAC debt markets may continue to enjoy momentum despite occasional bursts of high volatility – even if not at the record levels of recent years.
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BACKGROUND: Trauma care is expensive. However, reliable data on the exact lifelong costs incurred by a major trauma patient are lacking. Discussion usually focuses on direct medical costs--underestimating consequential costs resulting from absence from work and permanent disability. METHODS: Direct medical costs and consequential costs of 63 major trauma survivors (ISS >13) at a Swiss trauma center from 1995 to 1996 were assessed 5 years posttrauma. The following cost evaluation methods were used: correction cost method (direct cost of restoring an original state), human capital method (indirect cost of lost productivity), contingent valuation method (human cost as the lost quality of life), and macroeconomic estimates. RESULTS: Mean ISS (Injury Severity Score) was 26.8 +/- 9.5 (mean +/- SD). In all, 22 patients (35%) were disabled, causing discounted average lifelong total costs of USD 1,293,800, compared with 41 patients (65%) who recovered without any disabilities with incurred costs of USD 147,200 (average of both groups USD 547,800). Two thirds of these costs were attributable to a loss of production whereas only one third was a result of the cost of correction. Primary hospital treatment (USD 27,800 +/- 37,800) was only a minor fraction of the total cost--less than the estimated cost of police and the judiciary. Loss of quality of life led to considerable intangible human costs similar to real costs. CONCLUSIONS: Trauma costs are commonly underestimated. Direct medical costs make up only a small part of the total costs. Consequential costs, such as lost productivity, are well in excess of the usual medical costs. Mere cost averages give a false estimate of the costs incurred by patients with/without disabilities.
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In July of 2002, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed by Congress, including section 404 which requires the auditors to test and opine on the company's internal controls. Since that time there has been much debate about whether the intended benefits of increased investor confidence and financial statement transparency trump the unexpectedly high compliance costs, especially for public companies with market-caps less than $75 million. Before these companies begin complying in the upcoming year, interest groups are calling for the requirements to be 'scaled' to better fit the needs of these companies. While auditors already are expected to scale their audit approach to each individual client, more must be done to significantly decrease the costs in order to reverse the trend of small companies foregoing listing on U.S. capital markets. Increased guidance from the PCAOB, SEC, and other related parties could help the small-cap companies and their auditors be aware of best practices. Also, exempting industries that already follow similar guidelines or are significantly injured by the compliance requirements could help. Lastly, the controversial proposal of rotational audits could be put in place if the affected parties cooperate to remove the undue burden on these small-cap companies. Without some form of significant action, the investors could soon lose the ability to buy small-cap companies in U.S. markets.