2003-2004 Annual Report, May 2004

Annual report of the Department of Corrections, Iowa Prison Industries.

Celebrating Our Past...Embracing Our Future, Iowa Lottery Authority Annual Report, Fiscal Year 2005

Iowa Lottery Authority Annual Report, Fiscal Year 2005

DHS Targeted Case Management 2004 Annual Report, 2005

Annual report on the activities of the Department of Human Services Case Management Unit. The Iowa Department of Human Services Targeted Case Management Unit helps consumers with mental retardation, chronic mental illness, developmental disabilities and brain injury gain access to appropriate living environments, needed medical services, and interrelated social, vocational and educational service.

DHS Targeted Case Management 2005 Annual Report, 2006

Annual report on the activities of the Department of Human Services Case Management Unit. The Iowa Department of Human Services Targeted Case Management Unit helps consumers with mental retardation, chronic mental illness, developmental disabilities and brain injury gain access to appropriate living environments, needed medical services, and interrelated social, vocational and educational service. In 2005 the DHS Case Mangement Unit also begain serving children with a diagnosis of Serious Emotional Disturbance (SED).

2001 Annual Report of the Iowa Railway Finance Authority

Railway finance report for the Iowa Department of Transportation.

2005 Annual Report of the Iowa Railway Finance Authority

Annual report for Iowa Railway Finance Authority. Annual Report produced by Iowa Department of Transportation.

Watershed Improvement Review Board Annual Report, 2005

The Iowa Watershed Improvement Review Board was created by the Iowa Legislature and signed into law by the Governor in 2005 as Senate File 200. This statute is now codified in Iowa Code Chapter 466A. The fifteen-member board was appointed with the initial meeting being held August 22, 2005. Subsequent Board meetings were held October 10, December 2, and December 19. Attachment 1 lists the board members and their organization affiliation. The Board created a five-member subcommittee to develop and submit to the Board the Request for Applications (RFA) documents and procedural guidelines. These RFA documents were approved as modified on October 10, 2005.

Social Security in Theory and Practice (II): Efficiency Theories, Narrative Theories, and Implications for Reform

166 countries have some kind of public old age pension. What economic forces create and sustain old age Social Security as a public program? Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999b) document several of the internationally and historically common features of social security programs, and explore "political" theories of Social Security. This paper discusses the "efficiency theories", which view creation of the SS program as a full of partial solution to some market failure. Efficiency explanations of social security include the "SS as welfare for the elderly" the "retirement increases productivity to optimally manage human capital externalities", "optimal retirement insurance", the "prodigal father problem", the "misguided Keynesian", the "optimal longevity insurance", the "government economizing transaction costs", and the "return on human capital investment". We also analyze four "narrative" theories of social security: the "chain letter theory", the "lump of labor theory", the "monopoly capitalism theory", and the "Sub-but-Nearly-Optimal policy response to private pensions theory". The political and efficiency explanations are compared with the international and historical facts and used to derive implications for replacing the typical pay-as-you-go system with a forced savings plan. Most of the explanations suggest that forced savings does not increase welfare, and may decrease it.

Adverse Selection, Credit, and Efficiency: the Case of the Missing Market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our envi- ronment, entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects need to borrow from banks. As is generally the case in economies with adverse selection, the competitive equilibrium of our economy is shown to be ine¢ cient. Under adverse selection, the choices made by one type of agents limit what can be o¤ered to other types in an incentive-compatible manner. This gives rise to an externality, which cannot be internalized in a competitive equilibrium. We show that, in this type of environment, the ine¢ ciency associated to adverse selection is the consequence of one implicit assumption: entrepreneurs can only borrow from banks. If an additional market is added (say, a .security market.), in which entrepreneurs can obtain funds beyond those o¤ered by banks, we show that the e¢ cient allocation is an equilibrium of the economy. In such an equilibrium, all entrepreneurs borrow at a pooling rate in the security market. When they apply to bank loans, though, only entrepreneurs with good projects pledge these additional funds as collateral. This equilibrium thus simultaneously entails cross- subsidization and separation between di¤erent types of entrepreneurs.

Adverse selection, credit, and efficiency: the case of the missing market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our environment, entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects need to borrow in order to invest. Conventional wisdom says that, in this class of economies, the competitive equilibrium is typically inefficient. We show that this conventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption: entrepreneurs can only access monitored lending. If a new set of markets is added to provide entrepreneurs with additional funds, efficiency can be attained in equilibrium. An important characteristic of these additional markets is that lending in them must be unmonitored, in the sense that it does not condition total borrowing or investment by entrepreneurs. This makes it possible to attain efficiency by pooling all entrepreneurs in the new markets while separating them in the markets for monitored loans.

Communication, Coordination, and Efficiency in Evolutionary One-population Models

We analyze the role of commitment in pre-play communication for ensuring efficient evolutionarily stable outcomes in coordination games. All players are a priori identical as they are drawn from the same population. In games where efficient outcomes can be reached by players coordinating on the same action we find commitment to be necessary to enforce efficiency. In games where efficienct outcomes only result from play of different actions, communication without commitment is most effective although efficiency can no longer be guaranteed. Only when there are many messages then inefficient outcomes are negligible as their basins of attraction become very small.

Iowa Alcoholic Beverages Division, 71st Annual Report, July 2004 - June 2005

Iowa Alcoholic Beverages Division, 71st Annual Report, July 2004 - June 2005

2006 Annual Report of the Superintendent of Banking

Annual report of the Iowa Division of Banking