Diffusing knowledge-based core competencies for leveraging innovation strategies: modelling outsourcing to knowledge process organizations (KPOs) in pharmaceutical networks

As pharmaceutical firms try to market their products and reduce costs, vertically integrated structureshamper innovation processes. Yet, pharmaceutical firms must innovate to compete. Outsourcing knowledgeintensive activities to knowledge process organizations (KPOs) serves to reduce innovation process obstacles.Grounded in diffusion theory and strategic management literature, this conceptual paper explores fourinterrelated strategic concepts: core competencies, economies of scale and scope, knowledge sharing,and learning. This paper claims that (a) accumulated core competencies of multinational pharmaceuticalcompanies (MPCs) erode over time and these companies become dependent on KPOs (b) MPCs mustunderstand how KPOs manage core competencies (c) economies of scope benefit KPOs enabling them tosustain competitive advantages for their MPC partners, meanwhile the benefits from economies of both scaleand scope shift from MPCs to KPOs (d) KPOs need to monitor their rate of learning to remain competitive.The paper identifies implications for industrial managers and directions for future research.

The power of Australian small accounting firms’ unethical exposure

Purpose– The purpose of this paper is to investigate small business owner/manager’s exposure to unethical behavior, and to examine the influence of unethical exposure on organizational intention to implement ethical policies and practices.

Design/methodology/approach– Using a sample of 209 Australian small accounting firms with a path analysis, this paper adopts a modified ethical decision-making model to test the relationship between exposure and personal attitudes toward unethical behavior, and the relationship between exposure and intentions to implement ethical policies and practices at firm level.

Findings– The results show that increased exposure to unethical behavior triggered stronger personal attitudes with small accounting firm owners/managers tending toward accepting unethical behavior. In contrast, at the firm level, more exposure to unethical behavior creates cautious overtones and motivates owners/managers to take action and implement more ethical policies, with the underlying aim of addressing serious ethical issues.

Research limitations/implications– The study tests the ethical decision-making model but focuses only on three constructs (i.e. exposure, attitude and response). The aim is to examine whether extensive exposure to unethical behavior would change personal attitudes toward accepting such behavior, and whether unethical exposure would trigger firm owner/managers to take action and address the ethical dilemma by establishing some ethical guidelines. Other important variables (such as subjective norm, personal locus of control) embedded in the ethical decision-making model should be included in future research.

Practical implications– The study draws attention to ethical dilemmas encountered by many small accounting professionals and their organizations. It addresses the importance of upholding the ethical standard and avoiding the extensive exposure to unethical behavior. It also emphasizes the needs for small businesses to establish some ethical policies and practices.

Originality/value– The paper is purposely set out to reduce the gap in studying how small accounting firms make decisions in implementing their ethical policies and practices to address the rampant ethical dilemma faced by their employees as a result of many corporate scandals and financial crises of the past decade. The results are particularly valuable for small accounting firm owners/managers. The findings also have educational and policy implications.

The comparative efficiency and productivity of labor-managed and capital-managed firms

The available empirical literature comparing the efficiency and productivity of labor-managed and capital-managed firms is reviewed and meta-analysed. The results suggest that labor-managed firms are not less efficient or less productive than capital-managed firms. Labor-managed firms have lower output-to-labor ratios and even lower capital-to-labor ratios. However, the differences in these ratios are not statistically significant. The labor-managed firm's democratic governance, industrial relations climate, and organisational setting do not appear to adversely affect productivity and efficiency. © 1997 by URPE All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.

Does banks’ dual holding affect bank lending and firms’ investment decisions? Evidence from China

This study investigates the effect of banks’ dual holding on bank lending and firms’ investment decisions using a sample of listed firms in China. We find that dual holding leads to easier access to bank loans, a result that is more pronounced for non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs) than SOEs. We also find that dual holding distorts banks’ lending decisions and harms the investment efficiency for SOEs, while resulting in optimal lending decisions and enhanced investment efficiency for non-SOEs. For non-SOEs, further analysis suggests that optimal lending decisions and efficient investment can be achieved for firms with higher ownership concentration, and firms in which the family and foreign investors are the controlling shareholders. We argue that, in emerging markets, whether a bank plays a monitoring role by directly holding the debt and equity claims of companies relies heavily on whether the potential collusion between firm executives and bank managers can be averted, which in turn is determined by the firms’ governance framework and ownership structure.

