Desenho de um sistema de metas sociais

Este trabalho discute a racionalidade econômica para o desenvolvimento de um sistema de metas sociais como forma do governo federal aumentar a eficiência na utilização dos recursos sociais transferidos para os municípios. O trabalho desenvolve algumas extensões do modelo de agente-principal incluindo abordagens estáticas com e sem informação imperfeita. Os resultados dos modelos estáticos indicam que o uso de critérios usuais de focalização onde localidades mais pobres recebem mais recursos podem levar a incentivos adversos para a erradicação da pobreza. Demonstramos que transferências incondicionais do governo federal deslocam gastos sociais locais. O trabalho argumenta em favor do uso de contratos onde quanto maior for a melhora no indicador social escolhido, mais recursos o município receberia. A introdução de informação imperfeita neste modelo basicamente gera uma penalidade aos segmentos pobres de áreas onde os governos demonstram ser menos avessos a pobreza. O trabalho também aborda o problema de favoritismo político onde determinados grupos sociais têm maior, ou menor, atenção por parte de governos locais. O resultado é que as políticas sociais acabam privilegiando determinados setores em detrimento de outros. Com o estabelecimento de metas sociais é possível, se não eliminar o problema, ao menos criar incentivos corretos para que os gastos sociais sejam distribuídos de forma mais equânime.

Desenho de um sistema de metas sociais

Este trabalho discute a racionalidade econômica para o desenvolvimento de um sistema de metas sociais como forma do governo federal aumentar a eficiência na utilização dos recursos sociais transferidos para os municípios. O trabalho desenvolve algumas extensões do modelo de agente-principal incluindo abordagens estáticas com e sem informação imperfeita. Os resultados dos modelos estáticos indicam que o uso de critérios usuais de focalização onde localidades mais pobres recebem mais recursos podem levar a incentivos adversos para a erradicação da pobreza. Demonstramos que transferências incondicionais do governo federal deslocam gastos sociais locais. O trabalho argumenta em favor do uso de contratos onde quanto maior for a melhora no indicador social escolhido, mais recursos o município receberia. A introdução de informação imperfeita neste modelo basicamente gera uma penalidade aos segmentos pobres de áreas onde os governos demonstram ser menos avessos a pobreza. O trabalho também aborda o problema de favoritismo político onde determinados grupos sociais têm maior, ou menor, atenção por parte de governos locais. O resultado é que as políticas sociais acabam privilegiando determinados setores em detrimento de outros. Com o estabelecimento de metas sociais é possível, se não eliminar o problema, ao menos criar incentivos corretos para que os gastos sociais sejam distribuídos de forma mais equânime.

Desenho de um sistema de metas sociais

Este trabalho discute a racionalidade econômica para o desenvolvimento de um sistema de metas sociais como forma de o governo federal aumentar a eficiência na utilização dos recursos sociais transferidos para os municípios. O trabalho desenvolve algumas extensões do modelo de agente-principal incluindo abordagens estáticas com e sem informação imperfeita e abordagens dinâmicas com contratos perfeitos e imperfeitos. Os resultados dos modelos estáticos indicam que o uso de critérios usuais de focalização onde localidades mais pobres recebem mais recursos pode levar a incentivos adversos para a erradicação da pobreza. Nós também mostramos que transferências incondicionais do governo federal deslocam gastos sociais locais. O trabalho argumenta em favor do uso de contratos onde quanto maior for a melhora no indicador social escolhido, mais recursos o município receberia. A introdução de informação imperfeita neste modelo basicamente gera uma penalidade aos segmentos pobres de áreas onde os governos demonstram ser menos avessos a pobreza. O trabalho também aborda o problema de favoritismo político onde determinados grupos sociais têm maior, ou menor, atenção por parte de governos locais. O resultado é que as políticas sociais acabam privilegiando determinados setores em detrimento de outros. Com o estabelecimento de metas sociais é possível, se não eliminar o problema, ao menos criar incentivos corretos para que os gastos sociais sejam distribuídos de forma mais equânime. Também desenvolvemos modelos dinâmicos com diferentes possibilidades de renegociação ao longo do tempo. Demonstramos que a melhor forma de aumentar a eficiência alocativa dos fundos seria criar mecanismos institucionais garantindo a impossibilidade de renegociações bilaterais. Esse contrato ótimo reproduz a seqüência de metas e transferências de vários períodos encontrada na solução do modelo estático. Entretanto, esse resultado- desaparece quando incorporamos contratos incompletos. Nesse caso, as ineficiências ex-ante criadas pela possibilidade de renegociação devem ser comparadas com as ineficiências ex-post criadas por não se usar a informação nova revelada ao longo do processo. Finalmente, introduzimos a possibilidade do resultado social observado depender não só do investimento realizado, mas também da presença de choques. Nesse caso, tanto o governo quanto o município aumentam as suas metas de investimento na área social. Contratos lineares na presença de choques negativos fazem com que os municípios recebem menos recursos justamente em situações adversas. Para contornar esse problema, mostramos a importância da utilização de contratos com comparação de performance.

