Disclosure in insurance law : contemporary and historical economic considerations

This article examines the importance of accurate classification and identification of risk with particular reference to the problem of adverse selection. It is argued that, historically, this concern was the paramount consideration influencing standard form contract formation and disclosure laws. The scope of its relevance today however is less apparent in that contemporary insurance contracting is conducted in a vastly different environment from that which prevailed at the time Lloyd's was better known as a coffee house. Accordingly, the second part of this article looks at the contemporary framework of information disclosure and those dynamics within it designed to elicit information weighing on risk forecasting : specifically, (a) direct inquiry and testing requirements; (b) signaling - or incentive based structuring of insurance contractual and (c) bargaining in the shadow of the utmost good faith doctrine. Finally, certain conclusions arising out of contemporary and historical economic considerations underpinning disclosure in insurance law are outlined.

Utmost good faith in insurance : reform overdue?

Considerable attention has been devoted to the duty or doctrine of utmost good faith in the academic literature and in the courts. This attention ranges from an analysis of the precise legal basis for the duty through a consideration of the continuing nature of that duty in the post-contract environment.It is quite clear that all contracts of insurance are subject to this duty of utmost good faith. What is less clear and certain are the incidents attendant upon such a duty and the scope of the obligations that such a duty imposes. This article examines the relative positions that have been reached in England and Australia and concludes with some recommendations for legislative reform to this area of the law.

Prosecution history estoppel in the UK?

The doctrine of 'prosecution history estoppel' (PH estoppel) as developed in the United States has strong intuitive appeal, especially when applied to counterbalance a related patent law principle, the doctrine of equivalents. The doctrines are receiving increasing attention in US patent decisions, to the point where one patent litigator recently compared them to "two cars that keep bumping fenders. They are frequently returned to the shop for repairs". Could PH estoppel find its way into UK patent law? This article briefly examines the doctrine, its evolution in the US and the problems associated with importing the doctrine into the UK. As the EU legislation stands, Article 69 and the Protocol to the European Patent Convention (EPC) pose serious obstacles to using the doctrine directly in claim construction. However there appears to be some scope to apply the doctrine as a limited form of defence in infringement actions.

The problem child in Australian patent law : "fair" basing

The concept of "fair basing" is widely acknowledged as a difficult area of patent law. This article maps the development of fair basing law to demonstrate how some of the difficulties have arisen. Part I of the article traces the development of the branches of patent law that were swept under the nomenclature of "fair basing" by British legislation in 1949. It looks at the early courts' approach to patent construction, examines the early origin of fair basing and what it was intended to achiever. Part II of the article considers the modern interpretation of fair basing, which provides a striking contrast to its historical context. Without any consistent judicial approach to construction the doctrine has developed inappropriately, giving rise to both over-strict and over-generous approaches.

Digital constitutionalism and the role of the rule of law in the governance of virtual communities

This project proposes a new conceptual framework for the regulation of social networks and virtual communities. By applying a model based upon the rule of law, this thesis addresses the growing tensions that revolve around the public use of private networks. This research examines the shortcomings of traditional contractual governance models and cyberlaw theory and provides a reconstituted approach that will allow public constitutional-type interests to be recognised in the interpretation and enforcement of contractual doctrine.

Introduction

The 1990s saw the United Nations, the militaries of key member states, and NGOs increasingly entangled in the complex affairs of disrupted states. Whether as deliverers of humanitarian assistance or as agents of political, social, and civic reconstruction, whether in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, or East Timor, these actors have had to learn ways of interacting with each other in order to optimize the benefits for the populations they seek to assist. Yet the challenges have proved daunting. Civil and military actors have different organizational cultures and standard operating procedures and are confronted with the need to work together to perform tasks to which different actors may attach quite different priorities. From Civil Strife to Civil Society explores the nature of these challenges, blending the experience of scholars and practitioners. It is underpinned by an understanding that recovery from disruption is a laborious process that can easily be de-railed. The first part of the book offers a rigorous examination of the dimensions of state disruption and the roles of the international community in responding to it; the second part looks at military doctrine for dealing with disorder and humanitarian emergencies; the third part examines mechanisms for ending violence and delivering justice in post-conflict times; the fourth part investigates the problems of rebuilding trust and promoting democracy; the fifth part deals with the reconstitution of the rule of law; while the sixth and seventh parts address the reestablishment of social and civil order.

Identity fraud and torrens - minimising the risks and allocating the loss to achieve a sustainable system

Immediate indefeasibility is the cornerstone of the Torrens system of land registration. However, when combined with the apparent ease in which forged mortgages become registered, the operation of this doctrine can come into question. This article seeks to argue that, rather than question indefeasibility, the focus should be on the verification of identity of parties to land transactions. Whilst no system can ever be infallible, it is suggested that by correctly imposing the responsibility for identity verification on the appropriate individual, the Torrens system can retain immediate indefeasibility as its paramount principle, yet achieve the optimum level of fairness in terms of allocation of responsibility and loss. With the dawn of a new era of electronic conveyancing about to begin, the framework suggested here provides a model for minimising the risks of forged mortgages and appropriately allocating the loss.

