Gobernanza Democrática Territorial - Una aproximación analítica y cuantitativa

La Gobernanza Democrática Territorial (GDT) constituye un enfoque conceptual en torno a las formas de “organización” de los agentes locales y regionales, que se expresa en un modelo o modo de gobierno. Este enfoque emerge desde la década de los años noventa como una opción ó una alternativa frente a otros modelos de gobierno (el modelo burocrático y el modelo gerencial). La diferencia entre este concepto y otros afines – como la gobernabilidad, la gobernabilidad democrática y el buen gobierno – no es de grado sino de naturaleza. Así se deriva del análisis comparado entre estos conceptos.

Efectividad en redes Inter-Organizacionales : una aproximación al concepto y su medición

El concepto de efectividad en Redes Inter-organizacionales se ha investigado poco a pesar de la gran importancia en el desarrollo y sostenibilidad de la red. Es muy importante entender este concepto ya que cuando hablamos de Red, nos referimos a un grupo de más de tres organizaciones que trabajan juntas para alcanzar un objetivo colectivo que beneficia a cada miembro de la red. Esto nos demuestra la importancia de evaluar y analizar este fenómeno “Red Inter-organizacional” de forma más detallada para poder analizar que estructura, formas de gobierno, relaciones entre los miembros y entre otros factores, influyen en la efectividad y perdurabilidad de la Red Inter-organizacional. Esta investigación se desarrolla con el fin de plantear una aproximación al concepto de medición de la efectividad en Redes Inter-organizacionales. El trabajo se centrara en la recopilación de información y en la investigación documental, la cual se realizará por fases para brindarle al lector una mayor claridad y entendimiento sobre qué es Red, Red Inter-Organizacional, Efectividad. Y para finalizar se estudiara Efectividad en una Red Inter-organizacional.

Natural disasters and clientelism: the case of floods and landslides in Colombia

What are the effects of natural disasters on electoral results? Some authors claim that catastrophes have a negative effect on the survival of leaders in a democracy because voters have a propensity to punish politicians for not preventing or poorly handling a crisis. In contrast, this paper finds that these events might be beneficial for leaders. Disasters are linked to leader survival through clientelism: they generate an in-flow of resources in the form of aid, which increase money for buying votes. Analyzing the rainy season of 2010-2011 in Colombia, considered its worst disaster in history, I use a difference-in-differences strategy to show that in the local election incumbent parties benefited from the disaster. The result is robust to different specifications and alternative explanations. Moreover, places receiving more aid and those with judicial evidence of vote-buying irregularities, are more likely to reelect the incumbent, supporting the mechanism proposed by this paper.

Asymmetrically fair rules for an indivisible good problem with a budget constraint

We study a particular restitution problem where there is an indivisible good (land or property) over which two agents have rights: the dispossessed agent and the owner. A third party, possibly the government, seeks to resolve the situation by assigning rights to one and compensate the other. There is also a maximum amount of money available for the compensation. We characterize a family of asymmetrically fair rules that are immune to strategic behavior, guarantee minimal welfare levels for the agents, and satisfy the budget constraint.

Intention-based economic theories of reciprocity

In recent years, several experiments have shown individuals exhibit authentic reciprocal behaviour in anonymous one-shot interactions. As reciprocity has been shown to be relevant in several economic fields, there have also been several attempts to model reciprocal bahaviour. I review the intention-based models of reciprocity and present an example of teacher management in the public sector in which the government offers an incentive scheme to implement a program. The incentive scheme has a prisoner´s dilemma structure. In both simultaneous and sequential games, equilibrium results may differ from those predicted by standard theory.

Natural resource windfalls and efficiency of local government expenditures: evidence from Peru

We study the role of natural resource windfalls in explaining the efficiency of public expenditures. Using a rich dataset of expenditures and public good provision for 1,836 municipalities in Peru for period 2001-2010, we estimate a non-monotonic relationship between the efficiency of public good provision and the level of natural resource transfers. Local governments that were extremely favored by the boom of mineral prices were more efficient in using fiscal windfalls whereas those benefited with modest transfers were more inefficient. These results can be explained by the increase in political competition associated with the boom. However, the fact that increases in efficiency were related to reductions in public good provision casts doubts about the beneficial effects of political competition in promoting efficiency.