Sequential cost-reimbursement rules

This paper studies cost-sharing rules under dynamic adverse selection. We present a typical principal-agent model with two periods, set up in Laffont and Tirole's (1986) canonical regulation environment. At first, when the contract is signed, the firm has prior uncertainty about its efficiency parameter. In the second period, the firm learns its efficiency and chooses the level of cost-reducing effort. The optimal mechanism sequentially screens the firm's types and achieves a higher level of welfare than its static counterpart. The contract is indirectly implemented by a sequence of transfers, consisting of a fixed advance payment based on the reported cost estimate, and an ex-post compensation linear in cost performance.

A percepção da fiscalização dos contratos de mão de obra terceirizada pelos agentes envolvidos nesse processo no âmbito da Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte: uma análise sob o modelo do principal-agente

Outsourcing has emerged as one of the new ways of guiding the work. For its advantages and be consistent with the paradigms of managerial reform, outsourcing also started to be used in the Public Administration. However, taking into account the particularities of the latter, some issues are relevant when outsourcing concluded with the State. Gains notoriety, for example, the step of monitoring these contracts, to the extent that, from this activity, we can avoid the negative effects of outsourcing like the fact that the state will pay for labor and wage liens that are obligation of the company providing the services. This study aims to understand the perception that this process is under the Federal University of Rio Grande do Norte, from the point of view of different stakeholders, also explaining the motivations that these agents have to perform the supervisory process. As a theoretical basis was used the Agency Theory, which reinforces the supervisory activities as a necessary means to minimize moral hazard and adverse selection, seeking to understand not only the different motivations tax contracts to properly perform their duties, but also analyze other phenomena arising from this contractual relationship. To achieve the proposed objectives, were taken a literature review and a presentation of how to organize the management and oversight of contracts in UFRN. The methodological procedures included questionnaires and interviews with those involved in the process. After analyzing the results obtained in the survey instruments , and also based on the laws, regulations and instructions governing the procurement process within the UFRN, it was concluded that the process of overseeing the outsourcing of labor contracts in UFRN is not fully institutionalized, some points should be strengthened in order to have the consolidation of this process, highlighting the need for training of UFRN servers that act as tax, the knowledge that the contractual penalties are applied effectively, the need that there is a supervisor of tax of contractors and also the realization of the rotation system of outsourced employees

Informational Barriers to Energy Efficiency - Theory and European Policies. Bruges European Economic Research (BEER) Papers 15/2009

This BEER addresses informational barriers to energy efficiency. It is a widely acknowledged result that an energy efficiency gap exists implying that the level of energy efficiency is at an inefficiently low level. Several barriers to energy efficiency create this gap and the presence of asymmetric information is likely to be one such barrier. In this article a theoretical framework is presented addressing the issues of moral hazard and adverse selection related to energy efficiency. Based on the theoretical framework, European policies on energy efficiency are evaluated. The article is divided into two main parts. The first part presents the theory on information asymmetries and its consequences on energy efficiency focusing on the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection. Having established a theoretical framework to understand the agency barriers to energy efficiency, the second part evaluates the policies of the European Union on energy efficiency. The BEER finds that problems of moral hazard and adverse selection indeed can help explain the seemingly low levels of energy. In both presented models the cost to the principal from implementing high energy efficiency outcome is increased with the informational asymmetries. The theory reveals two implications to policies on energy efficiency. First, the development of measures to enable contractual parties to base remuneration on energy performance must be enhanced, and second, the information on technologies and the education of consumers and installers on energy efficiency must be increased. This could be complemented with certification of installers and energy efficiency advisors to enable consumers to select good agents. Finally, it is found that the preferred EU policy instrument on energy efficiency, so far, seems to be the use of minimum requirements. Less used in EU legislation is the use of measuring and verification as well as the use of certifications. Therefore, it is concluded that the EU should consider an increased use of these instruments, and in particular focus on a further development of standards on measurability and verification as well as an increased focus on education of consumers as well as installers and advisors on energy efficiency.

Agency theory problems behind the fall of shopping centers

The present article assesses agency theory related problems contributing to the fall of shopping centers. The negative effects of the financial and economic downturn started in 2008 were accentuated in emerging markets like Romania. Several shopping centers were closed or sold through bankruptcy proceedings or forced execution. These failed shopping centers, 10 in number, were selected in order to assess agency theory problems contributing to the failure of shopping centers; as research method qualitative multiple cases-studies is used. Results suggest, that in all of the cases the risk adverse behavior of the External Investor- Principal, lead to risk sharing problems and subsequently to the fall of the shopping centers. In some of the cases Moral Hazard (lack of Developer-Agent’s know-how and experience) as well as Adverse Selection problems could be identified. The novelty of the topic for the shopping center industry and the empirical evidences confer a significant academic and practical value to the present article.