Immediate indefeasibility : is it under threat?

Immediate indefeasibility has been adopted in Australia for close to 40 years. Recently however, and against the backdrop of economic fragility and global deregulation, there has been a polite questioning of its place. In Australia, some may argue that case law developments and legislative reform have placed indefeasibility under the microscope — in New Zealand, a similar telescoping by the respected views of their Law Commission. This note examines these reforms. It concludes that these reforms do not place immediate indefeasibility under threat. Rather, they modify and adapt the doctrine to fit within the context of contemporary financial instruments. Nevertheless, changes have so far been piecemeal, and its time for a consistent and logical examination of this issue to occur on the national, rather than the stage of each state.

Order supported by law : the enforcement of norms in virtual communities

As online social spaces continue to grow in importance, the complex relationship between users and the private providers of the platforms continues to raise increasingly difficult questions about legitimacy in online governance. This article examines two issues that go to the core of egitimate governance in online communities: how are rules enforced and punishments imposed, and how should the law support legitimate governance and protect participants from the illegitimate exercise of power? Because the rules of online communities are generally ultimately backed by contractual terms of service, the imposition of punishment for the breach of internal rules exists in a difficult conceptual gap between criminal law and the predominantly compensatory remedies of contractual doctrine. When theorists have addressed the need for the rules of virtual communities to be enforced, a dichotomy has generally emerged between the appropriate role of criminal law for 'real' crimes, and the private, internal resolution of 'virtual' or 'fantasy' crimes. In this structure, the punitive effect of internal measures is downplayed and the harm that can be caused to participants by internal sanctions is systemically undervalued.

Joinder to a later unsigned document?

It is well known that a statutory requirement of formality is associated with contracts concerning land. In this regard, s 59 of the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) provides: No action may be brought upon any contract for the sale or other disposition of land or any interest in land unless the contract upon which such action is brought, or some memorandum or note of the contract, is in writing, and signed by the party to be charged, or by some person by the party lawfully authorised. In addition to the possibility of a formal contract, the statutory wording clearly contemplates reliance on an informal note or memorandum. To constitute a sufficient note or memorandum for the purposes of the statute, the signed note or memorandum must contain details of the parties to the contract, an adequate description of the property, the price and any other essential terms. It is also accepted that the doctrine of joinder may be invoked in circumstances where the document signed by the party to be charged contains an express or implied reference to any other document. In this way, a sufficient note or memorandum may be constituted by the joinder of a number of documents.

Responsibility to Protect and Sovereignty

The responsibility to protect ('R2P') principle articulates the obligations of the international community to prevent conflict occurring, to intervene in conflicts, and to assist in rebuilding after conflicts. The doctrine is about protecting civilians in armed conflicts from four mass atrocity crimes: genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. This book examines interventions in East Timor, Sri Lanka, Sudan and Kosovo. The chapters explore and question UN debates with respect to the doctrine both before and after its adoption in 2005; contrasting state attitudes to international military intervention; and what takes place after intervention. It also discusses the ability of the Security Council to access reliable information and credible and transparent processes to enable it to make a determination on the occurrence of atrocities in a Member State. Questioning whether there is a need to find a closer operational link between the responsibilities to prevent and react and a normative link between R2P and principles of international law, the contributions examine the effectiveness of the framework of R2P for international decision-making in response to mass atrocity crimes and ask how an international system to deal with threats and mass atrocities can be developed in the absence of a central authority. This book will be valuable to those interested in international law, human rights, and security, peace and conflict studies

Intention, foresight and ending life : a response to "The Double Effect effect" by Charles Foster, Jonathan Herring, Karen Melham and Tony Hope, (CQ 20(1))

In this paper I examine the recent arguments by Charles Foster, Jonathan Herring, Karen Melham and Tony Hope against the utility of the doctrine of double effect. One basis on which they reject the utility of the doctrine is their claim that it is notoriously difficult to apply what they identify as its 'core' component, namely, the distinction between intention and foresight. It is this contention that is the primarily focus of my article. I argue against this claim that the intention/foresight distinction remains a fundamental part of the law in those jurisdictions where intention remains an element of the offence of murder and that, accordingly, it is essential ro resolve the putative difficulties of applying the intention/foresight distinction so as to ensure the integrity of the law of murder. I argue that the main reasons advanced for the claim that the intention/foresight distinction is difficult to apply are ultimately unsustainable, and that the distinction is not as difficult to apply as the authors suggest.