Do venture capitalists play a monitoring role in an emerging market? Evidence from the pay–performance relationship of Chinese entrepreneurial firms

This paper investigates venture capitalists' monitoring of managerial behavior by examining their impact on CEO pay–performance sensitivity across various controlling structures in Chinese firms. We find that the effectiveness of venture capitalists' monitoring depends on different types of agency conflict. In particular, we find that venture capital (VC) monitoring is hampered in firms that experience severe controlling-minority agency problems caused by disproportionate ownership structures. We provide further evidence that VC is more likely to exert close monitoring in firms that have greater managerial agency conflict, and thus require more direct monitoring. However, controlling-minority agency problems have a greater impact on VC monitoring than managerial agency problems. Overall, our study suggests that venture capitalists' monitoring role is hampered in an emerging market where firms have complex ownership structures that contribute to severe agency conflict between controlling and minority shareholders.

Does CEO pay dispersion matter in an emerging market? Evidence from China’s listed firms

This paper examines how the institutional features of emerging economies (i.e., government ownership, political connections, and market reform) influence CEO pay-dispersion incentives. Consistent with our expectation, we find that CEO pay dispersion generally provides a tournament incentive in China's emerging market, as it is positively associated with firm performance. In addition, tournament incentives are weaker where firms are controlled by the government and where the CEO is politically connected, but it became stronger after the China's split-share structure reforms. Further, we find that in state controlled firms the satisfaction gained by meeting multiple economic and social goals largely reduces the effectiveness of tournament incentives, while the managerial agency problems inherent in private firms might mitigate them.

Ownership structure and collateral requirements: Evidence from China’s listed firms

This paper examines the effect of ownership structure on collateral requirements using a sample of China's listed firms from 2007 to 2009. We find that compared to privately controlled companies, state-controlled companies are less likely to be required to pledge collateral, and such a difference is more pronounced for firms in troubled industries. The empirical results also show that the effect of state control on collateral requirements is weaker in companies with more foreign ownership. Moreover, the effect of state control on collateral requirements is weaker in companies with more third party guarantees. Finally, we find that the effect of state control on collateral requirements is more pronounced for firms operating in regions with more government intervention.

Political connections, founder-managers, and their impact on tunneling in China’s listed firms

We investigate the impact of manager political connection and founder status on tunneling in China's listed firms from 2004 to 2010. By classifying the political connections into three dimensions with two categories of controlling ownerships, we find that overall manager political connection is negatively related to tunneling in private firms but positively related to tunneling in SOEs. The CPC/CPPCC-type connection is likely to protect firms from tunneling, while the official-type connection facilitates tunneling from firms. The impact of these two types of political connection on tunneling is stronger at the central level than the local level. A chairman's political connection has significantly greater influence on tunneling than a CEO's connection. We also find that firms with founder-managers have a stronger resistance to tunneling than those with non-founder-managers, which is still observed in firms with politically connected founder-managers. Our results show that the incentives of various managers towards tunneling depend on their motivation for establishing relevant political connections.