A dual characterization of incentive efficiency

We show that incentive efficient allocations in economies with adverse selection and moral hazard can be determined as optimal solutions to a linear programming problem and we use duality theory to obtain a complete characterization of the optima. Our dual analysis identifies welfare effects associated with the incentives of the agents to truthfully reveal their private information. Because these welfare effects may generate non-convexities, incentive efficient allocations may involve randomization. Other properties of incentive efficient allocations are also derived.

Pressure groups and experts in environmental regulation

We study a problem of adverse selection in the context of environmental regulation, where the firm may suffer from a certain degree of ignorance about its own type. In a framework like the construction of a certain infrastructure project, the presence of ignorance about its impact on the environment, can play an important role in the determination of the regulatory policy. First, an optimal contract is constructed for any exogenous level of ignorance. Second, the presence of potentially informed third-parties is studied from the perspective of the regulator, which allows us to analyze the impact on the efficiency of the contract, of the presence of environmentalists and of experts. Then, we obtain some insights on how the problem differs when the degree of ignorance is a choice variable for the firm. We finally use our results to derive policy implications concerning the existing envoronmental regulation, and the potential role of interested parties as information providers.

Suppliers of Priors: A Theory of Retailing Inspired by the Market for Chinese Antiquities

Adverse selection may thwart trade between an informed seller, who knows the probability p that an item of antiquity is genuine, and an uninformed buyer, who does not know p. The buyer might not be wholly uninformed, however. Suppose he can perform a simple inspection, a test of his own: the probability that an item passes the test is g if the item is genuine, but only f < g if it is fake. Given that the buyer is no expert, his test may have little power: f may be close to g. Unfortunately, without much power, the buyer's test will not resolve the difficulty of adverse selection; gains from trade may remain unexploited. But now consider a "store", where the seller groups a number of items, perhaps all with the same quality, the same probability p of being genuine. (We show that in equilibrium the seller will choose to group items in this manner.) Now the buyer can conduct his test across a large sample, perhaps all, of a group of items in the seller's store. He can thereby assess the overall quality of these items; he can invert the aggregate of his test results to uncover the underlying p; he can form a "prior". There is thus no longer asymmetric information between seller and buyer: gains from trade can be exploited. This is our theory of retailing: by grouping items together - setting up a store - a seller is able to supply buyers with priors, as well as the items themselves. We show that the weaker the power of the buyer�s test (the closer f is to g), the greater the seller�s profit. So the seller has no incentive to assist the buyer � e.g., by performing her own tests on the items, or by cleaning them to reveal more about their true age. The paper ends with an analysis of which sellers should specialise in which qualities. We show that quality will be low in busy locations and high in expensive locations.

Optimal law enforcement under asymmetric information

In this paper, we focus on the problem created by asymmetric informationabout the enforcer's (agent's) costs associated to enforcement expenditure. This adverse selection problem affects optimal law enforcement because a low cost enforcer may conceal its information by imitating a high cost enforcer, and must then be given a compensation to be induced to reveal its true costs. The government faces a trade-off between minimizing the enforcer's compensation and maximizing the net surplus of harmful acts. As a consequence, the probability of apprehension and punishment is usually reduced leading to more offenses being committed. We show that asymmetry of information does not affect law enforcement as long as raising public funds is costless. The consideration of costly raising of public funds permits to establish the positive correlation between asymmetry of information between government and enforcers andthe crime rate.

Populations with elevated mutation load do not benefit from the operation of sexual selection.

Theory predicts that if most mutations are deleterious to both overall fitness and condition-dependent traits affecting mating success, sexual selection will purge mutation load and increase nonsexual fitness. We explored this possibility with populations of mutagenized Drosophila melanogaster exhibiting elevated levels of deleterious variation and evolving in the presence or absence of male-male competition and female choice. After 60 generations of experimental evolution, monogamous populations exhibited higher total reproductive output than polygamous populations. Parental environment also affected fitness measures - flies that evolved in the presence of sexual conflict showed reduced nonsexual fitness when their parents experienced a polygamous environment, indicating trans-generational effects of male harassment and highlighting the importance of a common garden design. This cost of parental promiscuity was nearly absent in monogamous lines, providing evidence for the evolution of reduced sexual antagonism. There was no overall difference in egg-to-adult viability between selection regimes. If mutation load was reduced by the action of sexual selection in this experiment, the resultant gain in fitness was not sufficient to overcome the costs of sexual antagonism.