Palliative care, double effect and the law in Australia

Care and decision-making at the end of life that promotes comfort and dignity is widely endorsed by public policy and the law. In ethical analysis of palliative care interventions that are argued potentially to hasten death, these may be deemed to be ethically permissible by the application of the doctrine of double effect, if the doctor’s intention is to relieve pain and not cause death. In part because of the significance of ethics in the development of law in the medical sphere, this doctrine is also likely to be recognized as part of Australia’s common law, although hitherto there have been no cases concerning palliative care brought before a court in Australia to test this. Three Australian States have, nonetheless, created legislative defences that are different from the common law with the intent of clarifying the law, promoting palliative care, and distinguishing it from euthanasia. However, these defences have the potential to provide less protection for doctors administering palliative care. In addition to requiring a doctor to have an appropriate intent, the defences insist on adherence to particular medical practice standards and perhaps require patient consent. Doctors providing end-of-life care in these States need to be aware of these legislative changes. Acting in accordance with the common law doctrine of double effect may not provide legal protection. Similar changes are likely to occur in other States and Territories as there is a trend towards enacting legislative defences that deal with the provision of palliative care.

Advance directives, autonomy and the refusal of life-sustaining medical treatment

As Australian society 1s agemg, individuals are increasingly concerned about managing their future, including making decisions about the medical treatment they may wish to receive or refuse if they lose decision-making capacity. To date, there has been relatively little research into the extent to which legal regulation allows competent adults to make advance refusals of life-sustaining medical treatment that will bind health professionals and others when a decision needs to be made at a future time. This thesis aims to fill this gap in the research by presenting the results of research into the legal regulation of advance directives that refuse life-sustaining medical treatment. In the five papers that comprise this thesis, the law that governs this area is examined, and the ethical principle of autonomy is used to critically evaluate that law. The principal finding of this research is that the current scheme of regulation is ineffective to adequately promote the right of a competent adult to make binding advance directives about refusal of medical treatment. The research concludes that legislation should be enacted to enable individuals to complete an advance directive, only imposing restrictions to the extent that this is necessary to promote individual autonomy. The thesis first examines the principle of autonomy upon which the common law (and some statutory law) is expressed to be based, to determine whether that principle is an appropriate one to underpin regulation. 1 The finding of the research is that autonomy can be justified as an organising principle on a number of grounds: it is consistent with the values of a liberal democracy; over recent decades, it is a principle that has been even more prominent within the discipline of medical ethics; and it is the principle which underpins the legal regulation of a related topic, namely the contemporaneous refusal of medical treatment. Next, the thesis reviews the common law to determine whether it effectively achieves the goal of promoting autonomy by allowing a competent adult to make an advance directive refusing treatment that will operate if he or she later loses decision-making capacity. 2 This research finds that conunon law doctrine, as espoused by the judiciary, prioritises individual choice by recognising valid advance directives that refuse treatment as binding. However, the research also concludes that the common law, as applied by the judiciary in some cases, may not be effective to promote individual autonomy, as there have been a number of circumstances where advance directives that refuse treatment have not been followed. The thesis then examines the statutory regimes in Australia that regulate advance directives, with a focus on the regulation of advance refusals of life-sustaining medical treatment.3 This review commences with an examination ofparliamentary debates to establish why legislation was thought to be necessary. It then provides a detailed review of all of the statutory regimes, the extent to which the legislation regulates the form of advance directives, and the circumstances in which they can be completed, will operate and can be ignored by medical professionals. The research finds that legislation was enacted mainly to clarify the common law and bring a level of certainty to the field. Legislative regimes were thought to provide medical professionals with the assurance that compliance with an advance directive that refuses life-sustaining medical treatment will not expose them to legal sanction. However, the research also finds that the legislation places so many restrictions on when an advance directive refusing treatment can be made, or will operate, that they have not been successful in promoting individual autonomy.

China and the "Responsibility to Protect" (R2P) : the implications of the Libyan intervention

The emerging principle of a “responsibility to protect” (R2P) presents a direct challenge to China's traditional emphasis on the twin principles of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other states and non-use of military force. This paper considers the evolution of China‟s relationship with R2P over the past ten years. In particular, it examines how China engaged with R2P during the recent Libyan crisis, and considers what impact this conflict may have first, on Chinese attitudes to R2P, and second, on the future development and implementation of the doctrine itself. This paper argues that China‟s decision to allow the passage of Security Council resolution 1973, authorising force in Libya, was shaped by an unusual set of pragmatic considerations, and should not be viewed as evidence of a dramatic shift in Chinese attitudes towards R2P. More broadly, controversy over the scope of NATO's military action in Libya has raised questions about R2P‟s legitimacy, which has contributed to a lack of timely international action in Syria and Yemen. In the short term at least, this post-Libya backlash against R2P is likely to constrain the Security Council‟s ability to respond decisively to other civilian protection situations.