Board structure and survival of new economy IPO firms

Research Question/Issue: This study examines the relevance of currently accepted best practice recommendations regarding board structure on the survival likelihood of new economy initial public offering companies. We argue that industry context determines governance outcomes. Research Findings/Insights: We study 125 Australian new economy firms listed between 1994 and 2002. Each firm is tracked until the end of 2007 for monitoring their survival. We find that board independence is associated with an increase in the likelihood of corporate survival. We also find that the benefits of board independence increase at a decreasing rate. Theoretical/Academic Implications: The standard best practice recommendation of board independence stems from the monitoring role of directors and is based on agency theory. The results from our study suggest that the recommendation regarding board independence does not work well for new economy firms. While the agency theory based model implies a monotonic relation between board independence and performance, our research suggests that the relationship is nonlinear. This variation occurs because of increased monitoring costs faced by outsiders due to higher information asymmetry and complexity of new economy firms. Our empirical results suggest that inside directors play a complementary role to outsiders in mitigating firm failure. Practitioner/Policy Implications: Our research offers insights to policy makers who are interested in setting best practice standards regarding board structure. Our research suggests that firm/industry characteristics play a crucial role in determining the optimal board structure. In firms/industries where outsiders face significantly higher information processing costs, insiders can play a valuable complementary role to outsiders in enhancing the effectiveness of the board. Thus future hard or soft regulations related to board structure should consider industry context.

Controlling shareholder, expropriations and firm’s leverage decision: Evidence from Chinese Non-tradable share reform

This paper examines the effect of excess control rights on the leverage decisions made by Chinese non-SOEs before and after the Non-tradable share reform (NTS reform). We find that firms with excess control rights have more excess leverage and their controlling shareholders use the resources for tunneling rather than investing in positive NPV projects. We also find that excess leverage in firms with excess control rights decreases and the market reaction to announcements of related party transactions are more positive after NTS reform. This confirms that tunneling by the controlling shareholders actually reduced. We argue that in emerging markets where legal protection for creditors and shareholders is weak, controlling shareholders borrow excess debt to tunnel through inter-corporate loans and related party transactions. Furthermore the privatization of these economies can reduce the controlling shareholders' tunneling activities and associated excess leverage which destroys firm value.

Disproportional ownership structure and pay–performance relationship: evidence from China’s listed firms

This paper examines the impact of ownership structure on executive compensation in China's listed firms. We find that the cash flow rights of ultimate controlling shareholders have a positive effect on the pay–performance relationship, while a divergence between control rights and cash flow rights has a significantly negative effect on the pay–performance relationship. We divide our sample based on ultimate controlling shareholders' type into state owned enterprises (SOE), state assets management bureaus (SAMB), and privately controlled firms. We find that in SOE controlled firms cash flow rights have a significant impact on accounting based pay–performance relationship. In privately controlled firms, cash flow rights affect the market based pay–performance relationship. In SAMB controlled firms, CEO pay bears no relationship with either accounting or market based performance. The evidence suggests that CEO pay is inefficient in firms where the state is the controlling shareholder because it is insensitive to market based performance but consistent with the efforts of controlling shareholders to maximize their private benefit.

Managerial ownership, capital structure and firm value: Evidence from China’s civilian-run firms

This paper examines the influence of managerial ownership on firm performance through capital-structure choices, using a sample of China’s civilian-run firms listed on the Chinese stock market between 2002 and 2007. The empirical results demonstrate a nonlinear relationship between managerial ownership and firm value. Managerial ownership drives the capital structure into a nonlinear shape, but in an opposite direction to the effect of managerial ownership on firm value. The results of simultaneous regressions suggest that managerial ownership affects capital structure, which in turn affects firm value. Our findings imply that the “interest convergence” and “entrenchment” effects of managers’ behaviour in terms of managerial ownership can also explain the agency-relevant situation of China’s civilian-run firms.

The effect of ownership structure on leverage decision: new evidence from Chinese listed firms

This paper examines the effect of state control and ownership structure on the leverage decision of firms listed in the Chinese stock market. Our results show that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have higher leverage ratios than non-SOEs, and SOEs in regions with a poorer institutional environment have higher leverage ratios than SOEs in better regions. We also show that the largest shareholding (the percentage of shares held by the largest shareholder) in the SOEs has a negative relationship with the leverage ratio, while the largest shareholding in non-SOEs has a non-linear relationship with the short-term and long-term debt ratios. Finally, this study also shows that the share split reform and the improvement of institutional environment both weaken the negative relationship and strengthen the positive relationship between largest shareholding and leverage of SOEs and non-SOEs to some extent. This paper documents how the financing behaviour of SOEs is more influenced by government intervention, while the financing behaviour of non-SOEs is more market oriented.