Agency problems with non-smooth decision profiles: the case of monopoly under product quality

A method for dealing with monotonicity constraints in optimal control problems is used to generalize some results in the context of monopoly theory, also extending the generalization to a large family of principal-agent programs. Our main conclusion is that many results on diverse economic topics, achieved under assumptions of continuity and piecewise differentiability in connection with the endogenous variables of the problem, still remain valid after replacing such assumptions by two minimal requirements.

Rahoitusvälineiden markkinat -direktiivin (MiFID) vaikutukset sijoituspalvelun tarjoajan velvollisuuksiin ja sijoittajansuojaan

Tutkielmassa selvitetään rahoitusvälineiden markkinat -direktiivin vaikutuksia sijoituspalvelun tarjoajan velvollisuuksiin ja sijoittajansuojaan oikeusdogmaattisen metodin avulla. Tutkielmassa pyritään vastaamaan seuraaviin kysymyksiin: 1) Millainen merkitys MIFID-direktiivillä on Euroopan unionin rahoitusmarkkinoiden integraatiolle? 2) Mitä velvollisuuksia sijoituspalvelun tarjoajalla on MiFID-direktiivin implementoinnin jälkeen? 3) Millainen sijoittajansuoja on MiFID-direktiivin seurauksena? 4) Mitä mahdollisia puutteita sijoittajansuojassa on, ja miten säädäntöä tulisi kehittää? MiFID-direktiivi edistää merkittävästi EU:n rahoitusmarkkinoiden integrointia. MiFID helpottaa pääomien ja sijoituspalvelujen liikkuvuutta jäsenvaltioiden rajojen yli. Sijoituspalvelun tarjoajan menettelytapavelvollisuudet ovat lisääntyneet, minkä johdosta sijoittajansuoja on parantunut. Etenkin direktiivin selonotto- ja tiedonantovelvollisuus aiheuttavat transaktiokustannuksia, mutta vähentävät toisaalta palvelun tarjoajan ja asiakkaan välistä neoklassista oikeustaloustieteellistä informaation epäsymmetriaa. Selonottovelvollisuuden sääntelyä EU:ssa kehitettäessä tulee kansallisia menettelytapoja yhdenmukaistaa. Kun palvelun tarjoajat täyttävät tiedonantovelvollisuuttaan, ei-ammattimaiset asiakkaat saattavat joutua informaatiotulvaan, josta jotkut eivät kykene erottamaan merkityksellisiä tietoja. Menettelytapojen nykyinen paras toteutus -velvollisuus on tulkinnanvarainen. Sijoitusneuvontaa koskee päämies–agentti-teorian mukainen valvontaongelma, minkä takia palvelun tarjoajan ja sijoittajan intressit tulisi säädännön avulla saada nykyistä yhteneväisemmiksi. MiFIDin säädökset eivät välttämättä johda ei-ammattimaisten asiakkaiden saaman informaation optimaaliseen allokointiin eivätkä informaatiokustannusten tehokkaaseen kohdistumiseen. Monimutkaisten rahoitusinstrumenttien käsitettä tulisi tarkentaa ja kyseisiä tuotteita tarjota ainoastaan ammattimaisille asiakkaille ja hyväksyttäville vastapuolille. Sijoittajansuojaa lisäisi heterogeenisen ei-ammattimaisten asiakkaiden ryhmän jako informaatiotarpeeseen perustuviin alaryhmiin, jotta eri asiakasryhmille voitaisiin tarjota heidän tarvitsemansa palvelu nykyistäkin kohdentuvammin. Tulisi selvittää, pitäisikö varoitus pääoman menettämisestä merkitä niihin sijoitustuotteisiin, joita riski koskee. Yhteinen eurooppalainen valvontaorganisaatio ilmeisesti voimistaisi rahoitusmarkkinoiden transparenssia, toimivuutta ja sijoittajansuojaa.

Testing for Hidden Information and Action in Automobile Insurance Market

I test the presence of hidden information and action in the automobile insurance market using a data set from several Colombian insurers. To identify the presence of hidden information I find a common knowledge variable providing information on policyholder s risk type which is related to both experienced risk and insurance demand and that was excluded from the pricing mechanism. Such unused variable is the record of policyholder s traffic offenses. I find evidence of adverse selection in six of the nine insurance companies for which the test is performed. From the point of view of hidden action I develop a dynamic model of effort in accident prevention given an insurance contract with bonus experience rating scheme and I show that individual accident probability decreases with previous accidents. This result brings a testable implication for the empirical identification of hidden action and based on that result I estimate an econometric model of the time spans between the purchase of the insurance and the first claim, between the first claim and the second one, and so on. I find strong evidence on the existence of unobserved heterogeneity that deceives the testable implication. Once the unobserved heterogeneity is controlled, I find conclusive statistical grounds supporting the presence of moral hazard in the Colombian insurance market.