Ownership structure and collateral requirements: Evidence from China’s listed firms
Data(s) |
01/12/2014
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Resumo |
This paper examines the effect of ownership structure on collateral requirements using a sample of China's listed firms from 2007 to 2009. We find that compared to privately controlled companies, state-controlled companies are less likely to be required to pledge collateral, and such a difference is more pronounced for firms in troubled industries. The empirical results also show that the effect of state control on collateral requirements is weaker in companies with more foreign ownership. Moreover, the effect of state control on collateral requirements is weaker in companies with more third party guarantees. Finally, we find that the effect of state control on collateral requirements is more pronounced for firms operating in regions with more government intervention. |
Identificador | |
Idioma(s) |
eng |
Publicador |
Elsevier |
Relação |
http://dro.deakin.edu.au/eserv/DU:30078272/tian-ownershipstructure-2014.pdf http://www.dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.irfa.2014.10.009 http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1057521914001392 |
Direitos |
2014, Elsevier |
Palavras-Chave | #Ownership #Collateral requirements #Marketization |
Tipo |
Journal Article |